Replace the Three Non-Nuclear Principles with “Do Not Let Them Strike” — Japan’s Awakening and the Need for Realistic Nuclear Deterrence
This article introduces a column by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Specially Appointed Professor at Reitaku University and Executive Director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, published in the Sankei Shimbun’s “Seiron.” Eighty years after the war, Japan faces a strategic turning point. With China’s rapid nuclear expansion, the threat of a Taiwan contingency, and North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, Japan must develop a realistic nuclear deterrence policy rather than relying solely on the United States. Kanehara argues that Japan should revise the third principle of its Three Non-Nuclear Principles from “not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought in” to “not allowing nuclear strikes against Japan.”
The following is from an article titled “Replace the Three Non-Nuclear Principles with ‘Do Not Let Them Strike’,” published in today’s Sankei Shimbun “Seiron” column by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Specially Appointed Professor at Reitaku University and Executive Director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
It is essential reading not only for the Japanese people but for readers around the world.

Japan is awakening.
Japan’s instinct for national survival slept for a long time after the war.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s dramatic victory in the general election signals the dawn of a new era.
Japan is awakening.
Looking back, Japan’s postwar history was a history of confrontation between the Liberal Democratic Party, which chose the Japan-U.S. alliance, and progressive forces inclined toward the communist bloc of China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea.
While protected by the overwhelming military power of the United States, the progressive forces turned a blind eye to the suppression of freedom within the communist bloc and continued to advocate “unarmed neutrality,” meaning the abandonment of the U.S. alliance and the dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces.
Japan’s national reason, burdened by an internal East-West division, became paralyzed.
Eighty years have already passed since the end of the war.
There is a clear reason why the centrist reform coalition that ignored changes in world politics suffered a crushing defeat.
Today’s young people see every day the rapid military expansion of China, the shadow of a Taiwan contingency, North Korea’s nuclear armament, and the tragic reality of the war in Ukraine.
Postwar Japan has consistently cherished freedom and peace.
No one can understand the claim that the Takaichi administration is militaristic, dictatorial, or rushing toward war.
Former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s reckless attempt to draw left-wing public sector unions into a centrist coalition with the help of Komeito ended in failure.
The flow of time moved far faster.
The era has changed.
The generation has changed.
This change is irreversible.
The long night called the postwar era is finally beginning to break.

For Japan, the urgent priority is the formulation of a realistic nuclear deterrence policy.
If nuclear weapons from China or North Korea strike Japan, hundreds of thousands or millions of Japanese would die in an instant.
Nevertheless, successive postwar Japanese prime ministers left nuclear matters entirely to the United States.
The authority to use nuclear weapons rests solely with the President of the United States.
Unless Japan’s prime minister raises the issue, the United States will not discuss operational nuclear matters.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe courageously proposed that Japan begin discussions on nuclear sharing, but soon afterward he was struck down by the bullets of a despicable assassin.
Nearly four years have already passed without progress.

Japan must urgently establish a realistic nuclear deterrence strategy.
First there is the strategic level.
The United States promises to provide a nuclear umbrella to NATO and to Japan and South Korea and to defend them as it defends its own homeland.
The United States constantly deploys more than 1,500 nuclear warheads aimed at Russian nuclear facilities.
If Russia launches strategic nuclear weapons against NATO, the United States will immediately destroy all Russian nuclear facilities.
Even if U.S. nuclear forces were destroyed in a first strike, the Trident missiles of strategic submarines would ensure a second retaliatory strike.
NATO is a nuclear alliance built on such guarantees and conducts regular exercises.
The Japan-U.S. alliance lacks such operational nuclear agreements.
China is now rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is expected to possess 1,000 warheads within four years.
The United States will soon face two nuclear powers, China and Russia.
If China launched a strategic nuclear attack on Japan, would the United States immediately eliminate all Chinese nuclear facilities to prevent further attacks.
If Japan’s major cities were attacked with nuclear weapons, would the United States retaliate with nuclear weapons.
The Japanese government must obtain detailed explanations from the United States and explain the reliability of this commitment to the Japanese people.

Second there is the tactical level.
A NATO-Russia war would quickly escalate into World War III and massive launches of strategic nuclear weapons, so political pressure always works to contain conflict.
However, a Taiwan contingency would be a regional war involving the United States, China, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, and escalation could occur more easily.
The Japan-U.S. alliance must establish a strong and flexible response strategy to maintain superiority over China.

The principle of “not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought in” must be changed.
If Japan introduces large numbers of Type-12 medium-range cruise missiles, the Japan-U.S. alliance will for the first time begin coordinating offensive operations against China.
The missing joker in the alliance’s deck is tactical nuclear weapons.
If China were to destroy a Japanese Self-Defense Forces base with a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon, Japan would have no tactical nuclear weapons for retaliation.
If the United States then sought a ceasefire, Japan would suffer a one-sided loss.
Unless Japan can signal equivalent retaliation, China will not be deterred from using tactical nuclear weapons.
Japan will soon face the issue of U.S. attack submarines carrying intermediate-range nuclear missiles calling at Japanese ports in the mid-2030s.
The United States does not disclose whether nuclear warheads are onboard.
Even so, Japan must accept such port calls.
Submarines are difficult to detect underwater and have high survivability.
Complaining about nuclear weapons simply because a submarine stops to take on water and food is unreasonable.
Japan must revise the third principle of its Three Non-Nuclear Principles from “not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought in” to “not allowing nuclear strikes against Japan.”
Debates about nuclear weapons are not ideological toys.
They are matters of life and death for the nation.
We hope for decisive leadership from the Takaichi administration.