An examination of the background to the Japan–Korea treaty negotiations, detailing South Korea’s claims for reparations, the responses of the United States and the United Kingdom, and Japan’s counterclaim regarding Japanese assets left behind in Korea after independence.

June 8, 2016

The following continues from the previous chapter.
From this chapter, readers will be able to clearly understand the correctness of Tadao Umesao’s conclusion that this is a country characterized by “bottomless evil” and “plausible lies.”
All emphasis in the text other than the heading is mine.

Background Leading up to the Treaty Negotiations
Claims as a “Victorious Nation against Japan”
See “Treaty of Peace with Japan” and “Japan’s War Reparations and Postwar Compensation.”
In March 1949, in its “Statement of Claims for Reparations against Japan,” the South Korean government calculated that, in addition to the return of tangible assets left by Japan in Korea, it could demand reparations amounting to 2.1 billion dollars. The South Korean government submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers a demand for reparations from Japan calling for “Japan to provide 2.1 billion dollars (at the time) plus the return of various tangible assets to Korea.”
During the negotiations for the conclusion of the Japan–Korea Basic Treaty, South Korea maintained the same position, asserting that it was a victorious nation against Japan, that is, a member of the Allied Powers, and demanded war reparations from Japan. Furthermore, on January 26, 1951, President Syngman Rhee announced the “South Korean Government’s Policy toward the Japanese Peace Conference,” expressing a desire to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference.
South Korea also demanded participation as a victorious nation (an Allied Power [Note 1]) in signing the Treaty of Peace with Japan (the San Francisco Peace Treaty), but this was rejected by the United States and the United Kingdom. Japan also opposed the move, arguing that “if South Korea were to sign, one million Koreans residing in Japan would acquire the right to receive compensation as Allied nationals,” and the United States accepted Japan’s view.
On July 9, 1951, John Foster Dulles, advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, told the South Korean ambassador to the United States that “only countries that were at war with Japan and that were signatories to the January 1942 Declaration by United Nations are eligible to sign the treaty; therefore, the South Korean government will not be a signatory.” The South Korean ambassador countered that “the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea had been at war with Japan for many years prior to World War II.” The United States explained that “Korea effectively contributed to Japan’s military power as part of Japan during the war,” and therefore excluded South Korea from the list of signatories to the peace treaty with Japan.
South Korea regarded this U.S. decision as unacceptable and condemned the exclusion of South Korea’s participation as “the height of inhumanity committed by irrationality.” Yoo Jin-oh, the South Korean representative to the Japan–Korea talks, argued in a paper published on July 30, 1951, that “the attitude of the current draft itself, which excludes Korea from the Allied Powers, is unjust. The fact that organized military forces composed of Koreans fought Japanese forces in Chinese territory during World War II proves the legitimacy of our claim that Korea must be included among the Allied Powers.”
Ultimately, South Korea was not permitted to participate in the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Peace with Japan on September 8, 1951.
Meanwhile, even after being excluded from the list of participants, South Korea dispatched a delegation to the United States and proceeded with preparations for claims against Japan, including confirming the validity of U.S. Military Government Ordinance No. 33, “Regarding the Acquisition of Japanese Property Rights in Korea,” which provided for the confiscation of Japanese public and private property in Korea after liberation.
In response to South Korea’s claims, Japan argued that it had lawfully possessed and governed Korea and had not been in a state of war with Korea, and therefore was not in a position to pay war reparations to Korea. Instead, Japan asserted that it had the right to demand the return of Japanese assets in Korea that had to be abandoned due to Korean independence (estimated at 5.25 billion dollars by a GHQ survey and approximately 5.3 billion dollars excluding military assets according to a Ministry of Finance survey).
However, an “Explanatory Memorandum” dated July 25, 1951, prepared by the Political Affairs Department of the Republic of Korea’s Representative Office in Japan, stated that “the reparations demanded by the Republic of Korea from Japan are very rarely directly caused by combat actions as described above,” and also noted that “it would be difficult to collectively demand reparations for damages incurred up to that time on the grounds that the annexation treaty was invalid.”

Mediation by the United States of America
It is known that behind the Japan–Korea negotiations, the U.S. government took the initiative from around July 1951. Although President Syngman Rhee sought Korea’s participation in the San Francisco Peace Treaty as a “victorious nation,” the Korean Peninsula had already been under Japanese rule during World War II and had not been in a state of war with Japan, leaving no basis for treating Korea as a “victorious nation.” As a result, South Korea was rejected by the Allied Powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, and was unable to become a “party concerned.”
After the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in September 1951, President Rhee, who had not been permitted to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference, sought direct dialogue with the Japanese government. With U.S. mediation, Japan and South Korea began preliminary talks on October 20, 1951, toward the normalization of diplomatic relations. The talks were held at the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) headquarters in Tokyo under the attendance of Diplomatic Section Chief Sebald.

This manuscript continues.