Based on an article by Hiroshi Hasegawa published in the January issue of Rekishitsu, this essay argues that contrary to sensationalist newspaper reporting, the Japanese public and even the military were weary of the China Incident and sought its resolution. It examines Konoe’s choices, the improbability of a coup, troop withdrawal, the Tripartite Pact, and the handling of the Wang Jingwei regime.

Contrary to sensationalist newspaper reporting, the people were weary of the China Incident.
2016-12-13
The following is a continuation of a truly authentic paper by Hiroshi Hasegawa, a 100-page tour de force published in the January issue of the bimonthly magazine “Rekishitsu.”
All emphasis within the text other than the headings is mine.
Among Konoe’s attendants were several powerful figures from the central leadership of both the Army and the Navy, and the roster had largely been completed.
I believe that even if this historic Japan–U.S. compromise of complete withdrawal from China had been achieved, a coup by a portion of the military would not have occurred.
The resolution of the China Incident was by then being desperately sought by the military itself.
However, if a coup had occurred, I think the Showa Emperor would have ordered its thorough suppression and, unlike at the time of the February 26 Incident, would have crushed it by force.
Contrary to sensationalist newspaper reporting, the people were weary of the China Incident.
The story that Konoe replied “Even so, it does not matter” to a warning from an acquaintance that he might be killed is well known.
Suppose, moreover, that Roosevelt had demanded, in addition to withdrawal from China, the denial of the Wang Jingwei National Government located in Nanjing—whose establishment Japan had been deeply involved in—and the nullification of the Japan–Germany–Italy Tripartite Pact.
The famous Hull Note (Outline of the Basis of Agreement Between the United States and Japan) presented by the United States to Japan on November 26 of that year included these two points together with complete withdrawal from China, and judging these U.S. demands unacceptable, Japan declared war on the United States and Britain and was defeated three years and eight months later.
In my estimation, Konoe, having accepted complete withdrawal from China, also consented to the nullification of the Tripartite Pact, and may even have told Roosevelt that he would go beyond nullification and abolish it.
Regarding Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union on June 22 of that year, while a Northern Advance theory calling for seizing this opportunity to strike the Soviet Union erupted within the Japanese Army, there were also upper- and mid-level officers who argued that this should be used as an opportunity to abrogate the Tripartite Pact.
The original aim of the Japan–Germany–Italy Tripartite Pact had been to form a four-power alignment including the Soviet Union, and owing to such circumstances Japan had even concluded a kind of friendship agreement with the Soviet Union, the Japan–Soviet Neutrality Pact, on April 13, 1941.
However, once it became not a four-power alignment but a German–Soviet war, Konoe likely considered the Tripartite Pact to be no longer valid.
Yet another issue—the handling of the Wang Jingwei regime—was difficult.
This pro-Japan cooperative government was, in effect, created by Japan.
The Japanese government could not treat the leading figures of this regime callously.
If it erred here, Japan would no longer be taken seriously even by its enemies.
If peaceful integration with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government was impossible, Konoe may have considered arranging the asylum of key figures of the Wang Jingwei regime in Japan.
For even if Manchuria were excluded, once Japanese forces withdrew from all of China, the Wang regime would in any case be unable to survive.
This essay continues.