When a decisive public capital injection was reduced to a fraction under media pressure, Japan’s long deflation began. This chapter traces the moment, the actors involved, and the real-world consequences witnessed firsthand.

2016-03-17

When Kiichi Miyazawa stated at an LDP training session in Karuizawa that the problem—different from an ordinary business cycle—required a public capital injection of around 15 trillion yen, Atsushi Yamada of the Asahi Shimbun led a campaign claiming it was outrageous to pour taxpayers’ money into what banks, real estate, and construction industries had done on their own.
As a result, the plan was crushed and reduced to a mere 800 billion yen.

That moment marked the beginning of Japan’s long deflation—now despised worldwide—an established historical fact.
I was the first to point this out, and because I earned my living in the real estate industry, I recognized it clearly.

A close friend from my alma mater—a late bloomer who eventually ranked first in his entire school—was on track to become president of the leading bank in Tohoku.

I once consulted him about arranging financing for another close friend who was purchasing a home abroad.
Despite my efforts, including appealing to it as a form of cultural exchange, the case was virtually impossible within Japanese banking practices at the time.

Even so, my friend did everything he could.
For that, I remain deeply grateful—and apologetic.

If by chance he ever reads this, I offer my sincere thanks and apologies here.