Following the Meng Wanzhou case, momentum to exclude Huawei spread across Europe, the United States, and Asia.
Citing Akio Yaita’s analysis, this essay examines the relationship between Chinese companies and the state, espionage allegations, and China’s National Intelligence Law, highlighting growing global concerns over Chinese technology firms.

January 24, 2019

Since the “Meng Wanzhou case,” moves to exclude Huawei have intensified not only in Europe and the United States but also across Asia.
Countries appear finally to have begun recognizing the risks posed by Chinese companies.

The following is from an article by Akio Yaita titled “Why Huawei Is Being Excluded,” published in yesterday’s Sankei Shimbun.
“Our employee Wang Weijing violated Polish law and was arrested for personal reasons; therefore, in accordance with internal employment regulations, we are terminating his labor contract.”
On January 12, Huawei Technologies, the Chinese telecommunications giant, issued a statement announcing the dismissal of Wang Weijing, an executive of its Polish branch.
This came only four days after Wang was detained by Polish security authorities on suspicion of espionage.
According to Polish media, Wang is suspected of conducting illegal intelligence-gathering activities on behalf of the Chinese government.
A Polish national, a former senior official in the Polish Interior Ministry, was also arrested as an accomplice.
Wang reportedly denies the allegations.
Within China, criticism has arisen that Huawei’s decision to dismiss Wang so quickly after the investigation began was “too hasty.”
Wang was compared with Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s vice chairwoman, who was arrested by Canadian authorities in December of the previous year.
She was accused of violating U.S. sanctions against Iran, but after her arrest Huawei repeatedly denied the charges and continued to demand her release from Canada.
Although Meng is the daughter of Huawei’s founder and a key executive, attention focused on the differing responses to Wang, who was also arrested by foreign security authorities.
Experts familiar with Chinese politics analyzed that both cases involved national security and exceeded the level that a single company could address.
They suggested that both protecting Meng and dismissing Wang were decisions made by Chinese authorities.
They further noted that Meng knows many important secrets related to China’s IT strategy and that China wants to avoid a trial overseas at all costs.
By contrast, Wang was a “small figure” and was discarded to prevent further damage to Huawei’s image.
Huawei’s statement described Wang’s arrest as being for “personal reasons,” but his career background suggests possible links to Chinese intelligence.
After graduating from Beijing Foreign Studies University in 2002, Wang served as a diplomat at the Chinese Consulate General in Poland for about five years starting in 2006.
He changed jobs in 2011 and joined Huawei’s Polish branch.
However, China’s “Diplomatic Personnel Law,” passed in 2009 by the National People’s Congress, clearly states that diplomats cannot resign while posted overseas.
A former Chinese diplomatic official pointed out that it is more natural to think Wang did not resign but was reassigned under government direction to a position more suitable for operations.
Huawei is not a state-owned enterprise and has expanded globally as a private company.
However, the cases involving Meng and Wang have further highlighted its various potential ties to the Chinese government.
China also has a National Intelligence Law.
It obligates organizations and citizens to support and cooperate with state intelligence activities.
If Chinese authorities request cooperation in intelligence operations, all Chinese companies, including Huawei, are unable to refuse.
Since the Meng Wanzhou case, momentum to exclude Huawei has grown not only in Europe and the United States but also across Asia.
Countries appear finally to have begun recognizing the risks posed by Chinese companies.