As a defeated nation, we must continue to appeal for their return as a protest against the unjust postwar treatment by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union.
He was so unguarded against Stalin because he believed he was in a strategically advantageous position.
July 17, 2018
The following is from a unique feature on the dialogue between Terumasa Nakanishi (professor emeritus at Kyoto University) and Soki Watanabe (researcher on modern Japanese-American history) in this month’s issue of Voice, one of the monthly magazines that Japanese citizens should read, titled “Right the wrongs of Yalta now, the source of today’s Asian confusion.“
This feature should be read by all Japanese, including history students, and by people worldwide.
The Foolish “Bedding” with Stalin
Watanabe
In February 1945, a meeting between the three leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and J. Stalin, took place at Yalta on the Soviet-held Crimean Peninsula (Yalta Conference).
The secret agreements included “Soviet forced labor for German prisoners of war” and “ceding various interests in the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, and Manchuria to the Soviets.”
The secret agreement was revealed to the American people in February 1946, and the New York World-Telegram criticized the government: “The United States went so far as to bribe Russia to join the fight against the Japs. It was completely unnecessary. Had there ever been such a meaningless bribe?”
Nakanishi
Prime Minister Churchill was well aware of the injustice of the secret Yalta Agreement.
In February 1946, about six months after the end of the war, in an official telegram sent by the British Foreign Office to all diplomatic missions abroad just before the publication of the secret agreement, it was pointed out that President Roosevelt’s signature promising the transfer of Japanese territories, including the Kuril Islands and the Northern Territories, to the Soviet Union was beyond the presidential authority of the United States, and in particular, that the Yalta Agreement was not valid without ratification by the U.S. Congress. In other words, the British government had been deeply suspicious of the validity of the Yalta Agreement from the very beginning.
However, Churchill knew this and signed the agreement without informing even his cabinet to smooth relations with Roosevelt, which was a severe problem from the moral point of view of both the U.S. and the U.K.
From the beginning of the 20th century, Churchill and other members of the British elite became seriously concerned about the downfall of the British Empire.
One of the trends that emerged was “Anglo-Saxonism,” which sought to maintain British hegemony by embracing the United States.
However, this was also the process of the British Empire being absorbed into the Pax Americana (domination by the United States).
In other words, many went out for wool and came home shorn.
The world-historical significance of the two world wars of the 20th century is that the British Empire, which tried to incorporate the United States successfully, was crushed by the United States.
I believe the Yalta Conference was the last historical moment of the “fall of Britain.”
Watanabe.
In March 1946, about a year after the Yalta Conference, Churchill said in his “Iron Curtain” speech that “the Western democracies, especially Britain and the United States, must restrain the Soviets, whose power and ideas continue to spread without end. The British conservatives, who had already known what the consequences of “sharing the bed” with Stalin would be even before the war, must have thought, “Did you realize it by now, you idiot?”
Nakanishi
Roosevelt called (Joseph) Stalin “Uncle Joe” in a friendly way.
However, this was only a stunt to appeal to the American people for friendship with the Soviets, and the American ruling class never let down its guard against the Soviets.
Then, how can we explain Roosevelt’s extraordinary concession to Stalin at the Yalta Conference?
Sometimes, I see the argument in conservative circles in Japan that “The communists brainwashed Roosevelt,” but I do not think the story is that simple.
Although he was not as well-educated as Churchill or Stalin, I believe that Roosevelt’s abilities as a strategist were first-class, including his ability to promote America’s entry into World War II with the aim of world hegemony.
Watanabe
To begin with, there is no evidence that Roosevelt read any books on communism.
He probably never even read the primary literature of Marx and Lenin.
The difficulty in interpreting Roosevelt lies in the fact that we cannot help but think of him as a “first-rate strategist as a result” despite his illiteracy.
Nakanishi.
It was rather his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, who was aptly named “Red First Lady,” who was an avid reader of books related to communism, wasn’t it?
Watanabe.
I believe that Roosevelt had the confidence, or perhaps overconfidence, to manipulate Stalin at will.
In November and December 1943, Roosevelt stayed at the Soviet Embassy during the Tehran talks, which brought together the same three major powers as the Yalta talks: the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.
