This section argues that leftist activities at prewar Tokyo Imperial University were not spontaneous academic movements, but were influenced by coordinated operations involving the Chinese Communist Party, its Japan Special Branch, and the Comintern. It demonstrates why postwar distortions in Japan cannot be understood through occupation policies alone.

2017-04-20
It should be understood that behind such activities at the University of Tokyo lay anti-Japan operations conducted by the Chinese Communist Party Japan Special Branch, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Comintern.
What follows is a continuation of the previous chapter.
In the wake of policy failures by the capitalist and liberal camps, admiration for socialism spread worldwide, and as elites increasingly became socialists, many of Japan’s imperial universities turned into leftist strongholds.
Masazo Ogiya, who later became editor-in-chief of Weekly Asahi and stirred up anti-American protests during the 1960 Anpo struggle, was a student at Tokyo Imperial University before the war.
In his book Our Takigawa Incident (Shinchosha), he described the situation at the university at that time as follows.
“In the spring of Shōwa 7 (1932), the University of Tokyo experienced a temporary surge in leftist movements.
The Manchurian Incident had broken out the previous summer, and the country was being increasingly painted in militaristic colors, yet the University of Tokyo stood firmly as a bastion of liberalism, and demonstrations were held on campus almost every day.”
Each time, three banners were hung from Classroom No. 31.
“One, overthrow the imperial system.
One, absolute opposition to imperialist war.
One, reduce tuition fees.”
This was the reality of prewar Tokyo Imperial University.
Naturally, it should be seen that behind such activities at the University of Tokyo were anti-Japan operations carried out by the Chinese Communist Party Japan Special Branch, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Comintern.
Liberal scholars and the mass media often claim that “before the war Japan was dominated by emperor-worship, and criticizing the emperor would lead to arrest under severe thought control,” but as far as academia was concerned, the reality was the opposite.
One cannot understand the distortions of postwar Japan by looking only at occupation policies.
National defense is not limited to military power alone.
In matters of foreign relations such as diplomacy and security, the accumulation of intelligence is essential.
Criticizing China without knowing the strategies and history of Chinese Communist operations against Japan will not improve the situation.
Unless one accurately understands what kind of strategies the opponent employs and what sort of operations they conduct, it is impossible to protect national interests.
In the United States, immediately after the end of the Cold War in 1992, the federal legislature launched Cold War history research as a national project.
The CIA, America’s foreign intelligence agency, also published a book titled Chinese Negotiating Style (translated by the Sankei Shimbun foreign news department and published by Bungeishunju), providing a detailed analysis of the operations conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
Despite having been subjected to such extensive operations by the Chinese Communist Party, why do the Japanese government and the Diet not undertake research into Chinese Communist operations against Japan?
While occupation policies played a role in distorting postwar Japan, the negative effects of Chinese Communist operations against Japan that began before the war are just as significant.
One cannot understand the distortions of postwar Japan by looking only at occupation policies.
In the United States, there are movements among intelligence officials and conservatives to comprehensively reexamine U.S.–China relations during the Roosevelt Democratic administration.
In coordination with such movements, it is hoped that research into the external operations of the Chinese Communist Party will also advance.