Originally posted on July 5, 2019.
Continuing from the previous chapter, this piece examines the internal power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party behind the Hong Kong protests, the confrontation between the Jiang Zemin faction and the Xi Jinping faction over control of Hong Kong, and the hollowing out of “one country, two systems.”
Through its discussion of the true nature of Chief Executive Carrie Lam, the deception in the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s explanations, the lineage of Communist Party officials who have managed Hong Kong, Macau, and overseas operations, and the structure of purges and internal warfare surrounding the Xi Jinping regime, it seeks to uncover why Hong Kong residents rose up at the risk of their lives.

2019-07-05
The spokesman of China’s Foreign Ministry denies Beijing’s management and control and argues that “it is the decision of the Hong Kong government itself,” but Hong Kong residents are rising up precisely because Hong Kong has no such “autonomy.”

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.
Forces that want to drag Xi Jinping down.
“The Chief Executive is a puppet of the Chinese Communist Party and has no choice. Otherwise even her family would be put at risk.”
“She is only being used as the point man to openly carry out an evil law.”　
This is the analysis of anti-Chinese Communist democratic activists, and I think the same way.　
Quite a few Hong Kong intellectuals say, “For more than twenty years, the Chinese Communist Party has continually intervened in Hong Kong’s administration and now holds full management and governing power,” and “What Hong Kong people have sought, together with the preservation of freedom and democracy, is ‘Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong,’ but it has become a mere formality.”　　
Meanwhile, the spokesman of China’s Foreign Ministry denies Beijing’s management and control and argues that “it is the decision of the Hong Kong government itself,” but Hong Kong residents are rising up precisely because Hong Kong has no such “autonomy.”　
The ornamental Chief Executive Carrie Lam was appointed Chief Executive in March 2017 and took office in July.
In conclusion, she was a figure promoted by Zhang Dejiang, who in the first Xi administration ranked third in protocol order and was then the head of the Chinese government’s top organ overseeing Hong Kong, the “Central Hong Kong and Macao Work Coordination Group.”
After stating four basic conditions that the Chinese government demands of a Hong Kong Chief Executive, namely “love of country and love of Hong Kong, the trust of the central authorities, governing ability, and the support of the Hong Kong people,” he stressed that “because the Chief Executive serves as a bridge between the central authorities and Hong Kong, there is no way not to interfere in the election,” and for this he was criticized by Hong Kong democrats as having “used strong-arm measures in the Chief Executive election system.”　
Zhang Dejiang of the Jiang Zemin faction first visited Hong Kong in 2004 as the incumbent Party Secretary of Guangdong Province, and was the cadre who took charge of the Sinicization of the Pan-Pearl River Delta, that is, Hong Kong and Macau.　
However, above him there is an even greater mastermind.
For many years, Hong Kong, Macau, and overseas operations were handled by the Jiang Zemin faction’s super-heavyweight figure, the “No. 21 figure,” former Vice President Zeng Qinghong, formerly ranked fifth.
Control over those operations was handed off to Xi Jinping, then taken over by Zhang Dejiang, and now in the second Xi Jinping administration the position is held by Han Zheng, of the Jiang Zemin faction and the first-ranking vice premier, who is ranked seventh.　
The position that Zeng Qinghong obtained at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, namely Politburo Standing Committee member, First Secretary of the Secretariat, and President of the Central Party School, was inherited from the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 onward by Xi Jinping.　
In other words, Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong played a major role in Xi Jinping’s rise through the ranks.
The two masterminds had aimed at a puppet regime just as they had during the Hu Jintao administration.
But once Xi Jinping seized the positions of General Secretary and President, he suddenly bared his fangs.
Together with Wang Qishan, who at the time ranked sixth, under the slogan of “tigers and flies alike,” he seized the vested interests and assets of the Jiang Zemin faction, and began arresting, one after another, Zeng Qinghong’s subordinates, beginning with a Vice Minister of State Security, on charges such as corruption, driving them into prison or to their deaths.　
The internal war among Chinese Communist Party cadres over the seizure of Hong Kong and Macau interests, details of which will be mentioned later, can be thought to have surfaced in the form of the evil law revising the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and the Hong Kong protests, which are driving Chairman Xi into a dead end.
The nightmare of “dynastic revolution.”　
I once wrote in this magazine things showing that Hong Kong is a dangerous place for Xi Jinping and his faction.　
From June 29 to July 1, 2017, Xi Jinping and his wife visited Hong Kong.
It was his first visit there since becoming President, and the first in nine years, but it was reported that Hong Kong’s security and police authorities raised the city’s security level during his visit to the highest anti-terror alert, and that an elite force of between 8,000 and 10,000 personnel, including mobile units and special police units, was deployed.　
From mainland China as well, large numbers of the People’s Liberation Army and armed police were thrown in beforehand, creating a system so that outsiders could not approach President Xi, who was “afraid of assassination.”　
It was also reported that just before Xi entered Macau last October, Zheng Xiaosong, the chief of the Macau Liaison Office, a Chinese government outpost and the top Chinese official in Macau, died in a fall.　
As for the cause of death of Zheng, who belonged to the Jiang Zemin faction hostile to Xi’s faction, the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office announced that he had “jumped to his death from his apartment, tormented by depression.”
The detention or fatal fall of a cadre versed not merely in “the underside of China” but in the evil of the world itself could very well be taken as an act of silencing.　
The problem is not that only the Jiang Zemin faction is evil.
Among the rulers of that neighboring country, it is the custom for a new evil to drive out an old evil, and this is called dynastic revolution.　
“The elders will no longer protect Xi Jinping. They have given up on him.”　
The other day I heard such words from a certain source said to be “close” even to the Deng Xiaoping family.
Has the result of devoting heart and soul to purges and weakening measures in order to seize every vested interest from the entrenched interest holders simply been that he now has nothing but enemies?　
Furthermore, there are figures such as Wang Yang, ranked fourth, who is said to have made an off-the-record remark with the significant implication that “it would be good if China’s system changed because of the U.S.-China trade war,” and Wang Huning, ranked fifth, an ultra-Marxist who controls the media and propaganda, and one cannot tell at all which way they are facing.
What is most exasperating is that China’s rulers are embodiments of greed, waging a “fight to the death” while dragging in the world and the media, all while seeking the fisherman’s profit.　
In other words, there is absolutely no such thing as a citizen’s point of view.
To be continued.