According to one Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paper, conversations in the embassy were wiretapped entirely at the time, and the document discusses how Roosevelt’s decision was dangerous and foolish from a security standpoint.
Roosevelt was exposing information within his administration to the Soviets as if he were an “exposed maniac.”
But that is why I cannot believe that Stalin’s communist spies manipulated Roosevelt.
On the contrary, Roosevelt may have thought he was manipulating the Soviets by daring to leak classified information.
He was so unguarded toward Stalin because he believed he was in a strategically advantageous position.
Nakanishi.
After all, Roosevelt aimed to destroy the British Empire and for the U.S. to gain world hegemony, and Japan and the Soviet Union were merely pawns in this effort.
This aim was half successful, and the U.S. became the world’s dominant power after the war.
The Cold War was the cost to achieve this goal.
Does this mean that Japan succeeded in taking over the country, but it was more difficult for the Soviet Union than expected?
In this sense, it would still be wrong to say that Roosevelt was manipulated by the Soviets.
Roosevelt’s Shady Dealings
Nakanishi.
Similarly, it is also incorrect to say, as leftist progressive historians do, that “the Roosevelt administration was friendly to socialist policies such as the New Deal, and that a kind of sympathy for socialism led to its lax response to Stalin.
In the first place, there was no moral integrity in Roosevelt’s words and actions at all, as he tried to carry out his policies according to one principle or ideology other than American hegemony.
In a secret meeting with Churchill over the Atlantic on August 9, 1941, Roosevelt, already clearly poised to enter World War II, declared that “neither [Britain nor the U.S.] seeks territorial expansion [in this war]” and that “neither desires territorial changes inconsistent with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned [for national self-determination]. The “Atlantic Charter,” itself a declaration of warlike propaganda, was issued.
Around the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, through U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew, proposed a Japan-U.S. summit meeting with Roosevelt to avoid a war between the two countries.
However, the U.S. stalled the meeting by pretending to be interested in it and then kicked off the conference with Konoe’s request.
In the meantime, he and Churchill had held the Atlantic talks.
In 1941, the U.S. was very insincere, almost deceptive, in its diplomatic dealings with Japan, including this one incident.
The final straw was the “Hull Note,” a coercive ultimatum.
I cannot help but wonder why postwar Japanese historians have not pointed out Roosevelt’s insidious treatment of Japan.
Watanabe.
I am currently working on a translation of “Back Door to War” by Professor Charles Tansill of Georgetown University’s Department of History (“Roosevelt’s Diplomacy 1933-1941” to be published this fall by Soshisha).
According to this book, when Prime Minister Konoe asked Roosevelt to meet with him, he insisted that the meeting would not be mentioned to the media. Still, the Roosevelt administration leaked the meeting request.
Konoe wanted to proceed with the negotiations discreetly to avoid being noticed by domestic hardliners against the U.S.
If his moves were “discovered,” he would surely lose his position.
I can only assume that the Roosevelt administration leaked this intending to destroy the Japan-U.S. summit.
Nakanishi
For the U.S., the series of Japan-U.S. negotiations from the spring of 1941 to the “Hull Note” was itself a “fake,” that is, a deception operation to buy time to prepare for the outbreak of war against Japan.
From the very beginning, Roosevelt had no intention of trying to compromise with Japan and avoid war.
The Northern Territories were “an issue between Japan and the Allies.
Watanabe
Also, at the Yalta Conference, a statement was issued calling for the restoration of sovereignty and autonomy taken away by the invading states.
The proviso “by the invading states” is based on the logic that the Soviet Union, as a member of the Allied Powers, is not an invading state and that the proviso does not apply to countries that have been deprived of their freedom by the Soviets.
The focus here is on the treatment of Poland.
World War II began when Nazi Germany violated the independence of Poland, whose security was guaranteed by Britain and France.
At the time, there was a Polish government-in-exile in London, and Britain guaranteed Poland’s independence.
Thus, Churchill had a duty to protect the Polish government in exile.
Meanwhile, Roosevelt also promised to restore freedom in the country to win Polish voters’ votes in the November 1944 elections.
