Former Japan Coast Guard officer Masaharu Isshiki discusses Chinese government vessels around the Senkaku Islands, what he sees as the limits of Japan’s security legislation, the need for the government to disclose video footage and other information, and the relationship between public opinion and media coverage. His conclusion is unequivocal: “If we desire peace, we must prepare for crisis.”

August 12, 2020
The following is from an essay by former Japan Coast Guard officer Masaharu Isshiki, published in a Hanada magazine selection under the title “Senkaku Invasion: Release the Footage of the Chinese Vessels.”
The opening section is omitted.
【Japan Left Unable to Respond】
Regarding violations of Japanese airspace, Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Act provides that when a foreign aircraft enters the airspace over Japan’s territory in violation of international law, the Civil Aeronautics Act, or other laws and regulations, the Minister of Defense may order units of the Self-Defense Forces to take necessary measures to make the aircraft land or leave Japanese airspace.
At the same time, however, there is no clear provision governing the use of weapons in such circumstances.
As a result, the use of weapons is effectively limited to cases of self-defense or necessity.
In practical terms, if an aircraft violating Japanese airspace ignores warnings, there is currently no concrete means of compelling it to leave.
There are other examples as well.
Japan sends Self-Defense Force units to PKO operations conducted under international rules while relying on a logic that works only domestically—that the Self-Defense Forces are not a military.
It must therefore be said that Japan’s security-related legal framework, with the Constitution at its apex, has reached its limits through institutional fatigue.
The same applies, in my view, to the incident of May 8.
Other countries would issue a forceful warning ordering the intruding party to leave their territorial waters.
Japan, however, faces limits because, when the other party is a state, even the threat of force is prohibited under its constitutional framework.
The other side has seen through this weakness and, in my assessment, has taken advantage of it.
At present, the system is somehow being kept functioning through the efforts of personnel on the front lines.
But if the other side acts in earnest, the weaknesses of the system will inevitably be exposed.
Legislation should therefore be put in place as quickly as possible before that happens.
Yet looking at the Diet in recent years is deeply discouraging.
I cannot help wondering what country those legislators belong to when they avoid the Commission on the Constitution while determined to prevent any amendment of a Constitution that, in my view, disregards the lives of the Japanese people.
At the same time, we citizens must first reflect on the fact that it is we who elect those legislators.
If we ask how laws can actually be changed, Japan is, after all, a democracy.
Public opinion must therefore become strong enough to demand change.
Bureaucrats actually draft legislation, but they rarely act proactively on matters unrelated to the interests of their own ministries.
Diet members can move the bureaucracy, and the voice of the people can move Diet members.
Security issues, however, tend not to translate directly into votes, so legislators are slow to act.
That means even stronger public pressure is required.
Does the media fail to report these matters because the public is not interested, or is the public not interested because the media fails to report them?
Only a small number of media outlets address this issue, and even then the coverage is limited.
As a result, many people either do not know what is happening or, although they may vaguely sense it, look the other way because they do not wish to acknowledge it.
【The Major Media That Do Not Report It】
If that is the situation, someone must create a major public impact, as then Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara did when he announced that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government would purchase the Senkaku Islands.
The most effective actor would, of course, be the government itself.
Yet regarding the May 8 incident, the only bodies that had acted at that point were the local assemblies of Yonaguni and Ishigaki.
Apart from the local Yaeyama Nippo and a small number of other media outlets, their actions received little coverage.
In addition, a fishing vessel owned by Satoru Mizushima, president of Japan Culture Channel Sakura, conducted fishing operations in waters around the Senkaku Islands from June 20 to June 22.
The catch was later served to Diet members and others at the Diet Members’ Office Building as part of a public-relations effort.
This, too, was hardly reported by the major media.
According to the account, Chinese government vessels also appeared ready to interfere on that occasion, but Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels provided protection and no actual damage occurred.
I do not know why the major media choose not to cover these events.
Under these circumstances, however, the government should demonstrate firm resolve and publicly release, both inside and outside Japan, the video footage that should have been recorded by Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels.
Some reports say that disclosure was being considered.
I find it difficult to understand why nearly two months of consideration should be necessary.
Could the footage contain something inconvenient for Japan?
Or are people within the government who are said to wish to avoid friction with the Chinese Communist authorities obstructing its release?
Whatever the explanation, if we consider what was then happening in Hong Kong, once the Chinese Communist authorities set their sights on something, they do not stop merely because they face international criticism or sanctions.
If Japan simply stands by, 102 days could become one year, and one year could become three.
Eventually many Japanese people may begin to regard the situation as normal, and before they realize it, the islands could, in Isshiki’s warning, end up under unlawful occupation in the same way he characterizes the situation surrounding Takeshima.
【If We Desire Peace】
More than that, if the other side concludes that Japan lacks the will to defend the Senkaku Islands, it may not hesitate to use force.
Isshiki argues that the Korean War began after Kim Il Sung mistakenly concluded that the United States intended to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula.
If Japan does not now demonstrate concretely its determination to defend the Senkaku Islands, he warns, a similar miscalculation could occur.
To prevent that, the government should trust the Japanese people and disclose as much information as possible concerning the Senkaku Islands so that the sense of crisis over what Isshiki describes as Chinese Communist aggression can be shared.
It should then act without delay, including by permanently stationing government personnel on the islands, as stated in the comprehensive policy platform on which the party fought the 2012 general election.
In doing so, Japan must demonstrate a clear determination to defend the Senkaku Islands not only to the Chinese Communist authorities but also to its ally, the United States, and to Asian countries facing similar pressure.
If we desire peace, we must prepare for crisis.