Originally published on August 30, 2020.
This chapter examines how visits to Yasukuni Shrine—which had never drawn protests from China or South Korea before 1985—were transformed into an international controversy through a series of articles by Asahi Shimbun correspondent Chihiro Kato, representations made by a visiting delegation from the Japan Socialist Party, and the Chinese government’s first official criticism.
It also examines the Diet resolutions and amendments to Japanese law concerning the pardon of convicted war criminals, as well as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ rejection of requests by U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to visit Yasukuni Shrine, thereby tracing how the Yasukuni issue was created and expanded.

2020-08-30
Unbelievably, NHK is broadcasting an entertainment program hosted by Ichiro Furutachi, to whom it is paying a substantial fee, but I have never watched it even once, and I never will.
That is because, until August six years ago, unaware of the true nature of the Asahi Shimbun and continuing to subscribe to it, I also continued to watch TV Asahi’s Hodo Station.
I can never forgive Furutachi because of my bitter resentment and regret over the time I spent watching it, my anger toward them, and the fact that, while serving as the leading example of a pseudo-moralist who spoke on behalf of the Asahi Shimbun, he continued to earn an annual income exceeding one hundred million yen and continued to deceive viewers.
By inviting such a man and paying him a substantial fee, NHK is unwittingly revealing that it is cut from the same cloth as he is.
This chapter also proves that my anger was justified.
The following continues from the preceding chapter.
■ The Issue of Visits to Yasukuni Shrine
By the time of Prime Minister Nakasone in Showa 60 (1985), Japanese prime ministers had visited Yasukuni Shrine approximately sixty times, yet neither China nor South Korea had ever protested before then.
Today, China says such things as, “If the prime minister stops visiting Yasukuni Shrine, Japan–China relations will improve substantially,” but that is absolutely untrue.
The issue of visits to Yasukuni Shrine is a “matter of the Japanese heart.”
If the Japanese were a people who stopped visiting the shrine after being threatened by a foreign country, then even if Japan were occupied, a partisan-style resistance movement would surely never arise.
It is deplorable that not only people in China and South Korea but even some Japanese argue that the prime minister should refrain from visiting the shrine, or that a separate facility should be constructed, because the “so-called Class war criminals” are enshrined there.
As the circumstances described below demonstrate, neither under Japanese domestic law nor under international law do any “so-called Class war criminals” exist in Japan.
Soon after the Peace Treaty came into effect, a national movement arose calling for “the saving of the lives of convicted war criminals, the commutation of their sentences, and their repatriation to Japan,” gathering approximately forty million signatures—about half of Japan’s population.
Both Houses of the Diet adopted resolutions calling for pardons almost unanimously, without distinction between conservatives and reformists.
As a result, on August 6, Showa 28 (1953), the Japanese government “amended the Act on Relief of War Victims and Survivors.”
This removed the treatment of Class A, B, and C war criminals as ordinary criminals and classified those who had died of illness or wounds or had been killed while performing public duties during the war as having died in the line of duty, thereby providing survivors’ pensions and condolence payments to their families.
This resolution and legal amendment ran counter to the original purpose of Article 11 of the Peace Treaty, which was to prevent the pardoning of convicted war criminals.
Nevertheless, all the Allied nations approved these measures equally because even the Allies later reflected that such a provision violated international law.
Thus, beginning in the autumn of Showa 53 (1978), the former “so-called Class war criminals” were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine.
The following year, Prime Minister Ohira visited the shrine twice.
When that same Prime Minister Ohira visited China, he was given an enthusiastic welcome.
However, in August of Showa 60 (1985), Asahi Shimbun correspondent Chihiro Kato began publishing a series of hysterically anti-Japanese articles under such titles as “‘Yasukuni’ Issue—The View of Asian Countries,” “Return to the Prewar Era,” and “Revival of Militarism.”
On August 15, the newspaper published an article based on an interview with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs titled “Hurting Asians—China Criticizes,” decisively escalating the issue.
On August 26 of the same year, a delegation visiting China and headed by Makoto Tanabe, Secretary-General of the Japan Socialist Party, incited the Chinese by declaring, “There is a danger that Prime Minister Nakasone is seeking to turn Japan into a major military power.
Are you not concerned about this!”
In response, the following day, August 27, Vice Premier Yao Yilin issued a statement criticizing Prime Minister Nakasone.
This was the first time China officially criticized a visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
Prime Minister Nakasone had visited the shrine a total of nine times by April 22, Showa 60 (1985), but he stopped visiting after this critical statement was issued.
In April of Heisei 8 (1996), President Clinton expressed a desire to visit Yasukuni Shrine when he came to Japan.
However, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the request.
Furthermore, when President Bush was preparing to visit Japan in February of Heisei 14 (2002), he informed Japan in advance that he wished to visit Yasukuni Shrine together with Prime Minister Koizumi.
Prime Minister Koizumi agreed, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again suppressed the proposal.
The conflict-avoidance mentality of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leaves me utterly speechless with disbelief.
Had the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by both presidents taken place, the persistent protests subsequently made by China and South Korea might never have occurred.
Request from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Testimony of Nobuo Ishihara, then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary.
Sankei Shimbun, January 18, Heisei 26 (2014), “Ippitsu Taron: Our Predecessors Settled the ‘War Criminal’ Issue,” by Keiichiro Nakashizu; “Amendment of the Act on Relief of War Victims and Survivors: Act No. 127 of April 30, Showa 27.”
Article 11 of the Peace Treaty: Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan.
The power to grant clemency, reduce sentences, or grant parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the basis of the decision of the government or governments which imposed the sentence in each instance and on the recommendation of Japan.
In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the basis of the decision of a majority of the governments represented on the Tribunal and on the recommendation of Japan.
(Translation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, “judge ents” was rendered as “judgments.”)
Chihiro Kato: Asahi Shimbun reporter, head of its China General Bureau, editorial staff writer, and editorial writer.
From 2004 to 2008, he appeared alongside Ichiro Furutachi as a commentator on TV Asahi’s Hodo Station.
Beginning in 2010, he served as a professor at the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University.
He was the principal culprit who turned the Yasukuni Shrine issue into an international controversy and brought humiliation upon Japan.