Decarbonization Is Creating Dangerous Vulnerabilities: Japan Must Not Hand Strategic Leverage to China
This essay (Taishi Sugiyama, May 26, 2022) argues that accelerating decarbonization will make Japan dangerously dependent on China, especially for critical minerals such as silicon and rare earths used in solar panels and electric vehicles.
Such dependence mirrors Europe’s past overreliance on Russian natural gas, which ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the Ukraine war.
Japan already faces massive public burdens from renewable-energy surcharges, and further EV and hydrogen investments could severely weaken its industrial competitiveness and national power.
With the rise of a new Cold War and the collapse of international cooperation on climate issues, many countries are returning to fossil fuels.
After “decoupling from Russia,” the next strategic priority should be “decoupling from China.”
Japan must urgently reconsider decarbonization policies that create vulnerabilities China can exploit.
The following is from today’s “Seiron” column in the Sankei Shimbun, titled “Energy Must Prioritize National Security,” written by Taishi Sugiyama, Research Director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies.
This essay is required reading not only for the Japanese people but for readers around the world.
Boldface in the text is mine.
The government’s “Clean Energy Strategy” interim summary has been released.
Following the war in Ukraine, priorities shifted to “decoupling from Russia before decarbonization,” yet in the end, the government plans massive investments in decarbonization at enormous cost.
In a rapidly changing world, can such a strategy truly work?
Annual burden of 15 trillion yen.
This “Clean Energy Strategy” was originally conceived under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to advance decarbonization investment.
However, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the importance of national security grew, and the interim summary was reorganized into a two-part structure: Chapter 1 on energy security and Chapter 2 on decarbonization.
Even so, the balance between security and decarbonization has not been achieved.
It is nothing more than tying bamboo to a tree.
Energy security involves not only preventing supply disruptions but also ensuring affordable energy.
Thus, there is a fundamental trade-off with costly decarbonization, yet awareness of this is weak.
The strategy requires annual investment of 15 trillion yen.
The word “investment” sounds positive, but the source of these funds is the people.
Already, the public bears 2.4 trillion yen annually in renewable energy surcharge costs alone.
The strategy includes further renewable energy expansion, as well as electric vehicles and hydrogen use—items that likely entail massive cost increases compared to existing technologies.
How far will the public burden grow?
How can we expect economic growth under such conditions?
However, the strategy also includes investments in battery factories, semiconductor plants, and data centers—items that contribute to economic security and economic growth.
Governments around the world are now engaged in competitive industrial attraction, and Japan must do likewise.
Toward the end of the year, the strategy is expected to become more concrete, but its content must be carefully scrutinized so as to avoid turning Japan into a high-cost economy and limiting it only to policies that truly contribute to growth.
In doing so, the mindset of “decoupling from Russia, then decarbonization” is far too naive regarding national security.
Japan must analyze current realities carefully and rebuild the strategy.
Let me raise two points.
Decarbonization declines in the new Cold War.
Global attention to environmental issues began with the 1992 Earth Summit.
The climate change framework convention was adopted there.
It is no coincidence that this occurred simultaneously with the end of the U.S.–Soviet Cold War following the Soviet collapse in 1991.
With East–West ideological conflict ending, Francis Fukuyama declared the “end of history” with the victory of democracy.
Under a utopian sense that “the entire world would converge into Western-style democracy and peace would be achieved,” global-scale cooperation on environmental issues gained momentum.
But the utopia did not materialize.
China, having grown economically, did not become democratic as the West hoped but instead intensified its authoritarianism and began seeking global hegemony.
Russia, destabilized by failed rapid democratization, returned to authoritarian rule.
It engaged in armed conflicts such as the annexation of Crimea and continued strained relations with Western nations.
Ultimately, the war in Ukraine erupted, making the deterioration decisive.
The beginning of a new Cold War is now clear, and the preconditions for addressing climate change have fundamentally changed.
Global cooperation is no longer realistic.
Countries—especially in Europe—are scrambling for increased fossil fuel production and procurement.
Though advanced nations have not yet removed the “decarbonization” signboard, its priority will inevitably fall.
After decoupling from Russia comes decoupling from China.
What comes after decoupling from Russia?
U.S. Senator Marco Rubio warns:
“Even now, with war in Ukraine, I am watching China. That is the real problem for the United States. China’s threat is a thousand times greater than Russia’s. Its economy is far larger and its military power superior. U.S. companies have already become lobbyists representing various positions of the Chinese government for the sake of business.”
Senator Tom Cotton argues that decoupling from China must proceed simultaneously with decoupling from Russia.
“We must prevent China from feeling economically superior to the United States and thus becoming willing to use force against Taiwan. The U.S. economy should be strategically separated from China’s. Especially in vital and strategic industries such as semiconductors and rare earths, this must begin immediately.”
Europe’s deep dependence on Russia’s energy—especially natural gas—created its vulnerability and emboldened Russia.
The cost was the catastrophic war in Ukraine.
Likewise, introducing massive amounts of solar panels and electric vehicles now would result in dependence on China’s industries—particularly Silicon, rare earths, and other critical minerals.
Moreover, the enormous cost burden of decarbonization would damage Japan’s manufacturing sector and erode national strength.
Japan must not create vulnerabilities through decarbonization policies that allow China to exploit weaknesses.
It must reconsider these policies immediately.
(Sugiyama Taishi)
2022.5.26
