This essay explores the geopolitical concept of buffer states by examining Afghanistan’s historical role and drawing parallels to the Korean Peninsula. Based on Masayuki Takayama’s column, it analyzes regional power dynamics and strategic considerations.

2019-02-18
In Europe, Switzerland occupies a similar position.
If a major power were to seize it, the security of surrounding nations would be threatened.
That is why it was made a permanently neutral state and prevented from forming military alliances.

There is a view that the handling of Afghanistan has direct implications for the Korean Peninsula.
From Japan’s perspective, that peninsula appears to be a strategic point.
The chapter I posted on 2019-02-15 under this theme now ranks seventh in Ameba’s official hashtag ranking for “stamps.”

The following is from this week’s column by Masayuki Takayama, the unique postwar journalist, published in Shukan Shincho.

Theory of Leaving Korea Alone
Afghanistan lies at the center of Asia and occupies its highest strategic ground.
Whoever controls it can overlook Russia, the Middle East, India, and China.
If one wished, it could be used to attack and destroy them.
In Europe, Switzerland occupies a similar position.
If a major power seized it, the safety of surrounding countries would be threatened.
Therefore it was made a permanently neutral country and prevented from entering military alliances.
Afghanistan has no such arrangement.
Countries seeking hegemony have repeatedly attempted conquest.
First India tried and failed.
The Hindu Kush mountains running through central Afghanistan tell that history.
In the local Dari language, the name means “killer of Indians.”
Next Russia and Britain competed for conquest.
It was called the Great Game.
Britain won.
Though it captured Kabul, the country was, simply put, a land of bandits.
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmens, and Hazaras all contended and fought among themselves.
Even the newly arrived British forces were attacked and killed whenever they showed weakness.
Britain abandoned control of Afghanistan.
In January 1842, 15,000 British soldiers, their families, and camp followers fled snowbound Kabul.
Only one man, Dr. William Brydon, reached Jalalabad.
He later became the model for Dr. Watson in Conan Doyle’s stories.
The defeat occurred largely because Indian troops could not withstand the cold.
The British replaced them with Gurkha soldiers raised in the Himalayas and tried again.
They attempted control three times, including after World War I, but could not subdue the bandit-like factions.
Next came Brezhnev’s Soviet Union.
It hoped to rebuild its communist regime there, but in addition to local fighters, al-Qaeda trained by the United States proved formidable.
The Soviet army collapsed, and with it the Soviet Union itself.
Then the United States entered.
Its purpose was not regional hegemony but to eliminate al-Qaeda after 9/11.
After ten years it killed bin Laden, but U.S. forces remained.
Now in its eighteenth year, American war dead exceed 7,000.
Even under a Trump administration less interested in the region, troops remain because a rising China has begun to target it.
However, confident it can restrain China through measures such as tariffs and pressure on Huawei, the U.S. government says it may halve its 14,000 troops this year.
Historically, Afghan tribes have mostly fought among themselves and have not united to invade surrounding states.
But any external interference provokes endless resistance.
Left alone, they herd sheep, sell opium, and occasionally attack lost foreigners, causing little major harm.
The U.S. appears to see it this way and in withdrawal talks with the Taliban demands that they sever ties with al-Qaeda and other external forces.
Put simply, it is seeking to turn Afghanistan into a kind of Switzerland.
There is a view that this approach applies equally to the Korean Peninsula.
To Japan, that peninsula appears strategically vital.
If any great power seized it, Japan would be in danger.
That is why Japan fought the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.
China, too, would find it problematic if Western liberal culture advanced to the Tumen River.
Russia would face grave concern if U.S. bases appeared in North Korea.
Given the competing interests of surrounding countries, the present division of the peninsula has functioned as a convenient equilibrium.
Historically, however, Korea has often been divided into two or three competing entities.
Much like Afghanistan.
It has rarely united to expand outward.
Therefore, once North Korea’s nuclear issue is resolved, perhaps surrounding nations should consult and withdraw entirely from the peninsula.
They might tell Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in that everyone hopes it will become the Switzerland of the East.
They are proud people.
They might gladly agree.