Britain’s maritime strategy sought to contain the Russian navy by using the Kuril Islands and the Japanese archipelago. This article examines the geopolitical logic behind the Sakhalin–Kuril exchange, Britain’s advice to Meiji leaders, and why Stalin later regarded the Kurils as indispensable spoils of war.

Containing the Russian navy through the Kuril Islands and the Japanese archipelago was a British national strategy.
2016-11-26.
What follows is a continuation of the previous chapter.
It was Britain that advised the Meiji government.
The Northern Territories, consisting of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands, totaling five thousand square kilometers northeast of Hokkaido, have never once been foreign territory.
Beyond them, the Kuril Islands stretch northward with Shumshu Island at the northern end, reaching all the way to the Kamchatka Peninsula.
They form a geopolitical chokepoint separating the Sea of Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean, yet why did the Meiji government consider exchanging Sakhalin for the Kurils.
Russia designated Sakhalin as a penal colony.
In February 1855, Ansei 2, the Tokugawa shogunate concluded the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Russia.
The border was drawn between Etorofu and Uruppu Islands, and Sakhalin was designated as land of joint residence for Japanese and Russians.
However, in 1869, Meiji 2, Russia unilaterally designated Sakhalin as a penal colony.
Thereafter, Russian migration to Sakhalin surged, violence and theft became frequent, and murders occurred.
To protect Japanese settlements in Sakhalin, establishing a clear border became an urgent task.
The man chosen was Enomoto Takeaki, then serving as head of the Hokkaido Development Commission.
He was well versed in Hokkaido affairs and strong in international law.
Although Enomoto hesitated, Kuroda Kiyotaka forced his return to Tokyo by submitting a personnel proposal to the Dajōkan and had him appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia, with the rank of Vice Admiral, at a cabinet meeting attended by the Emperor.
Enomoto departed Yokohama on March 10, 1874, traveled via the Suez Canal, landed in Italy, and arrived in Saint Petersburg on June 10.
Russia wished to possess all of Sakhalin.
Japan had no objection to abandoning Sakhalin.
Although a point of agreement was visible, negotiations proved difficult.
The Russian side raised minor issues one after another, including the handling of murder cases in Sakhalin, in order to delay matters, and full negotiations did not begin until November 14.
Later, wavering in Japan’s negotiating stance further complicated matters, and criticism of weak diplomacy swirled in both countries.
Britain advised.
From Russia’s perspective, Japan’s desire to abandon vast Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands, aligned like go stones, may have appeared strange.
Certainly, the Meiji government was fragile and lacked the financial and military capacity to govern Sakhalin.
Yet British advice weighed even more heavily.
Japan lacked the national strength to develop Sakhalin.
It could not defend it.
The Kuril Islands, surrounded by sea, were easier to defend.
If Sakhalin were left as it was, Russian southward expansion would reach Hokkaido.
If Russia invaded, the British navy could send reinforcements to the Kurils.
Britain continued to offer such advice to key figures of the Meiji government.
The mastermind was the British minister to Japan, Harry Parkes.
He is believed to have directly approached Ōkubo Toshimichi, one of the three great leaders of the Restoration.
At the time, Britain was the world’s foremost naval power, known as the empire on which the sun never set.
Skilled in maritime strategy, Britain feared future Russian naval expansion into the Pacific and sought to confine Russia to the Sea of Okhotsk by ensuring Japanese possession of the Kuril Islands.
In 1860, Man’en 1, Russia seized Primorye from China under the Treaty of Beijing and made Vladivostok a naval base.
In 1861, Bunkyū 1, the Russian warship Posadnik entered Asō Bay in Tsushima and occupied the island’s center.
Its captain, Nikolai Birilyov, demanded from the shogunate the lease of Tsushima, construction of barracks, food supplies, and prostitutes.
Ultimately, after British mediation, the Posadnik withdrew, but from this time Britain grew increasingly alarmed by Russia’s Pacific ambitions.
Containing the Russian navy through the Kuril Islands and the Japanese archipelago was a British national strategy.
An irreplaceable spoil of war.
On the Russian side, it was the former Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin who recognized the importance of the Kuril Islands.
Russia had ceded not only the Kuril Islands but also southern Sakhalin to Japan under the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War.
Any Russian vessels attempting to advance into the North Pacific would be monitored and targeted while passing through this region.
For Stalin, who aimed to build a naval power to rival the United States, the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin were spoils of war that could never be relinquished.
Seventy years after the Sakhalin–Kuril Exchange Treaty, on August 15, 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered.
The Soviet Union, having unilaterally abrogated the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on August 9 and invaded Manchuria, did not cease fighting and continued territorial expansion.
The invasion of Shumshu Island occurred on August 18, and the occupation of the Northern Territories took place after September 2, when Japan signed the instrument of surrender aboard the USS Missouri.
To be continued.