An Act of Clearly Organized Terrorism— The Yun Bong-gil Bombing, 85 Years On, and the Political Exploitation of “History” —
An analysis of the 1932 Shanghai Tenchōsetsu bombing, demonstrating that it was an organized terrorist act rather than a solitary act of resistance. Marking the 85th anniversary, the essay examines how China and South Korea have politically exploited the incident, how that alliance has fractured amid the THAAD dispute, and how the instrumentalization of “history” continues to shape East Asian politics.
2017-03-20
This clearly tells the story of an organized act of terrorism.
The following is from page 8 of today’s Sankei Shimbun.
Emphasis in the text, except for the headline, is mine.
Will there be a “ceremony” praising an act of terror from 85 years ago?
Shanghai Bureau Chief: Kawasaki Masumi
Set against the Taegukgi, now the national flag of South Korea, a man grips a hand grenade in his left hand and a pistol in his right, staring straight ahead with piercing eyes.
It is a photograph of a man from the Korean Peninsula named Yun Bong-gil.
At a memorial hall dedicated to this man in Shanghai’s Luxun Park (formerly Hongkou Park), his image is projected prominently on a screen and praised in Chinese as a “righteous martyr.”
Before the war, nearly 100,000 Japanese lived in Shanghai.
On April 29, 1932 (Showa 7), Yun Bong-gil infiltrated a ceremony celebrating the Emperor’s birthday (Tenchōsetsu) held at Hongkou Park and threw a bomb, killing two key figures, including General Yoshinori Shirakawa, commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army.
He was the perpetrator of the terrorist attack known as the “Shanghai Tenchōsetsu Bombing Incident.”
Many were killed or wounded, including Mamoru Shigemitsu, who later became foreign minister and suffered the loss of his right leg.
In South Korea, this man is regarded as a “hero,” second only to An Jung-geun, who assassinated former Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi in October 1909.
This year marks the 85th anniversary of Yun Bong-gil’s attack.
Since last December, pamphlets introducing Yun Bong-gil, written in Hangul and Chinese, have been distributed at the memorial hall, which charges an admission fee of 15 yuan (about 250 yen).
These pamphlets were donated by South Korean actress Song Hye-kyo, known for her anti-Japanese remarks, among others.
According to the explanation, Yun was arrested at the scene, subjected to “brutal torture” by the Japanese military, sentenced to death by court-martial on May 25, 1932, transferred to Kanazawa, and executed by firing squad on December 19 of the same year.
It states that he “heroically sacrificed his life.”
He was 24 years old.
At the memorial hall, praise even extends to Kim Gu (1876–1949), identified as the man who ordered Yun Bong-gil to carry out the bombing.
Kim Gu was one of those who opposed Japan’s rule over the Korean Peninsula, went into exile, and helped establish the “Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea” in the French Concession of Shanghai.
Kim Gu had been imprisoned for robbery and murder and was involved in numerous assassinations.
On the morning of the attack, he invited Yun Bong-gil, who would become a hitman, to breakfast, exchanged pocket watches with him, and handed him bombs concealed in a lunchbox and a water bottle.
This clearly tells the story of an organized act of terrorism.
Kim Gu later served as president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea but came into conflict after the war with Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), who became South Korea’s first president.
Ironically, Kim Gu himself was assassinated and killed in June 1949.
Fast forward to February of this year, when compared with the killing of Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong-un, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, one gains the impression that politics on the Korean Peninsula remains trapped in the deep darkness of a bloodstained history.
The question is whether a commemorative ceremony marking the 85th anniversary of Yun Bong-gil’s terrorist attack will be held in Shanghai this year.
This is because the political landscape is decisively different from that of 2015, when China and South Korea enjoyed a honeymoon relationship symbolized by then-President Park Geun-hye’s visit to China and her participation in events marking the 70th anniversary of victory in the war against Japan.
Last year, a joint China–South Korea ceremony was held on April 29.
Yun Bong-gil’s memorial hall had functioned as a propaganda base demonstrating China–South Korea cooperation in the historical war against Japan, but that relationship is now fundamentally shaken.
The Xi leadership has opposed South Korea’s deployment of the U.S. military’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, arguing that it also threatens China.
Political pressure on South Korea and the United States has intensified.
Not only have there been boycotts of South Korean products, but rallies condemning South Korea have been mobilized across workplaces, schools, and even kindergartens, with videos of anti-South Korea chants flooding the internet.
There is no longer an atmosphere in China that welcomes joint China–South Korea anti-Japanese activities.
At the same time, China is carefully watching how the new South Korean administration, expected to be inaugurated in May following a presidential election to be held within 60 days of President Park’s removal by the Constitutional Court on the 10th of this month, will respond to the THAAD issue and to the Japan–South Korea agreement on resolving the comfort women issue.
Whether a ceremony “celebrating” the 85th anniversary will be held in Shanghai depends on the stance of South Korea’s new government.
The opportunistic political exploitation of “history” will continue from here on.
