An examination of Mineo Nakajima’s critique of Japan’s 1972 normalization of relations with China, focusing on Kakuei Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, Japan’s rapid tilt toward Beijing, relations with Taiwan, and the absence of a long-term China strategy.

August 13, 2020.
The following is an excerpt from an essay by Mineo Nakajima entitled “The Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China Was a Mistake,” which I introduced at the time.
The text identifies the source as the October 2012 issue of WiLL, edited under the responsibility of Yoshiko Hanada.
What kind of political and social atmosphere surrounded Japan when diplomatic relations with China were normalized in 1972?
How did Japan’s political leaders view relations with China, and did their diplomatic decision rest upon a genuine long-term strategy and vision?
Mineo Nakajima, who himself was involved in the policy-formulation process at the time, fundamentally reexamines those questions.
The following is taken from an essay by Mineo Nakajima, President of Akita International University, entitled “The Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China Was a Mistake,” which appeared in the Hanada Selection then on sale. [WiLL, October 2012 issue, edited under the responsibility of Yoshiko Hanada]
This is an essay that should be read not only by the Japanese people but by people throughout the world.
It Was China That Was in a Hurry to Establish Diplomatic Relations
The formation of the Tanaka Cabinet in July 1972 represented the emergence of a new political climate immediately after the collapse of the Eisaku Sato administration, which had long carried the mainstream conservative tradition.
At the same time, however, it was directly connected with the major diplomatic issue of normalizing relations between Japan and China, and Prime Minister Tanaka, together with Foreign Minister Ohira, visited China as early as September of that year and established diplomatic relations in one stroke.
At the time, virtually all of the Japanese media, with the exception of the Sankei Shimbun—then called the Sankei Shimbun in katakana—were demanding the establishment of diplomatic relations with China almost unconditionally.
Amid the changes in the international community following the shocking U.S.-China rapprochement that had begun the previous summer, Japan tilted toward China in an avalanche-like movement, as though driven by the cry, “Do not miss the bus.”
I can still vividly recall the sight at a hotel in Tokyo of leading Liberal Democratic Party figures of the time, including Takeo Miki, Kakuei Tanaka, and Masayoshi Ohira, standing together on a stage and linking arms with Xiao Xiangqian, representative of the China-Japan Memorandum Trade Office, who was merely of counselor rank.
Japan had tilted so one-sidedly toward China that it was completely lacking in strategy and tactics for diplomacy toward China, as well as any long-term vision for Japan-China relations or any conception of what those relations should become in the future.
Forty years have passed since then.
If we calmly examine not only the Senkaku Islands issue, the Yasukuni issue, questions of historical perception, and China’s recent military buildup, but also the problem of public sentiment in both Japan and China, then the question of whether the establishment of diplomatic relations forty years earlier was itself correct should be seriously reconsidered.
At the time, I happened to be involved in part of the policy-formulation process concerning Japan-China relations from the Sato administration onward as a member of the International Relations Advisory Council, which had been established as a private advisory body to the Chief Cabinet Secretary.
The members of the International Relations Advisory Council, composed mainly of scholars, included Tadao Umesao, Tadao Ishikawa, Shinkichi Eto, Yonosuke Nagai, and Fumi Kamiya.
Among the younger members were Masakazu Yamazaki, Jun Eto, Masataka Kosaka, and myself.
Because Kosaka and I were the youngest, we came to serve as secretaries of the group.
The circumstances surrounding this are frequently mentioned in such works as The Diary of Eisaku Sato, six volumes, published by Asahi Shimbun in 1997–99, and The Diary of Minoru Kusuda, published by Chuokoron-Shinsha in 2001.
Although we agreed on recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, we believed that Japan’s relationship with Taiwan—that is, the Republic of China—was of extreme importance and that diplomatic relations with China should be established while sufficiently coordinating Japan’s relations with Taiwan.
That position was also expressed in Prime Minister Sato’s policy speech to the Diet in January 1971, in which the words “People’s Republic of China” were used for the first time.
Around the same period there was also the so-called Hori Letter issue, in which Tokyo Governor Ryokichi Minobe carried a letter addressed to Premier Zhou Enlai from Shigeru Hori, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, when Minobe visited China.
To be continued.