This essay examines the danger of anti-nuclear arguments that end up serving China’s economic, military, and technological ambitions. By contrasting U.S. restrictions on nuclear technology transfers to China, support for small modular reactor development, and Japan’s policy stagnation, it argues that nuclear power lies at the core of national security and industrial competitiveness.

2019-04-11
Japan’s nuclear technology was introduced from the United States.
Given that historical background, the United States should naturally be expected to have Japan shoulder part of the strategic confrontation with China in terms of national security, yet the current reality is far removed from that.

I had recently grown so disgusted with commentaries that pandered to China that I had almost stopped reading the Nikkei altogether, even to the point of considering cancelling my subscription.
Today, for the first time in a long while, I read it again as I used to, and what I found was the article below.
If the frequency of genuine commentary like this were higher, I thought, perhaps I might continue my subscription after all.
If one reads this essay, one can see clearly that keeping the Asahi Shimbun, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations dominated by left-wing infantilists, the so-called civic groups, and the so-called cultural figures endlessly shouting opposition to nuclear power serves China as a strategy that kills three birds with one stone.
First, it is an extremely effective way of driving a wedge between Japan and the United States.
Second, for the sake of advancing the nuclear industry that China has positioned as one of the pillars of its national policy, and indeed for fulfilling its ambition of world domination even through nuclear technology, it weakens Japan’s nuclear industry, which is China’s greatest rival in both technology and capital, and not only weakens it but removes Japan from the ranks of China’s competitors.
Third, it permanently deprives Japan of the ability to possess nuclear weapons, while the outrageous ambitions openly circulated on the Chinese internet, such as that by 2050 Japan will become a province of China, cease to be something one can laugh off and instead become a realizable strategy through China’s abnormal military expansion.

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Emphasis in the text is mine.

As has long been pointed out, the economy is also a matter of national security.
Once China came to be recognized as an economic and military threat, not only the maintenance of defense production but also technological superiority in corporate and industrial competition came to be strongly regarded as a requirement of national security.
The growing sophistication of cyberattack technologies and the globalization of supply chains have also heightened the sense of crisis, as the means of stealing “sensitive technologies” that could greatly affect national security have become increasingly diverse and complex.
Applied to reactor technology, this means that not only nuclear weapons development but also the loss of the relative superiority of reactor-related technologies and industrial competitiveness is recognized as a factor in nuclear proliferation risk.
In October 2018, the United States in principle prohibited the transfer to China of innovative technologies such as light-water reactors and small modular reactors, or SMRs.
It also prohibited the transfer of all nuclear-related items to China General Nuclear Group and its affiliated companies, which had employed an engineer indicted in 2016 on espionage charges.
SMRs are next-generation reactors equipped with built-in safety control systems that reduce accident risk, while the simplification and standardization of design make mass production possible and offer the advantage of reducing investment risk.
In addition to functioning as a baseload power source, they are also effective for adjusting the load of renewable energy, which will be introduced on a large scale in the future, and are regarded as the next-generation trump card for reactor exports.
In the United States, private-sector businesses operating under a market economy and tasked with pursuing profit receive financial support from the government, which underpins their business foundation.
The Department of Energy invested approximately 8.8 billion yen in 22 next-generation reactor development projects, including NuScale Power, a venture developing light-water SMRs.
This includes the light-water SMR of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, a joint venture between America’s GE and Hitachi, Ltd.
Permission was also granted to use the experimental reactors owned by Idaho National Laboratory.
Furthermore, the Department of Defense concludes power purchase agreements, thereby helping to secure future revenue.

Japan’s nuclear technology was introduced from the United States.
Because of that historical background, the United States should naturally be expected to have Japan shoulder part of the strategic confrontation with China in terms of national security, yet the current situation is far removed from that.
Not only have plans for new construction stalled, but with regard to next-generation reactor development, policy support measures in line with the technological roadmap through commercialization have not been realized.
There are no newly built reactors in Japan scheduled to begin operation in the 2030s.
In order to maintain reactor-related technologies, Japan should participate in the development of next-generation reactors such as America’s SMRs and in overseas market expansion, and should also consider eventually opening the way for the domestic introduction of next-generation reactors.