This essay examines the limits of missile defense and the unreliability of relying on another country’s “nuclear umbrella,” drawing parallels with France’s decision under Charles de Gaulle to acquire nuclear weapons as an independent deterrent.

In fact, France also reached the same conclusion during the era of Charles de Gaulle and chose to arm itself with nuclear weapons.
2016-10-31
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Naturally so.
The United States is not a “samurai serving a lord.”
(Of course, Japan itself is not a monarchy either.)
If anything, it is more like a “bodyguard hired with money.”
A samurai who serves not for money but for loyalty might, at times, protect his lord’s life even at the risk of his wife being killed.
However, a bodyguard does not possess such deep-seated loyalty.
If a bodyguard’s wife is in danger, the realistic choice is to terminate the contract and flee together with her.
Naturally, if a bodyguard were to prioritize the employer over his wife, the wife would be furious.
There is no way the American people would tolerate placing their own lives in danger for the sake of another country.
And there is no way the U.S. government would do something that the American people would not tolerate.
This means that Japan’s so-called “peace constitution,” with its reliance on defensive power provided by other countries, is not something that guarantees protection of Japan “to the very end” with one hundred percent certainty.
If Japan were to go to war with China today, Japan could never defeat China.
With conventional weapons, Japan would hold the advantage.
However, because Japan adheres to an exclusively defensive posture, the best possible outcome would be no more than a draw.
Moreover, because China possesses nuclear missiles, if China were to use nuclear intimidation against Japan, Japan would be forced to accept extremely unfavorable conditions.
In short, under the current situation, Japan could at best achieve a draw, and if China were to resort to nuclear intimidation, Japan would be compelled to accept peace terms equivalent to defeat.
From China’s perspective, facing a Japan that does not possess nuclear missiles is something to fear not at all.
In the worst case, Japan would suffer a third and fourth nuclear attack, following Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
It is futile to place hope in MD, missile defense.
MD, missile defense, is useless in actual combat.
June 22, 2006, former Secretary of Defense William Perry.
It has not been proven whether the U.S. ballistic missile interception system is effective against North Korean missiles.
If interception fails, the value of missile defense will be undermined.
December 18, 2007, Philip Coyle, former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
(Regarding the successful interception test in which the Aegis destroyer Kongo launched and intercepted an SM-3 missile off the coast of Hawaii.)
“The test was staged.”
“There is no need to waste hundreds of billions of yen simply to maintain good relations with the United States.”
“MD is far too detached from reality.”
The following is an excerpt from China’s ‘Nukes’ Rule the World by Kan Ito.
Thomas Christie.
(Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Defense.)
The success rate of the MD missile defense system is at best around 0 to 20 percent.
All successful MD system tests conducted so far have been carried out only under unrealistically simple conditions.
Comparing these tests with the realistic conditions under which nuclear missiles would be used in actual war is meaningless.
Therefore, as the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, we cannot estimate the system’s actual success rate.
David Calleo.
(Professor at Johns Hopkins University.)
(The Chinese and Russian militaries) can conduct nuclear attacks by simultaneously employing ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and more.
If subjected to such a simultaneous nuclear attack, the MD system would be completely useless.
Among the military experts I know, there is not a single person who truly believes MD is effective.
MD is an extremely expensive system, yet developing counterweapons and countertactics capable of neutralizing MD does not require particularly high costs.
In the future, it may be possible to construct technical MD systems to protect limited military facilities in specific areas.
However, it is impossible to realize MD capable of protecting civilians from nuclear attacks by enemy states.
In fact, France also reached the same conclusion during the de Gaulle era and armed itself with nuclear weapons.
“When the Soviet Union attacks Paris, I cannot believe that the United States would sacrifice New York in order to retaliate against the Soviets.
We will possess ten warheads ourselves, and if attacked, we will strike back at Moscow.”
This is General Pierre Gallois’s “nuclear theory of a middle power.”
Considering the dangers of relying on other countries for national security, it can be said to be an entirely natural choice.
To be continued.
The above is taken from http://ccce.web.fc2.com/a.html.