Originally published on June 24, 2019.
This is a piece that positions the Mitrokhin Archive as “top-class, first-rate historical material of the highest order” and discusses what kinds of operations the KGB carried out against the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the industrial sector, and even the Japanese mass media.
Through the penetration of the Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun, and others, manipulation of public opinion, intelligence gathering, and operations that exploited journalists’ financial motives and vulnerabilities, it severely denounces the vulnerability of Japan’s news organizations and the influence of foreign powers.
2019-06-24
How much direct support the KGB had provided to the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, what kinds of operatives it had infiltrated into the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, through the activities of those operatives, into Japanese politics
This is a chapter originally published on 2018-04-10 under the title, “The Mitrokhin Archive is, quite literally, ‘top-class, first-rate historical material of the highest order’ concerning the intelligence activities of the Soviet KGB.”
As an article about the Mitrokhin Archive, rather than the Wikipedia article introduced in the previous chapter, the blog post titled “The Reality of Foreign Covert Operations Directed at the Japanese Mass Media,” which I just discovered on the Internet at kironitatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-83.html, is probably more accurate, including in the way it is written.
＊As I reread this chapter, I was reminded of the series of activities by David Kaye, who bears a title such as United Nations Special Rapporteur.
Anyone with a brain beyond that of a kindergarten child can understand that he is an agent of China and the Korean Peninsula.
He has been made to submit such ludicrous reports as “the freedom of Japan’s news organizations is being infringed”…and the people feeding information to people of that sort are groups including lawyers such as the husband of Mizuho Fukushima.
In other words, if one considers that agents of China and the Korean Peninsula are operating behind the scenes, the whole course of events immediately becomes clear.＊
The “Electronic Magazine” Genji Vol. 4 was recently released, and in it, Satoshi Fujii has written shocking material about intelligence operations conducted by the Soviet KGB.
I will introduce its contents, including quotations from it.
Mitrokhin was a former KGB employee who defected from the Soviet Union to Britain in 1992, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
When he defected to Britain with the assistance of the British intelligence service MI6, he handed MI6 classified documents packed into no fewer than “six large containers.”
This Mitrokhin Archive is, quite literally, “top-class, first-rate historical material of the highest order” concerning the intelligence activities of the Soviet KGB.
The American FBI described the Mitrokhin Archive as “the most complete and extensive intelligence ever received,” while the American CIA described it as “the greatest repository of counterintelligence information since the war.”
When Mitrokhin defected from the Soviet Union to Britain, he brought out an enormous quantity of classified documents amounting to six large containers.
With this much material, it may be only natural that, if analyzed painstakingly, the full picture of Soviet intelligence activities would become visible.
That is presumably why the CIA called it “the greatest repository of counterintelligence information since the war.”
Now, these six containers full of documents were subsequently analyzed primarily by MI6.
For the analysis, intellectual expertise from around the world was assembled, including leading researchers from the University of Cambridge Intelligence Seminar, which specializes in academic research on the “history of intelligence activities.”
The results of that analysis were compiled into general-interest books titled “Mitrokhin Archive” and “Mitrokhin Archive II,” which are now sold as ordinary foreign-language books available to anyone.
These books summarize the kinds of intelligence activities the KGB carried out in countries around the world, including the United States and Britain.
And an outline of KGB activities in our country, Japan, is contained in a chapter titled “JAPAN” in “Mitrokhin Archive II.”
Remarkably, an outline of KGB activities against Japan has also been compiled.
So what, in fact, did it contain?
The chapter “JAPAN” contains analytical findings on such points as how much direct support the KGB had provided to the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party, what kinds of operatives it had infiltrated into the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how the activities of those operatives had influenced Japanese politics, and furthermore, what methods were used to conduct industrial espionage and what benefits the Soviet Union obtained from it.
In other words, KGB activities extended not only into the political world but also into the industrial world.
That would mean that, while attempts were made to control the Japanese government so that diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union would benefit the Soviet side, industrial spies were also highly active.
Now then, were operations against Japan limited only to the political and industrial worlds?
In fact, it appears that there was one more important target of operations in addition to these.
What could that have been?
Among such information, the covert operations the KGB conducted against the “mass media” are also explicitly recorded.
I see.
So measures aimed at the mass media were also carried out.
Then what kinds of measures were undertaken?
“Mitrokhin’s files name at least five Japanese journalists who operated as KGB agents during the 1970s. (This does not include publications of the Japan Socialist Party.)
・A reporter for the Asahi Shimbun, codename ‘BLYUM’
・A reporter for the Yomiuri Shimbun, codename ‘SEMYON’
・A reporter for the Sankei Shimbun, codename ‘KARL (or KARLOV)’
・A reporter for the Tokyo Shimbun, codename ‘FUDZIE’
・A senior political reporter for one of Japan’s major newspapers, codename ‘ODEKI’”
It is revealed, then, that KGB agents were active and engaged in information operations not only at the Asahi Shimbun, but also at the Yomiuri Shimbun and Sankei Shimbun, which have strong “anti-Soviet” images.
