Japan and the United States Share the Same Basic View of China — Xi Jinping’s State Visit and the Responsibility of Japanese Diplomacy
Published on January 21, 2020.
Continuing from the previous chapter, this article presents a dialogue among Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Sakurai Yoshiko, and Takubo Tadae on Japan-U.S. perceptions of China, President Trump’s “America First,” multilateral cooperation, the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India security network, China’s military expansion, the Senkaku, Hong Kong, and Uyghur issues, and the meaning of receiving President Xi Jinping as a state guest. It examines the challenge of Japanese diplomacy: saying what must be said to China while urging it to act according to international standards.
January 21, 2020
President Trump has declared “America First,” but every country gives top priority to its own national interests. The ways in which they realize those interests vary.
The following is a continuation of the previous chapter. Emphasis in the text is mine.
Japan and the United States Share the Same View of China
Takubo
The current international situation gives me the impression that the order established by the United States after the war, including democracy and globalization, may be in retreat.
Among the European leaders of the Group of Seven advanced nations, perhaps German Chancellor Merkel is the only one still talking about democracy.
And President Trump has put forward “America First.”
Under these circumstances, will a new international order emerge, or are we in a period of transition?
Abe
The G7 began during the era of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War structure as a forum of countries that shared universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights, and that also possessed economic strength.
I believe it has played a major role in economics and security.
It is true that there are challenges to multilateralism, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and the World Trade Organization, WTO.
President Trump has declared “America First,” but every country gives top priority to its own national interests.
The ways in which they realize those interests vary.
However, multilateral cooperation is indispensable in securing one’s national interests.
Recently, President Trump attended the NATO summit and demanded that each country shoulder its share of defense costs.
In maintaining Europe’s defense system, he may also be saying, “Do not rely only on the United States.”
In that context, Japan too must assume responsibility for the security of this region.
Using the increasingly solid U.S.-Japan alliance as leverage, Japan must make efforts to expand an “alliance network,” not only between Japan and the United States, but also among Japan, the United States, and Australia, or among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India.
President Trump is not denying multilateralism, and Japan too would like to make efforts so that the United States remains at the center of the multilateral framework.
Takubo
So, as a premise, Japan and the United States share a common understanding of how to view China.
Abe
In the medium to long term, China is one of the greatest challenges for the international community.
Of course, it is also the greatest opportunity, but China is spending enormous sums to strengthen its military power and is attempting unilateral changes to the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
Amid these circumstances, Japan for a long time did not try to become an international player.
I believed that, in such a situation, Japan and the region could not be protected.
During my first administration, although it was not reported much, I went to Brussels and became the first Japanese prime minister to deliver a speech at the North Atlantic Council, the highest decision-making body of NATO.
That became the starting point for Japan to deepen cooperation with NATO.
The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, ACSA, which allows the mutual provision of goods and services, used to exist only between Japan and the United States, but since the second Abe administration was formed, we have expanded the security network with agreements between Japan and Australia, Japan and Britain, Japan and France, and Japan and Canada, and we are now in the final stages of negotiations with India.
In the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific, Japan recognizes that it must contribute to the region as a central player, and it has been steadily accumulating efforts for that purpose.
Takubo
The United States has an extremely tough policy toward China, but I feel that your policy toward China, at least in the short term, may be diverging from that of the United States.
Abe
Immediately after Mr. Trump was elected president, I visited Trump Tower in New York and had a long conversation with him, and the central theme was China.
He listened very attentively.
Japan and the United States do not differ in their basic understanding.
Japan and the United States are allies, and the alliance is the foundation of Japan’s diplomacy and security.
There must be no wavering in that.
At the same time, as Prime Minister of Japan, I have said to China what must be said.
When we say that Japan-China relations have “returned to a normal track,” it means that, compared with the period when mutual visits between leaders were not taking place, both sides have now come to visit each other.
Precisely because there are issues, we must engage in dialogue.
I have told President Xi Jinping, for example, that China must not misread Japan’s will regarding the Senkaku Islands.
I will continue to say what must be said, and of course Japan’s basic position will not change.
Japan will not make concessions on fundamental issues such as security or territory.
However, it remains true that China is an extremely important and major player in the world.
As China continues to achieve economic growth, I believe its power will increase.
Therefore, as a fellow Asian country and as a neighboring country, Japan must encourage China to act in accordance with international standards.
That is why, this time, we will receive President Xi as a state guest.
The meaning of this is that, as the new Reiwa era begins, it will be an opportunity for Japan and China to confirm their shared recognition that both countries bear great responsibility for regional and global peace, stability, and prosperity, and to share the recognition that they must fulfill that responsibility.
