Drawing on a powerful essay by Hiroshi Hasegawa, this piece examines the diplomatic exchanges surrounding Konoe Fumimaro and the U.S. leadership, highlighting Ambassador Grew’s conclusion that responsibility for the U.S.–Japan war lay squarely with America. It traces the rejected summit, the Hull Note, and a decisive historical turning point.

The responsibility for the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States lies unilaterally with the American side, Joseph Grew declares.
2016-12-14
A close friend of mine said that he investigated the date of birth of Hasegawa Hiroshi and came to respect him even more.
This is because Hasegawa is of the age that Nishibe Susumu has already described as that of the late elderly.
“Like Watanabe Shoichi, this is not something undertaken without great resolve.
I think it is also a testament addressed to the Japanese people and the Japanese nation.”
Recently, I have come to think that there are things in this world that go beyond mere coincidence.
As if resonating with Hasegawa’s all-out essay, I also introduced an article by Watanabe Soyuki published in this month’s issue of VOICE.
Toward the foolishness that can only be described as “preposterous” of the Asahi Shimbun and the so-called cultural figures who have gone along with it, and toward the fact that we have been made to read their preposterous commentaries for so long, we feel an anger beyond measure.
This is a truth that all Japanese people and people around the world must know immediately.
The following is a continuation of Hasegawa Hiroshi’s all-out essay.
All emphasis in the text is mine.
Responsibility for the outbreak of war lies with the United States.
Konoe Fumimaro sent messages to Franklin D. Roosevelt urging the holding of a Japan–U.S. summit, and even before that, intentions suggesting that the president was not uninterested were conveyed.
However, regarding this summit, on October 2 the Secretary of State Cordell Hull ultimately refused, citing the need for prior agreement by both sides on the pending issues.
This was the dividing line of history.
The previously mentioned Konoe–Grew meeting held on the night of September 6 at the residence of Ito Fumiyoshi took place while hopes for the realization of a Konoe–Roosevelt meeting were still held, at least on the Japanese side.
Even with Grew’s assistance, Konoe likely wanted to meet Roosevelt one-on-one.
At the meeting at the Ito residence, Grew was told by Konoe of his resolve to make decisive compromises in order to reconcile Japan and the United States, and he received a deep impression.
Grew reported to Secretary of State Hull on September 29 his conviction that if a Roosevelt–Konoe meeting were realized, it would surely succeed.
In his postwar book Turbulent Times, Grew harshly criticized the Roosevelt administration of the time as follows.
“All of us at the American Embassy in Tokyo believed that if the meeting between Prince Konoe and the President proposed by Japan had taken place, the United States could have rebuilt Japan–U.S. relations without paying any sacrifice whatsoever, whether in its principles or its interests, and furthermore could have led to a comprehensive resolution of all issues in the Pacific” (based on the November 21, 1952 issue of Sekai Shuho introducing the book).
The responsibility for the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States lies unilaterally with the American side, Grew concludes.
That Grew was correct is also proven by statements from the Japanese side.
At that time, Kenryo Sato, who was Director of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry, mocked the American refusal of the Konoe–Roosevelt meeting by saying, “America too is foolish. If it had met unconditionally, everything would have gone exactly their way,” a remark remembered by junior officers of the section.
This essay continues.