Originally published on June 24, 2019.
This essay presents the Mitrokhin Archive as a top-tier historical source and examines how the KGB conducted influence operations in Japan against the Japan Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, industry, and the Japanese mass media.
By tracing infiltration into newspapers such as Asahi, Yomiuri, Sankei, and Tokyo Shimbun, as well as opinion manipulation, intelligence gathering, and the recruitment of journalists through money and blackmail, it sharply indicts the vulnerability of Japan’s media to foreign influence.

2019-06-24
How much direct support the KGB had provided to the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, what kinds of operatives it had infiltrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and through the activities of those operatives, what kind of influence it had exerted on Japanese politics.

This is a chapter I originally published on 2018-04-10 under the title, “This Mitrokhin Archive is, literally, a supreme first-rate historical source of the highest order on the intelligence operations of the Soviet KGB.”
As for articles on the Mitrokhin Archive, rather than the Wikipedia article introduced in the previous chapter, the blog post I found on the internet a short while ago, titled “The Reality of Foreign Influence Operations Directed at the Japanese Mass Media,” on kironitatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-83.html, is probably more accurate, including in the way it is written.
As I reread this chapter, I was reminded of the سلسلة of activities of David Kaye, with his title of so-called United Nations Special Rapporteur and the like.
That he is an agent of China or of the Korean Peninsula is something anyone with a mind beyond that of a kindergarten child can understand.
The ones feeding information to the sort of people who make him issue laughable reports such as “freedom of the press in Japan is being violated” are groups such as the lawyers including the husband of Mizuho Fukushima.
In other words, if one understands that agents of China and the Korean Peninsula are working in the shadows, the whole matter immediately becomes clear.
The electronic magazine Genshi Vol. 4 was recently published, and in it Mr. Satoshi Fujii has written shocking material about Soviet KGB intelligence operations.
Including quotations from it, I will now introduce the contents.
Mitrokhin was a former KGB officer who defected from the Soviet Union to Britain in 1992, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
When he defected to Britain with the help of the British intelligence service MI6, he handed over to MI6 classified documents packed into no fewer than “six large containers.”
This Mitrokhin Archive is, literally, a supreme first-rate historical source of the highest order regarding the intelligence activities of the Soviet KGB.
The American FBI evaluated the Mitrokhin Archive by saying, “Of the information obtained thus far, it is the most complete and the most wide-ranging in its coverage,” and the American CIA likewise described it as “the greatest counterintelligence treasure trove since the war.”
So Mitrokhin, in defecting from the Soviet Union to Britain, carried out an enormous quantity of classified documents amounting to six large containers.
If one has that much material, then by carefully analyzing it, it may be only natural that the full picture of Soviet intelligence operations would come into view.
That is presumably why the CIA called it “the greatest counterintelligence treasure trove since the war.”
Now then, this vast volume of documents filling six containers was later analyzed, mainly by MI6.
In carrying out the analysis, the wisdom of the world was gathered, including first-rate researchers from the Cambridge University Intelligence Seminar, which specializes in academic research on the history of intelligence activities.
And the results of that analysis were compiled into general books entitled Mitrokhin Archive and Mitrokhin Archive II, and are now sold as ordinary foreign-language books that anyone can obtain.
These books summarize what kinds of intelligence operations the KGB conducted in countries around the world, including the United States and Britain.
And an outline of KGB activities in our own country, Japan, is contained in one chapter of Mitrokhin Archive II, namely “JAPAN.”
So the outline of KGB activities against Japan is also compiled there.
Then what kind of contents were actually there.
Within that chapter, “JAPAN,” are included analytical findings on such points as how much direct support the KGB had given to the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, what kinds of operatives it infiltrated into the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what sort of influence those operatives exerted on Japanese politics through their activities, and furthermore, by what methods industrial espionage was carried out and what kind of benefits the Soviet Union gained from it.
So KGB activities extended not only into the political world but also into industry.
That means that while the Soviet side was controlling the Japanese government in diplomatic negotiations so as to serve Soviet interests, industrial spies were also very active.
Now then, were operations against Japan directed only at the political world and industry.
In fact, it appears there was one more important target of influence operations in addition to these.
What on earth was it.
Among that information, influence operations carried out by the KGB against the “mass media” are also clearly specified.
I see.
So measures directed at the mass media were also being carried out.
Then what sort of measures were taken.
“In Mitrokhin’s files, the names of at least five Japanese journalists appear as having worked as KGB agents in the 1970s.
(This does not include publications of the Japan Socialist Party.)

