This essay explores Japan’s strategic paralysis—unable to amend its constitution or abolish the Enemy State Clauses—and analyzes Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to prioritize the immediate protection of Japanese lives and property over symbolic historical redress.

2016-03-01

The following is a continuation of the previous chapter.

If a Japan–China confrontation were to take on a sense of reality, Japan would have no choice but to secure the cooperation of the United States at all costs. I believe it was during the first Abe administration that I once had an opportunity to meet the Prime Minister and asked him the following question: “What would happen if the United States were to abandon Japan? Even in situations such as PKO operations, while Japan hesitates amid domestic debate, China could easily step forward and say, ‘Then we will do it instead.’ If that were to happen, wouldn’t the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty effectively collapse?”

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo responded with a very grave expression, saying, “What I am most concerned about is the Japan–U.S. relationship.”

Japan is in a state where it cannot amend its constitution and has not even been able to abolish the Enemy State Clauses.

There exists one “national interest” that seeks to eliminate the danger of leaving to future generations the so-called “shame” of the Japanese people—a shame that, unbelievably, began with falsehood—through the continued inheritance of the Kono and Murayama Statements. And there is another “national interest”: the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese people today.

Between these two national interests, Prime Minister Abe chose the latter as the responsibility of his cabinet.

To be continued.