Based on a chapter published on October 23, 2015, this passage examines, through a Sankei Shimbun essay by Sekihei, the background behind the successive detention of Japanese nationals in China on suspicion of espionage.
It argues that China’s Anti-Espionage Law, enacted in 2014, contains provisions so vague and expansive that virtually any activity can be reinterpreted as espionage, and that behind this stands Xi Jinping’s doctrine of “comprehensive national security.”
By treating not only politics and the military but also the economy, culture, society, and science as matters of national security, this framework is said to pose grave risks to the normal economic activities of Japanese companies as well as to human and cultural exchange between Japan and China.
The chapter urges readers to face the reality that interaction with China itself now entails danger, and to reconsider how Japan should deal with such an alien state going forward.

2019-04-22
And with the enforcement of this “Anti-Espionage Law” as the trigger,
we must once again think about how we ought to deal with that alien country.

This is a chapter published on October 23, 2015.
The other day, I wrote about the news that the fourth Japanese national this year had been detained in China on suspicion of espionage.
As to what this actually means…
There has been no newspaper article that explained it better than Sekihei, whom I introduced.
It is from an essay regularly carried in the October 22 edition of the Sankei Shimbun under the title Sekihei’s China Watch.
The bold emphasis other than the heading is mine.

Paranoid Suspicion Over “Espionage Charges”

On 2015/10/11,
it newly became known that a Japanese woman was being detained in Shanghai, China,
on suspicion of being a “spy.”
In 2015,
this made the number of Japanese detained or arrested in China on the same suspicion
four.
The “espionage charges” brought against them differed in each case,
but the real question is rather
what lay behind the rapid increase since the start of 2015 in this “spy hunt” targeting Japanese nationals.
One reason may be
that China’s “Anti-Espionage Law” was enacted in November 2014.
In Article 38 of that law,
which defines acts of espionage,
there is the phrase
“(5) engaging in other espionage activities,”
and this is precisely the problem.
In this case,
the “other” is completely unlimited,
and it is a dangerous clause that allows any sort of expansive interpretation.
In other words,
if the Chinese authorities simply determine that
“this is an act of espionage,”
then almost anything may be regarded as “espionage.”

Behind the making of such a sloppy “Anti-Espionage Law”
lies what President Xi Jinping began advocating around April 2014,
namely,
the idea of
“a comprehensive view of national security.”
At the first meeting of the newly established Chinese Central National Security Commission on April 15, 2014,
President Xi,
who had placed himself at the head of the commission,
gave an “important speech”
and brought forward the unfamiliar concept of
“a comprehensive view of national security.”
Generally speaking,
“national security” is often understood to mean
“the safety of the state against military threats from outside,”
but what President Xi calls “comprehensive national security” is different from that.
His speech listed eleven categories,
including
“political security, territorial security, military security, economic security, cultural security, social security, scientific security, ecological security, and resource security,”
and explained that the point of this
“comprehensive view of security”
was to protect all of these forms of “security.”
In other words,
from President Xi’s point of view,
today’s China is under threat not only in politics and the military,
but in every sphere,
including the economy, culture, society, and science,
with respect to
“the security of the state.”
Therefore,
China must from now on protect state security
in all of these “every fields,”
so he says.

This way of thinking
can no longer be called anything other than paranoid suspicion of the sort expressed by the phrase
“seeing enemy soldiers in every bush and tree,”
and the “Anti-Espionage Law” that was born in November 2014
is a law enacted precisely on the basis of such paranoid suspicion.
As a result of expansively interpreting what counts as
“espionage”
across every sphere of politics, economy, culture, and science,
the State Security authorities on the ground have in the end come to treat acts that are not really “espionage” at all
as “acts of espionage” anyway.
The Japanese nationals who have been detained in concentrated fashion since the beginning of this year
may indeed be called victims of just such an expansively interpreted “spy hunt,”
but the problem lies ahead.

Under the “Anti-Espionage Law,” in extreme cases,
for example, even conduct such as a Japanese company carrying out market research in China for sales promotion
might be regarded as
“other espionage activities”
that threaten China’s “economic security,”
and merely bringing books, DVDs, or the like into China
might also give rise to suspicion as
“other espionage activities”
threatening China’s “cultural security.”
In any case,
the enforcement of this “Anti-Espionage Law”
is certain to obstruct the normal economic activities of Japanese companies operating in China,
and it is obvious that it will hinder human exchange and cultural exchange between Japan and China.
Under such circumstances from now on,
Japanese companies and ordinary Japanese people alike must first properly recognize
that every kind of exchange with China carries “danger,”
and it may be better to refrain from entering China when the necessity is low.
And with the enforcement of this “Anti-Espionage Law” as the trigger,
we must once again think about how we ought to deal with that alien country.