This essay analyzes how the Enemy State Clauses of the UN Charter could legitimize Chinese military sanctions against Japan in the event of a conflict. It exposes a fundamental constraint on Japan’s security posture that remains far more dangerous than Article 9 of the Constitution.

2016-03-01

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.

The Yoke of the Enemy State Clause

If Japan and China were ultimately to clash, what would happen? If we compare military capabilities alone, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force would likely not lose to the Chinese Navy, nor would the Air Self-Defense Force be inferior to the Chinese Air Force. However, Japan must not forget the fundamental premise that it is “a country that cannot wage war.”

Last year, when the security legislation was enacted, newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun loudly claimed that Japan had “become a country that can wage war,” but this is utterly absurd. Beyond the constraints of Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan still bears the burden of the “Enemy State Clauses” within the United Nations Charter. Simply put, the Enemy State Clauses stipulate that if a country that belonged to the enemy (Axis) side during World War II engages in military action, sanctions may be imposed against that country without seeking approval from the Security Council (specifically stipulated in Articles 53, 77(1)(b), and 107 of the UN Charter).

If Japan—still treated as a “criminal” within the United Nations, that is, within the international community—were to take action in response to provocations by China, a permanent member of the Security Council, these Enemy State Clauses could be used to justify Chinese military sanctions against Japan.

To be continued.