This article explains the true structural causes behind the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi disaster, based on Masayuki Takayama’s investigative column in Shukan Shincho.
It reveals how the United States, despite implementing robust post-9/11 nuclear-terror countermeasures, failed to pass crucial information to Japan.
GE’s failure to warn Japanese operators about total power-loss scenarios meant the Fukushima accident was, in essence, a man-made disaster triggered by foreign negligence.
The article further exposes how the Kan administration’s newly created Nuclear Regulation Authority, staffed with individuals lacking expertise in nuclear engineering or counter-terrorism, issued unrealistic and exorbitantly costly demands.
These included building pointless “Great Walls,” assuming attacks by 200-ton aircraft, constructing underground control centers and 50,000-ton reservoirs, and forcing power companies to implement defense measures that should have fallen under national security and the Self-Defense Forces.
As a result, nuclear power—once Japan’s most stable and cheapest energy source—was driven into collapse.
The article argues that Japan must integrate nuclear plants with national defense operations to restore safe, affordable energy.

Misfortune struck TEPCO’s Fukushima repeatedly.
Naoto Kan created a Japanese version of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, but appointed amateurs who knew nothing about nuclear power or terrorism as its members.
This article explains what Masayuki Takayama revealed in Shukan Shincho: the true cause of the Fukushima nuclear accident, and the massive waste and confusion produced by Japan’s newly created nuclear regulatory system.

Bin Laden ordered the terrorists to hijack four civilian airliners.
Two of them crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, and the third slammed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.
The fourth, United Airlines Flight 93, was hijacked and turned around, but crashed en route.
Where was this aircraft aiming?

There was a theory that, judging from its heading toward Washington, D.C., its target was the White House.
If so, that target is a three-story building only 21 meters tall.
The hijackers had only small-aircraft flight experience, and such a small structure was too tiny for guiding a 115-ton airliner into it.

They would want something large and easy to hit.
Something that would inflict enormous damage on American society.
From this viewpoint, the most plausible target that emerged was the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant on the Hudson River, about 40 km from New York City.

It had three reactors.
What would happen if a 115-ton airliner crashed directly into them?

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) created a full-scale mock-up and actually crashed an F-4 Phantom into it in an experiment.
The reactor building suffered only minor structural damage, and the reactor containment vessel remained intact.
However, the impact and resulting fire damage were enormous.

The shock cracked the bottom of the spent-fuel pool next to the reactor, and all power sources were lost.
Cooling water could not circulate, the reactor began to run out of control, and spent fuel rods in the dried pool ignited at high temperatures.

According to this scenario, 44,000 people in the surrounding area would die in the initial stage, and ultimately 500,000 people within an 80-km radius would perish.
In other words, had Flight 93 struck here, the entire Manhattan area would have become a dead zone.

Based on this, the NRC issued an improvement order in 2005 requiring all nuclear plants to install multiple highly robust backup power systems.
The U.S. government also created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and in cooperation with the FBI and the Department of Defense, implemented full protection measures—from monitoring suspicious foreigners to guarding nuclear facilities.
It was also decided that if a hijacked airliner appeared, it would be shot down without hesitation.

This improvement order was delivered to GE, but GE did not inform TEPCO or other operators that used GE-made light-water reactors.
Had GE passed on that information, the total power loss during the massive tsunami of March 11, six years later, could have been avoided.
That accident was a man-made disaster caused by the irresponsibility of an American corporation.

Misfortune continued for Fukushima.
Naoto Kan created Japan’s version of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, but appointed amateurs who knew nothing about nuclear power or terrorism as its members.
For some reason, the regulator worked closely with earthquake researchers, demanding massive earthquake and tsunami countermeasures.
It ordered the construction of meaningless “Great Walls” around nuclear plants.

For terrorism countermeasures, it assumed an attack even more severe than the U.S. scenario—a 200-ton airliner crashing directly into the facility.
To withstand such an impact and subsequent fires, the regulator demanded reinforced reactor buildings.
If so, both the shock and the fires would be catastrophic.
If the operations building burned, the intake pipes for the cooling water would also be destroyed.

Therefore, the regulator forced power companies to build a 50,000-ton underground reservoir and an underground control room 100 meters below the surface.
Since ground assaults were also possible, they were ordered to prepare for that too.

Recently, the regulator punished TEPCO, saying that the terrorism countermeasures at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa were “inadequate.”
But such measures are inherently the responsibility of the state.

If a terrorist-controlled aircraft appears, the Self-Defense Forces should shoot it down.
If there is a ground attack, the Ground Self-Defense Force should crush it.

Yet the regulator insists that nuclear plants defend themselves entirely at their own expense.
The costs of meaningless Great Walls and terrorism-related precautions reached several hundred billion yen per reactor.

As a result, nuclear power generation costs skyrocketed.
In recent calculations by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, nuclear power has even become more expensive than solar panels.

In the past, the real cost of nuclear power was less than 5 yen per kilowatt.
It could supply Japan’s factories with cheap, stable electricity, and the towns around nuclear plants prospered lavishly.
Every public building around Fukushima Daiichi was built with TEPCO’s money.
Thousands of local millionaires were created from TEPCO contracts.

Even after the accident, TEPCO’s payouts continued, producing new “disaster millionaires.”
Despite this, nuclear power remained capable of providing inexpensive and stable electricity—until the regulator finally destroyed it.

At this point, the government should station Self-Defense Forces equipped with anti-air missiles at each nuclear plant and restore the ability to provide cheap electricity.