Published on November 30, 2019.
This article republishes a chapter originally issued on May 21, 2019, discussing how the Taiwanese semiconductor syndicate “Qingbang” expanded, and how its activities relate to Elpida’s business crisis, Toshiba Memory, and China’s interest in Toshiba’s radar technologies.
It examines photomask rights in Taiwanese foundries, the sale of good chips as defective products through underground markets, memory price destruction through below-cost dumping, the leakage of F-35-related technologies, China’s TJ31 fighter, and the memory technologies required for high-precision radar development, arguing that semiconductor technology lies at the heart of national security.
It also criticizes the cold and contemptuous reporting by Asahi Shimbun and NHK during Toshiba’s management crisis.

November 30, 2019
I was reminded of the extremely cold reporting by Asahi Shimbun and NHK toward Toshiba, reporting that looked down on Toshiba as if it were a zombie company.
I am republishing a chapter originally issued on May 21, 2019, under the title: “The reason the bankrupt Elpida fell into financial difficulty was also that the Taiwanese semiconductor syndicate poured memory chips into the market below cost and destroyed the market price.”
A chapter originally published on August 19, 2017, under the title, “The reason the bankrupt Elpida fell into financial difficulty was also that the Taiwanese semiconductor syndicate poured memory chips into the market below cost,” is now in the real-time best ten.
The following is the continuation of the previous chapter.
Emphasis in the text, except for headings, is mine.
The reason “Qingbang” became gigantic.
It is said that at the top stands Chiao Yu-chao, CEO of the Taiwanese memory company Winbond.
There are two reasons why the semiconductor syndicate “Qingbang” became gigantic.
One is the utilization of rights to the circuit prototypes called “photomasks” for chips outsourced by companies around the world to Taiwanese semiconductor foundries.
Because Taiwanese law makes them the property of the factory, no matter how hard Japan works and invests in semiconductor circuit design, similar products appear in the market in the blink of an eye.
The other is that while Taiwanese semiconductor factories accept cheap contracts for mass production of chips, they pass off good products as defective products and sell them in the underground market, using them to create secret funds for Qingbang.
Depending on market conditions, they sell chips at extraordinary prices and manipulate market prices.
The reason the bankrupt Elpida fell into financial difficulty was also that the Taiwanese semiconductor syndicate poured memory chips into the market below cost and destroyed the market price.
The target of Qingbang, now a semiconductor syndicate, is not limited to Toshiba Memory; it also includes the radar technology of Toshiba itself.
In the U.S. JSF, or Joint Strike Fighter, program that produced the F-35, the U.S. government announced that it had suffered damage from “Chinese spies.”
The details have not been made public, but I have also obtained internal information that semiconductor-related technologies connected with flight controllers were leaked to China through subcontractors of the ordering party.
Qingbang was also involved in this.
Recently, China has been advertising the Chinese-made fighter “TJ31,” a copy of the F-35, to countries that cannot purchase weapons from the United States, but there are rumors that its engine performance and radar technology are inferior to those of the original F-35.
What China desperately wants in order to close that technological gap is world-class engine and radar technology, and it is Toshiba that possesses some of the world’s leading radar technology.
The reason the U.S. government has repeatedly blocked attempts by Tsinghua Unigroup, a Chinese semiconductor company, to acquire American memory companies is that it fears China will acquire high-performance radar.
If a Chinese-made F-35 copy fighter were equipped with high-precision radar, China’s reckless expansion could no longer be stopped.
The development of high-precision radar requires processing data through high-speed input and output, and that requires advanced memory technology.
That is the greatest reason the United States has refused Chinese acquisitions of memory companies.
To be continued.
As I reread this piece, I remembered the extremely cold reporting by Asahi Shimbun and NHK toward Toshiba when Toshiba fell into a management crisis over the fraudulent accounting problem at the major U.S. nuclear power company it had acquired, reporting that looked down on Toshiba as if it were a zombie company.
In other words, I became convinced that it is no exaggeration at all to say that they are agents of China.