Published on August 1, 2019.
This essay introduces a column by Kadota Ryusho and discusses Japan’s review of preferential export measures for three items, including hydrogen fluoride, and the removal of South Korea from the “white list” as a historic turning point in Japanese diplomacy.
It criticizes the Foreign Ministry, the Japan–Korea Parliamentary League, and pro-Korean media such as the Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun, arguing that Japan must monitor these “enemies within” in order to build a genuine Japan–South Korea relationship.

August 1, 2019.
What is important for us is how to monitor the Foreign Ministry, the Japan–Korea Parliamentary League, and pro-Korean media such as the Asahi and Mainichi, which will try to turn the present measures back to square one.
The following is from the serialized column by Kadota Ryusho, one of the finest journalists working today, published at the beginning of the monthly magazine Hanada, released yesterday, which is essential reading for the Japanese people and for people all over the world.
What the Japanese people are being asked in the “battle with South Korea.”
It is truly gratifying that, as Japan–South Korea relations have entered a new stage, the possibility has emerged that the very nature of Japanese diplomacy may fundamentally change.
The review of preferential export measures to South Korea for three items, including hydrogen fluoride, and the measure to remove South Korea from the “white list” are historic and epoch-making.
South Korea must feel as if it has been struck on the head with a hammer.
For the first time, it has been hit back by Japan, a country it had looked down on, assuming it could do anything it wanted.
This regulation against South Korea was possible precisely because it was handled by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
In addition to years of countless discourtesies, South Korea’s conduct—the destruction of the comfort women agreement, the “requisitioned workers” ruling, the ban on marine products, the radar lock-on incident, and so on—finally exceeded even the limits of the tolerant Japanese people’s patience.
In January of this year, Prime Minister Abe instructed each ministry to conduct concrete studies of countermeasures based on international law.
As the entire government entered into that work, the ministry that tackled it most enthusiastically was the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
It searched “steadily” and “seriously” for measures that would have the maximum effect if regulations against South Korea were implemented.
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Seko Hiroshige ordered officials to find an effective method that would also pose no legal problems.
As a result of ministry-wide hearings and simulations, what Japan should do as sanctions against South Korea gradually became clear.
Team Abe, centered on Imai Takaya, the Prime Minister’s Secretary from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, who enjoys Prime Minister Abe’s deep trust, and on the unique Abe–Suga–Seko line built within the Prime Minister’s Office, finally achieved an epoch-making policy shift.
On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry, which for many years had allowed South Korea to do whatever it wanted, was shocked by this policy change.
No, to be precise, the present measures were possible because they were not handled by the Foreign Ministry.
Japanese diplomats think only that “diplomacy means avoiding trouble” or that “the first principle of diplomacy is to make concessions to the other side.”
Unable to gather proper information at overseas missions, and unable to build human networks in the countries where they are posted, they continue their elegant diplomatic lives, with their basic posture being merely “to complete their terms without incident.”
We must not forget why South Korea became so arrogant in the first place.
South Korea is a country of sadaejuui, bowing completely before the strong and behaving arrogantly toward the weak.
In truth, it was Japan that made that country into such a “rude country” toward Japan.
The Japan–Korea Parliamentary League, swarming around vested interests; Japanese newspapers that fabricated nonexistent forcible recruitment of comfort women and stirred up Korean anger again and again; and the Foreign Ministry, which had nothing in mind except “concessions” and “appeasement,” all combined to lead South Korea to the outrageous misunderstanding that it could do anything it wanted to Japan.
In other words, unless Japan changes those “enemies within,” no new Japan–South Korea relationship will be born in the future.
On the other hand, South Korea, having been written off by Japan, is in a miserable position.
No matter how loudly President Moon Jae-in shouts that “the one that will suffer damage is the Japanese economy,” the South Korean economy cannot function “without Japan.”
Let us see just how far China can help South Korea.
As of July 17, Japan says, “This is not a regulation,” and Japan is now in the stage of “waiting” for South Korea to take retaliatory measures, such as imposing high tariffs on imports from Japan.
If South Korea takes retaliatory measures, Japan will probably take new countermeasures.
In other words, from this point onward, Japan’s true fearsome power will be displayed.
If Japan begins sanctions in the financial field, the South Korean economy will not last long.
South Korean banks with poor financial conditions use, for example, credit lines from Japanese banks to settle trade payments, and this can be called a complete “Japan-dependence disease.”
If this area is restricted, credit anxiety will arise, and a currency crisis will begin all at once.
Furthermore, if it becomes clear that hydrogen fluoride and other materials necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons have passed to North Korea, this would fall under Article 10 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, which applies “when it is particularly necessary for maintaining the peace and security of our country,” and it would become possible to apply to South Korea the licensing system for remittances stipulated in Article 16 of the same Act.
In other words, every remittance to South Korea would require permission, creating, in effect, a state of “remittance suspension” from Japan.
How one views South Korea as it collapses is up to each person.
Japan should quietly watch South Korea receive the “retribution” for having trampled on and slighted Japan to the very end.
That is precisely when Japan should exercise the three non-Korean principles: “Do not help, do not teach, and do not get involved.”
A true Japan–South Korea relationship will be born from that point onward.
When Koreans look back one by one on the acts they have committed up to now, the possibility will emerge for the first time that Pandora’s box called “historical truth” will open.
If a relationship of moderation and respect between nation and nation can be built between Japan and South Korea, it will be “after that.”
What is important for us is how to monitor the Foreign Ministry, the Japan–Korea Parliamentary League, and pro-Korean media such as the Asahi and Mainichi, which will try to turn the present measures back to square one.
Through the regulations against South Korea, which are said to have received as much as 98 percent support on the Internet, I want to believe that, although it is still far in the future, a “true Japan–South Korea relationship” will be born.