Published on November 27, 2019.
This article examines the confusion at the heart of the Democratic Party administration during the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident through the testimony of Haruo Uehara, former president of Saga University, who advised the Prime Minister’s Office immediately after the disaster.
It focuses on the failure to decide on external cooling equipment, the prime minister’s fixation on technical details, and delays in final decisions, questioning the qualities required of a national leader in a crisis.

November 27, 2019
The residents of Miyagi’s 5th district who voted for Jun Azumi, who was also at the core of the Democratic Party administration at the time, must read this especially carefully.
I am republishing a chapter originally published on March 10, 2019, titled, “All they said was, ‘The prime minister will not make a decision and will not decide.
Since the prime minister is the final decision-maker, nothing can be done.’”
The Japanese people who vote for the Constitutional Democratic Party must read this and engrave it in their hearts.
The residents of Miyagi’s 5th district who voted for Jun Azumi, who was also at the core of the Democratic Party administration at the time, must read this especially carefully.
The following is the continuation of the previous chapter.
A leader unable to decide.
“How could the Japanese people have ended up with such a foolish prime minister?
As far as I know, he may be the worst prime minister in history.”
This was the impression of Haruo Uehara, former president of Saga University, who, as an expert on reactor condensers, had been giving advice and proposals to the Prime Minister’s Office from immediately after the nuclear accident occurred.
Mr. Uehara had been asked for his opinions on energy policy as a whole by many prime ministers, from Takeo Fukuda in earlier years to Shinzo Abe more recently, but he said he was utterly appalled by Mr. Kan.
The sequence of events was as follows.
Immediately after the accident occurred, Mr. Uehara appealed to the Prime Minister’s Office to restore the cooling system and also sent drawings for the installation of external cooling equipment.
On March 16, he was called to Tokyo by Goshi Hosono, special adviser to the prime minister at the time, at the Integrated Headquarters for the Response to the Incident.
He also met Yoshito Edano, chief cabinet secretary at the time, and Banri Kaieda, minister of economy, trade and industry at the time, then once returned to Saga City, where his office was located, and proceeded to arrange the machinery needed for the work.
“However, no matter how much I talked with senior officials at the Prime Minister’s Office, all they said was, ‘The prime minister will not make a decision and will not decide.
Since the prime minister is the final decision-maker, nothing can be done,’” Mr. Uehara said.
At that time, one government official lamented, “The prime minister has no broad perspective at all.
On the contrary, he obsesses over trivial matters that he happens to know about, and he is always two days late in making a judgment.”
That was precisely the structure that was unfolding.
On March 20, former internal affairs minister Kazuhiro Haraguchi of the Democratic Party, former Cabinet Office parliamentary secretary Hiroshi Ogushi, and others gathered at Mr. Uehara’s office to discuss the response to the nuclear accident.
There, Mr. Haraguchi contacted Mr. Kan by mobile phone and put Mr. Uehara on the line, where the following exchange took place.
Mr. Kan: “I have read your report, but I cannot understand it technically.
Where is the external cooling equipment to be attached?
I cannot make a decision unless I know where it should be attached.”
Mr. Uehara: “That should not be something for the prime minister to think about.
Even if you do not understand it technically, surely you can decide whether to do it or not.”
At that, Mr. Kan suddenly flew into a rage, shouting, “What!” and then, in words that could not even be recognized as Japanese, continued yelling endlessly.
Mr. Uehara looked back on it this way in an interview with the writer.
“I was shocked and became truly frightened.
I felt that if the prime minister of a country was in such a state, the country was in danger.”
To be continued.