English-language sources sometimes offer strikingly different evaluations of historical figures compared to Japanese sources. Drawing on an article by Soyuki Watanabe in the January issue of VOICE, this piece examines the contrasting Japanese and American assessments of Konoe Fumimaro and his diplomacy around the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

When reading English-language sources, one is sometimes surprised at how greatly evaluations of individuals differ from those in Japanese-language sources.
2016-12-13
The following is from the January issue of VOICE.
This monthly magazine, priced at 780 yen, is filled with facts that the vast majority of Japanese people who are not subscribers were completely unaware of.
One should go to a bookstore immediately and subscribe.
Different evaluations of Konoe Fumimaro in Japan and the United States.
Soyuki Watanabe (researcher of modern and contemporary Japanese–American history).
When reading English-language sources, one is sometimes surprised at how greatly evaluations of individuals differ from those in Japanese-language sources.
A typical example may be Konoe Fumimaro.
Konoe’s evaluation in Japan is generally not favorable.
His poor reputation stems from the fact that the First Konoe Cabinet (June 4, 1937 – January 5, 1939) betrayed public expectations.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
On July 7, the month after Konoe took power, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred.
This incident was thought likely to be quickly settled, but dragged on due to Chiang Kai-shek’s belligerent attitude and expanded into the Second Shanghai Incident (August 13).
Had Japan followed the mediation of German Ambassador to China Oskar Trautmann (the Trautmann mediation), it might have been possible to prevent the expansion of the battle lines.
The military also disliked the expansion of the fighting.
However, influenced by the advice of brains such as the Comintern spy Hotsumi Ozaki, the battle lines were expanded.
Despite being in a position to stop it, this was not done.
Because Konoe had leaned toward communism during his student days, he is even suspected of having acted to benefit the Chinese Communist Party and, by extension, Stalin.
Yet in American historical works that view diplomacy—particularly that of Franklin D. Roosevelt—critically, Konoe’s diplomacy during this period is not regarded as problematic.
This essay continues.