And with regard to the Asahi Shimbun, it is said that the following description appears.
“The KGB has great influence over Japan’s largest newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun.”
What does it mean to say, “The KGB has great influence over the Asahi Shimbun”?
This indicates that the operative inside the Asahi Shimbun referred to above as “BLYUM” wielded great influence within the Asahi Shimbun, or that there may have been multiple operatives inside the Asahi Shimbun in addition to BLYUM.
I see.
That is probably the appropriate way to interpret it.
Then, overall, how many operatives were active inside Japanese newspaper companies?
“By the autumn of 1972, the Tokyo resident staff of ‘LINE PR’ had 31 agents and had concluded 24 secrecy agreements.
The Japanese in particular are among the most avid newspaper-reading people in the world, and by feeding false statistical information and the like to newspapers, the Centre sought to instill impressions favorable to the Soviet political leadership.”
(Note by Satoshi Fujii: “LINE PR” was an intelligence organization within the KGB.)
Considering how many reporters inside Japanese newspaper companies were actually assigned to Russia-related coverage, should this number not be regarded as quite large?
When writing articles, they probably also checked with the company’s internal “Russia experts,” but if all such “Russia experts” were operatives, then it would not necessarily be wrong to think that the influence of these operations extended across the entire body of Russia-related articles published by the newspaper companies.
Then, were operations against the media conducted solely for the purpose of manipulating Japanese public opinion?
Apparently not.
Among media personnel, some people with particular connections have the privilege of being able to access government information that is not ordinarily made public.
The KGB made use of these privileges enjoyed by the media in its operations.
“During the period from 1962 to 1967, when there was no resident officer in Tokyo, Japan’s principal center for intelligence information, the most successful agent was a Tokyo Shimbun journalist codenamed ‘KOCHI.’
Although he probably did not have access to classified documents of the Cabinet or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had access to fairly high-level gossip.”
I see.
So even the movements of senior government officials were being thoroughly grasped.
Then how did the Soviet Union report the information thus obtained back to the home country?
Here we learn that even an unexpected means was used.
“Articles written by the journalist ROY were extremely valuable in the communication of intelligence information.”
Astonishingly, newspaper pages themselves were being used directly as a means of transmitting intelligence information.
Both the Japanese government and the mass media were treated with remarkable contempt.
And there was yet another role played by operatives within the mass media.
“He (Satoshi Fujii’s note: the above-mentioned operative ROY) made efforts to recruit KHUN, who was also his intelligence partner in Japan and had conducted intelligence activities in China.”
In other words, ordinary Japanese reporters were also being organized as operatives.
Then how did these reporters become operatives?
“Most KGB agents belonging to the media were probably motivated mainly by money.”
As they became friendly and began eating meals together, something like, “You’ve taught me all sorts of things, so I’ll treat you today,” was probably the starting point, but in the end, it developed into a relationship in which they received money.
And although there were many such cases, of course it appears that these were not the only kinds of cases.
Cases such as the following are also described.
“Mitrokhin’s materials state that, regarding ‘SEMYON,’ while visiting Moscow in the early 1970s, ‘he came to be recruited on the basis of compromising material.’
It involved exchanging currency on the black market and immoral conduct (one of the KGB’s ‘honey traps’).”
“SEMYON” is the KGB operative inside the Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned earlier.
In other words, the KGB set a trap for him, obtained leverage over him through his weakness, and forced him to become an operative.
It seems that the Japanese mass media are far too lacking in vigilance against foreign intelligence activities.
As a result, information is presumably controlled in the direction foreign powers wish it to flow, and through this, the interests of the Japanese people are routinely harmed.
Having been thoroughly immersed in “pacifist education,” are there not people acting as members of the mass media without even considering the obvious assumption that foreign countries may conduct malicious covert operations against Japan?
Now, when we read newspapers in our daily lives and think of countries that we suspect may exert a strong influence over the news, I think many people would probably think of China, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States rather than Russia.
Of course, there are areas where the government must exercise caution in intervening in how the mass media should operate, but I believe it may in fact also be necessary for the government to begin pursuing the mass media on the basis of concrete evidence.
For example, although the fact that more than 200 million yen in donations had been made from the Democratic Party side to an organization connected with North Korea was something that then Prime Minister Naoto Kan himself acknowledged in the Diet, it was not widely covered by the mass media, and I believe that even now the majority of the public remains unaware of this fact.
By presenting facts such as these as examples, I believe the government itself should raise the question of whether the influence of foreign powers has deeply penetrated the mass media and whether that is severely distorting reporting.
And through such actions, I believe that, at the very least, it is important in itself to bring about a loss of trust in the mass media as they exist today.
Those who believe that there is something wrong with the current state of the Japanese mass media, which is vulnerable to information operations by foreign powers, are asked to click.