At the time of the Yalta Conference, however, communist organizations had already been established in Poland with the support of the Soviets.
What’s more, Churchill and Roosevelt had approved of the situation.
The two men approved the communization of not only Poland but also Eastern Europe because they were clearly aware that they could not have defeated Nazi Germany without the help of Soviet military power, and they felt a strong sense of guilt.
Nakanishi
During World War II, the Pacific front was overwhelmed by the overwhelming military power of the United States.
However, the Allied victory would not have been possible on the European front without the four years of deadly battles and enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet forces against Nazi Germany.
It is true that in June 1944, after the Normandy landings, the U.S. and British Allied forces opened the Western Front and began their advance toward Germany. Still, the number of casualties was tiny compared to the deaths suffered in the previous German-Soviet war.
It was because most of Germany’s war-fighting capability was directed toward the war against the Soviet Union, i.e., the Eastern Front.
Watanabe.
In the Second World War, the Soviets lost a total of 20 million lives.
This high number of casualties must have been a “psychological handicap” for Roosevelt and Churchill in their negotiations with Stalin.
Nakanishi.
From the perspective of these two men, the U.S. and Britain, who were in a position and ability to view the war on a global scale, must have known that they had no choice but to give the Soviets a reasonable “share” of the war, based on the nature of World War II as an imperialist war to capture concessions.
In other words, they “gave” Poland and Eastern Europe to Stalin, knowing they would be placed under an oppressive communist regime.
It is clear from this point that the “no territorial expansion” policy in the Atlantic Charter was nothing more than propaganda for the Axis powers or their own people.
Furthermore, what the Japanese should look back on today is the relationship between the secret Yalta Agreement and the Northern Territories issue.
American historians make excuses such as “Roosevelt was unaware of the existence of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Friendship (1855) and the Treaty of Exchange of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin (1875),” but this is, of course, a lie.
The U.S. State Department, as well as Roosevelt, knew that the Kuril Islands, especially the four northern islands, were inherently Japanese territory, and they ceded them to the Soviets; in other words, the Allied nations as a whole expanded their territory, which is the prerogative of a conqueror.
The Japanese government relies on the aforementioned Atlantic Charter, in which Roosevelt and Churchill advocated “non-territorial expansion” as the basis for demanding the return of the Northern Territories, claiming that they are “unjustly occupied by Russia.” as a pillar.
However, if we look in detail at the actions of the U.S. and U.K. leaders during the war leading up to the Yalta Conference, we must not forget that the U.S. and U.K. created the Northern Territories issue.
In other words, the Northern Territories is not an issue between Japan and the Soviet Union (Japan and Russia), but between Japan and the Allied Powers.
Watanabe.
As you have pointed out, the Northern Territories issue that still plagues Japan today is undoubtedly due to the foolishness of the decisions made by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Yalta Conference.
The first step in resolving this issue would be to acknowledge the failure of the secret agreement at the Yalta talks.
But that recognition also implies a change in the traditional view of the history of the Great War (exegetical history) that Britain and the U.S. fought totalitarian countries to defend democracy.
Unless historical revisionism, which views the diplomacy promoted by Roosevelt and Churchill with skepticism, becomes the mainstream of historical interpretation, it will be challenging to solve the Northern Territories issue.
Nakanishi.
In this regard, the Putin administration’s statement that “the Northern Territories became Russian territory as a result of the Allied victory in World War II” is a kind of real intention or a more historically accurate view, which is more in line with the true nature of that war, World War II, as a traditional “war of conquest” You could say that it is in line with …….
The Northern Territories were taken from Japan by the fundamental norms of international politics, the legitimate “game of rules,” so there is no need to return them.
He is telling the Japanese people to listen to what America and Britain really think.
The U.S. and the U.K., as the victors in World War II, have also made substantial territorial expansions in the Pacific islands and many other strategic locations since the war.
In this respect, “the U.S. and the U.K. are birds of a feather with the Soviet Union.”
Of course, Japan must maintain its position of returning the four islands following the principle of “law and justice.”
As a defeated nation, we must continue to appeal for their return as a protest against the unjust postwar treatment by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union.