Under that sense of responsibility, we made the decision to invite him as a state guest.
For example, regarding the “Belt and Road Initiative,” we have said from the beginning that issues such as transparency, openness, economic viability, and debt sustainability must be made consistent with international standards.
At the G20 Summit held in Japan in June of the first year of Reiwa, the Chinese side began to assert, “We will follow the rules.”
However, we must watch carefully to see whether they actually do so.
Of course, there are times when they do not change their thinking.
On issues such as the Senkaku Islands, the detention of Japanese nationals, and China’s response to Hong Kong, I intend to say firmly what must be said.
Sakurai
At present, an overwhelming majority of American public opinion holds an extremely severe view of China policy.
I think it is important how we understand America’s China policy.
However, we must always keep in mind the possibility that the United States could join hands with China over Japan’s head.
At the same time, the United States today is moving in the direction of defending important values such as democracy and human rights.
How Japan contributes to that is, I think, connected with Mr. Xi’s visit to Japan this time.
Abe
I believe that America’s security stance and concerns toward China are not so much those of the Trump administration as they are a common position shared by both Republicans and Democrats.
Unless China significantly changes its behavior, I do not think America’s response will change so easily.
On the other hand, regarding U.S.-China trade friction, Mr. Trump probably wants to take the lead.
We hope that trade relations between the two countries will become stable, and I believe the world economy also seeks that.
Then how should Japan contribute?
For example, there is the issue of fifth-generation mobile communications systems, or 5G, which will form a foundation for security.
At the recent G20 as well, Japan declared that it would become a leader among countries that share values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
As Japan is a nation built on technology, we expressed our intention to make it possible for Japan to provide the foundation for leadership.
In that respect as well, Japan intends to make a proper contribution.
Making Maximum Use of the “State Guest” Visit
Takubo
Returning to the immediate issue, if Mr. Xi is invited as a state guest, it will inevitably lead to a visit to China by His Majesty the Emperor.
Also, there is concern that the timing of receiving him as a state guest, while bloody incidents are occurring in Hong Kong and while viewing cherry blossoms, would be extremely problematic.
Abe
When I recently held summit meetings with President Xi and Premier Li Keqiang, I strongly called for restraint in Hong Kong and strongly urged that the issue should be resolved through dialogue.
As I said earlier, inviting him as a state guest is to make the visit an opportunity for both countries to share the recognition that they have, and should have, responsibility for the peace and stability of the region.
We will make efforts, but we would also like the Chinese side to make such efforts.
Sakurai
Among the people around me, there is not a single person who supports treating Mr. Xi as a “state guest.”
Moreover, all of them are supporters of the Abe administration.
You said in May that Mr. Xi would be treated as a state guest, before the Hong Kong issue arose, but after the Hong Kong issue broke out, world opinion changed completely.
The Uyghur issue has also emerged.
Even though the proposal was made before the new situation emerged, is it not possible to change course?
In addition, I think it may run counter to the national interest.
Abe
I think many readers of Sound Argument may sympathize with your opinion, Ms. Sakurai.
To repeat myself, a state guest visit is indeed something of extreme importance to the Japanese people.
Precisely because this is an important visit, I want to make it one in which both sides firmly recognize their responsibilities.
Sakurai
You will raise issues such as the Senkaku problem, the unjust detention of Japanese nationals, and human rights problems in Hong Kong and the Uyghur region overall, correct?
Abe
I have raised them up to now, and at the Japan-China-South Korea summit meeting to be held in China at the end of the year, I will naturally assert what must be said in the summit meeting with Mr. Xi.
Takubo
Has Japan not become overwhelmingly more advantageous in Japan-China relations?
The Belt and Road Initiative and other policies have failed, the Chinese economy is not in good shape, and President Trump has launched a trade war against China.
When China desperately wanted help from Japan, you also extended your hand, and it seems that things unexpectedly went well for both sides.
Is that not precisely why it is dangerous?
Rather, in such a case, would it not be better not to play the “state guest card,” but instead to present a demand such as, “I will visit Yasukuni Shrine”?
Abe
Japan-China relations were in an extremely difficult situation when I became prime minister.
I believed that stabilizing Japan-China relations was necessary for Japan’s national interest, and it was also strongly demanded by the international community.
We have made repeated efforts to stabilize the relationship, and although I have not yielded on anything that should not be yielded, the relationship has improved and mutual visits have proceeded smoothly.
This time, I would like to make maximum use of the fact that both countries have agreed on a state visit.