• An Asahi Shimbun reporter, codename ‘BLYUM’
• A Yomiuri Shimbun reporter, codename ‘SEMYON’
• A Sankei Shimbun reporter, codename ‘KARL’ (or ‘KARLOV’)
• A Tokyo Shimbun reporter, codename ‘FUDZIE’
• A senior political desk reporter at one of Japan’s major newspapers, codename ‘ODEKI’”
  So it has been made clear that not only the Asahi Shimbun, but also the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Sankei Shimbun, which have a strong anti-Soviet image, had KGB agents active within them and engaged in influence operations.
  And regarding the Asahi Shimbun, it seems that the following is written.
  “The KGB has great influence over Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s largest newspaper.”
  What does it mean to say that “the KGB has great influence over the Asahi Shimbun.”
  This suggests either that the operative inside the Asahi Shimbun called “BLYUM” possessed major influence within the paper, or that there may have been multiple operatives inside the Asahi Shimbun besides BLYUM.
  I see.
  That is probably the proper way to understand it.
  Then, overall, about how many operatives were active inside Japanese newspaper companies.
  “By the autumn of 1972, the residents of Tokyo ‘LINE PR’ controlled 31 agents and had concluded 24 confidential contracts.
  The Japanese, in particular, have a national character of reading newspapers more eagerly than any other people in the world, and by feeding false statistical information and the like to the newspapers, the Center attempted to implant an impression of Soviet political leadership.”
  (Mr. Satoshi Fujii’s note: “LINE PR” is an intelligence organization inside the KGB.)
  If one considers how many journalists there actually are within Japanese newspaper companies who are responsible for articles related to Russia, should not this number be regarded as quite large.
  When preparing an article, they probably also check with the in-house “Russia expert,” but if all such “Russia experts” were operatives, then it may not be altogether mistaken to think that the influence of those operations extended to all Russia-related articles published by newspaper companies.
  Then, were influence operations against the media intended only for manipulating Japanese public opinion.
  Apparently not.
  Among media personnel, those with certain connections possess the privilege of being able to access government information that is not ordinarily made public.
  The KGB made use of such privileges of the media for its operations.
  “During the period from 1962 to 1967, when the resident in Tokyo, the main hub of Japanese intelligence information, was absent, the most productive agent was a Tokyo Shimbun journalist, codename ‘KOCHI.’
  He had access to rather high-level gossip, probably not classified documents, from the Cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”
  I see.
  So even the movements of top government officials were being firmly grasped.
  Then how did the Soviet Union report back to the home country the information it obtained in this way.
  Here we find that even a surprising method was utilized.
  “Articles written by the journalist ROY were extremely valuable in communicating intelligence information.”
  Astonishingly, they were using the printed newspaper page itself as a means of transmitting intelligence information.
  Both the Japanese government and the mass media were looked down upon to a remarkable degree.
  And there was yet one more role for operatives in the mass media.
  “He [Mr. Satoshi Fujii’s note: the above-mentioned operative ROY] was also instrumental in recruiting KHUN, who was the partner in Japanese operations of a Japanese-based operation that conducted intelligence work in China.”
  In other words, ordinary Japanese reporters too were being organized as operatives.
  Then how did such reporters become operatives.
  “Most of the KGB agents belonging to the media were probably motivated mainly by money.”
  As they became friendly and began dining together, perhaps things such as, “You’ve told me all sorts of things, so let me treat you today,” became the starting point, but in the end it means that the relationship developed into one in which money was being received.
  And while there seem to have been many such cases, of course it appears that not all cases were of that type.
  The following type of case is also written about.
  “Mitrokhin’s materials state that, regarding ‘SEMYON,’ during a visit to Moscow in the early 1970s, ‘he was recruited on the basis of compromising material.’
  It involved black-market currency exchange and immoral conduct, one of the KGB’s ‘honey traps.’”
  “SEMYON” is the KGB operative within the Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned earlier.
  In other words, he was trapped by the KGB, had his weakness seized upon, and was made into an operative.
  It seems that the Japanese mass media are far too lacking in vigilance toward foreign intelligence operations.
  Because of that, information is ordinarily controlled in the direction foreign powers wish to push, and by that the interests of the Japanese people are harmed.
  Is it not the case that, having been soaked to the core in “pacifist education,” they act as media people without even entertaining the natural assumption that foreign countries may maliciously conduct influence operations against Japan.
  Now, when we read newspapers in everyday life and think of countries we suspect of exercising strong influence within the reporting, I imagine that more people will think not of Russia but of China, South Korea, North Korea, or America.
  Of course the government must be cautious in speaking about the way the mass media ought to be, but I think it is in fact also necessary for the government to begin pursuing the mass media on the basis of concrete evidence.
  For example, even though Naoto Kan himself, who was Prime Minister at the time, admitted in the Diet that over 200 million yen in donations had been made from the Democratic Party side to an organization related to North Korea, the matter was not widely covered by the mass media, and even now I think the majority of the people remain unaware of this fact.
  By giving examples of such facts, I believe the government itself should raise the issue that foreign influence may have deeply penetrated the mass media, and that this may be seriously distorting reporting.
  And through such action, I believe it is at least important in itself to bring about the collapse of trust in the present mass media.
  If you think that the current state of the Japanese mass media, weak against the information operations of foreign powers, is wrong, I ask you to click.