Building on a chapter published on March 19, 2019, and drawing on an essay by Masayuki Takayama, this piece examines the design and manufacturing defects in GE-built reactors related to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Asahi Shimbun’s shifting of responsibility, and the reality of the improvements carried out by Japanese engineers.
It sharply criticizes reporting that ignored the severe defects of GE reactors, including stress corrosion cracking, turbine failures, and fuel rod cladding problems, while portraying TEPCO and Japanese nuclear technology alone as the villains.

2019-03-21
Like Toyota’s Lexus lawsuit, it is almost entirely a baseless complaint masquerading as litigation, but even if Mitsubishi had some defect, it cannot be compared with the gravity of GE’s defective reactors.

The chapter I published on 2019-03-19 under the title,
An article without a single fragment of truth anywhere in it.
That is what I want to ask them, whether that is acceptable.
has entered the official hashtag ranking at No. 31 for Lexus.
The following is from a work by Masayuki Takayama.
The one most at fault in the Fukushima nuclear accident is the United States.
Exactly two years after 3/11,
a somewhat surprising article appeared in the Asahi Shimbun.
It was an interview with a former General Electric executive stationed at TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear plant.
The reason it was surprising was that, from the moment of the disaster itself, the Asahi had consistently obscured the fact that the reactor involved in the accident had been made by GE.
For example, there was an article titled “Sweet Assumptions” by nuclear affairs editorial writer Keiji Takeuchi written soon after the disaster.
“The containment vessel was not equipped with a valve because in Japan it was believed that a core meltdown would not occur.
A valve introduced under pressure from overseas developments has now become the lifeline.
It shows how naive the original accident assumptions were.”
If one reads only that, it sounds as though the reactor were Japanese-made and did not even have a gas vent valve.
But the reactor was unquestionably made by GE, and the valve had been voluntarily installed by TEPCO after observing the Three Mile Island accident in the United States.
It was GE whose “assumptions were naive,” yet the Asahi framed the matter as though TEPCO’s assumptions had been inadequate, and thereafter used that as the basis for its anti-nuclear-power scare campaign.
And only now does it admit that it was made by GE.
Did it think that by now the heat had died down enough.
Did it think it might quietly revise its old lie before anyone noticed.
The content of that interview is extraordinary.
The GE manager was a Japanese man born in Okinawa who had devoted his youth to anti-base activism, later worked as a seaman, was picked up by GE, and became a boiling water reactor specialist without even knowing about thermal neutrons or criticality.
One cannot help wondering whether such a person could really be trusted, but he reveals that “the Fukushima reactor experienced several abnormal situations, including GE’s design mistakes.”
That is true, and among them the stress corrosion cracking was particularly severe.
High-pressure steam pipes and the shroud surrounding the reactor core cracked one after another, causing radiation leaks.
The power-generating turbines also fractured, and the fuel rod cladding failed as well.
In short, it was a completely defective reactor.
The reactor became inoperable, but GE did nothing.
So TEPCO and Japanese manufacturers such as Toshiba cooperated to solve the problem.
These are the people the Asahi contemptuously calls “the nuclear village.”
They also determined that the stress corrosion was caused by high-carbon stainless steel and the welding process.
The cracking turbines too were changed from cast-molded parts to integrally machined components using Japanese technology.
It was during these improvements that the gas vent valve, which this time allowed the worst-case scenario to be avoided, was also installed.
The GE-model reactors, which after that became Japanese-made in every respect except outward appearance, knew no failures until the great tsunami of 3/11.
The interview does not mention this, and instead the reporter leads the witness with questions like, “Are nuclear plants not dangerous?”
and has him dwell emotionally, as a GE stationing representative, on “how indifferent TEPCO was to safety.”
“BWRs cannot be handled unless one is highly skilled.
There were times when one had to sharpen all five senses, touch the piping, and check for abnormal vibration or temperature.”
He says nothing about the fact that the piping he checked had long since been replaced by safe Japanese-made piping.
It is the kind of speech that shows he has fully acquired the lying habits of Americans.
Another point he does not touch is why GE irresponsibly left defects such as stress corrosion cracking unattended.
Now, the U.S. side is suing Mitsubishi under product liability law, saying that the San Onofre nuclear plant had to be decommissioned because the steam generator supplied by Mitsubishi malfunctioned.
Like Toyota’s Lexus lawsuit, it is almost entirely a baseless complaint masquerading as litigation, but even if Mitsubishi had some defect, it cannot be compared with the gravity of GE’s defective reactors.
And yet why did TEPCO not seek recourse against GE.
Because Article 4 of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Act prohibits the application of product liability law by stipulating that “no party other than the operator, such as TEPCO, bears liability for compensation.”
At that time, nuclear power projects depended on financing from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and indeed from GE itself.
It is said that this provision was inserted because of the American side’s intention that, since they were already “taking care of” Japan, Japan should not start thinking about product liability law.
That is probably also why GE was content to leave Fukushima in the hands of a former seaman.
Thanks to GE’s corner-cutting, or rather because of it, Japan became able to build fine nuclear plants on its own.
Exports have also been going well.
The interview touches on the current reality that those Japanese-made nuclear plants are being exported one after another, and the Asahi has him ask, “Is that really acceptable?”
An article without a single fragment of truth anywhere in it.
That is what I want to ask them, whether that is acceptable.
(Issue of August 1, 2013)