This passage describes the postwar shift from the 1960s to the 1970s in the United States, claiming that a New Left “John Dower” faction came to dominate Japanese studies and that those outside it cannot obtain jobs or research funding. It discusses the reappraisal of Herbert Norman, changes to the Tokyo Trial narrative, parallel research in Japan and the U.S. on issues such as “comfort women,” Nanjing, and Unit 731, and the practice of labeling dissenters as “revisionists.”

If you do not belong to the Dower faction, you have no job, and you cannot receive research funding.
2016-12-13
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Emphasis in the text is mine.
That is the major postwar flow in America from the 1960s to the 1970s.
The reappraisal of the communist Herbert Norman has also been thriving in recent years.
The other day, an American historian named Jason Morgan, the author of “Why Does America Look Down on Japan? Correcting the Error-Filled ‘Historical View of Japan’” (Wani Books PLUS Shinsho), came to Japan and was interviewed by Will, and he said that America’s historical academia is worse than Japan’s.
There are only left-wing and New Left historical associations, and it is not permitted to study fair and neutral history.
It seems the New Left John Dower faction has taken it over.
Ito
If you do not belong to the Dower faction, you have no job, and you cannot receive research funding.
I have an acquaintance who came to Japan, obtained a degree in Japan, and works at a Japanese university.
He must have been left out of the Dower faction.
Ezaki
I have watched the trend of New Left Japanese studies in America from the standpoint of a conservative activist.
After Dower, who reappraised Norman, appeared, the Japanese people were made to revise their view of history in the following way: they are not “victims of Japan’s militarists,” but “perpetrators against Asia,” and from now on Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator should be pursued more, and specifically, Japan’s democratization should be evaluated by whether or not it pursues the war responsibility of the Emperor and toward Asia that were not pursued at the Tokyo Trial—.
Up to that point, the Tokyo Trial historical view was at least the idea that the Japanese people were victims of Japan’s militarists, but this is a further major shift, a major deterioration.
It was in the 1970s that that basic way of thinking by the New Left was established.
Based on that, research questioning Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator regarding things such as “comfort women accompanying the military,” the Nanjing Incident, and Unit 731 came to be conducted in parallel simultaneously in Japan and the United States.
Left-leaning intellectuals in both Japan and the United States pursue nothing but Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator, which could be called the “past perfect,” and if one tries to interpose an objection regarding that, they slap on the label of revisionist (a revisionist).
When you look at the flow of movements in history and politics, that is how it is.
I think that what has been swallowed up by such a flow is the historical academia of Japan and America today.
This essay continues.