Drawing on Akio Yaita’s article, this definitive edition examines how Prime Minister Shinzo Abe rejected China’s preconditions, secured his first summit with Xi Jinping, and restored Japan’s initiative in its diplomacy toward China.

The following is drawn from an article titled “Prime Minister Abe Changed Japan’s Diplomacy Toward China,” written by Akio Yaita, then Taipei Bureau Chief, and published in the Sankei Shimbun on September 2, 2020.
In November 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held his first meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing.
Until then, China had effectively demanded Japanese concessions over visits to Yasukuni Shrine and the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands as preconditions for holding a Japan–China summit.
Prime Minister Abe, however, never departed from his position that he would meet Xi only if there were no preconditions.
Even when the Chinese authorities mobilized pro-China forces within Japan and applied pressure in various forms, Abe refused to compromise.
The meeting ultimately took place only after the Chinese side yielded.
Yaita described this first meeting, which lasted approximately twenty-five minutes, as such a clear Japanese victory that it could almost be called the first of its kind in the long history of Japan’s diplomacy toward China.
The article follows.
[From the article by Akio Yaita]
There have been several scenes during my career as a journalist that have left a particularly strong impression on me.
One of them was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China, which I covered in November 2014.
I was astonished by the sullen expression on the face of Chinese President Xi Jinping, the host who received Abe when he attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing.
Xi looked almost as though he did not even want to see Abe’s face.
Xi’s expression revealed his frustration.
For approximately two years after Abe became prime minister, China continued to demand Japanese concessions concerning visits to Yasukuni Shrine and sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture, as conditions for holding a Japan–China summit.
Abe maintained his position of giving China “no concessions,” saying that he would meet Xi only if there were no preconditions.
The Chinese authorities mobilized pro-China forces within Japan and attempted to exert pressure in various ways.
Previous administrations would probably have wavered and presented some form of compromise.
Abe, however, did not waver at all, and the matter was settled when the Chinese side gave way.
The first meeting between Abe and Xi, which consequently took place and lasted approximately twenty-five minutes, was such a clear Japanese victory that it could almost be called the first of its kind in the long history of Japan’s diplomacy toward China.
Until the Abe administration, Japan–China relations had proceeded almost entirely at China’s pace.
China repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction over historical perceptions, the issue of comfort women during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Senkaku Islands and other matters, while Japan continued to provide China with economic assistance through official development assistance and other programs.
This extraordinarily distorted structure continued for years, but Abe gradually corrected it.
In 2015, Abe issued his statement marking the seventieth anniversary of the end of the war and stressed that Japan must not allow future generations to be “predestined to apologize.”
Thereafter, Abe refused to entertain China’s demands for further apologies or expressions of remorse concerning historical issues.
He succeeded in neutralizing the history card that China had used for many years.
Japan–China relations finally became “future-oriented.”
His decision to terminate Japan’s official development assistance to China was also a wise one.
It was also characteristic of Abe to speak actively and directly to China about matters such as its expansion into the South China Sea, even when they did not concern Japan directly.
It consequently ceased to be unusual for Japan to take the initiative in its relations with China.
The Abe administration built a close relationship with US President Donald Trump and placed the Japan–US relationship firmly at the center of its foreign policy.
Its position toward China earned deep trust from Southeast Asian countries and other neighboring nations.
A researcher at a think tank affiliated with Taiwan’s governing party, which was under pressure from China, recalled: “Mr. Abe was like a leader who would stand against the threat from China. We felt reassured because we knew he would always stand with us.”
Of course, the Abe administration’s diplomacy toward China was not perfect.
One may argue, for example, that it should have adopted a stronger position in response to the frequent appearances of Chinese government vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
One diplomatic misstep may have been Abe’s statement to Xi that he wished to welcome him to Japan as a state guest “when the cherry blossoms are in bloom.”
Because diplomatic protocol makes it difficult for one national leader to withdraw an invitation extended to another, this issue could become an impediment to Japanese diplomacy.
On the day following Abe’s August 28 resignation press conference, the Global Times, a newspaper under the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, declared in an editorial: “Japan is a country that we need to bring to our side. The United States and Japan are not necessarily united on issues concerning China.”
China appeared to view the change of prime minister as an opportunity and would undoubtedly employ various schemes in an attempt to divide Japan and the United States.
While addressing the remaining issues, the next administration must firmly inherit the Abe administration’s position toward China without wavering.