The Futility of Emotion-Driven Nuclear Abolitionism: NATO’s Deterrence and Soviet Concessions

2018/3/1
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
In Western European countries, however, many people supported deploying new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the West to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union’s SS-20 missiles and maintain deterrence and balance.
This was because NATO’s standing united and taking defensive measures against the Soviet threat was considered the best way to preserve peace and stability.
The policies of the respective governments were also consistent with this thinking.
As a result, the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles in five Western European countries was completed.
This was around 1984.
Naturally, the Soviet Union, which initially reacted vehemently, boycotted disarmament-related negotiations with the United States and Western Europe.
The West, however, remained steadfast.
The Futility of Nuclear Abolitionism
Surprisingly, however, in 1986 the Soviet Union proposed eliminating both its SS-20 missiles and the West’s intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
At the time, a consensus emerged in Western Europe that the missile deployments by the United States and Europe had been the decisive factor in securing Soviet concessions and a softening of its stance.
Correcting the imbalance in nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union through new missile deployments became a major test of Western Europe’s resolve and unity.
“Correcting the imbalance in nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union through new missile deployments became a major test of Western Europe’s resolve and unity.
But Western Europe stood firm against Soviet pressure, overtures, and domestic anti-nuclear movements, and accomplished the task.
That was what secured Soviet concessions.”
(Editorial in Britain’s Financial Times)
“The Soviet concessions demonstrated the complete failure of the argument for unilateral disarmament advanced by Western Europe’s anti-nuclear movements.
It was NATO’s decision to maintain deterrence and balance, rather than the anti-nuclear movement, that secured the removal of the SS-20 missiles.”
(Editorial in The Sunday Times)
This understanding provides more than sufficient historical proof of the futility of the emotion-driven nuclear abolitionism that the Asahi Shimbun continues to advocate.
To be continued.

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