The February 26 Incident fundamentally altered Japan’s political structure by making military pressure absolute. In an atmosphere where diplomatic compromise risked rebellion, Hideki Tōjō emerged as the only figure capable of controlling the army. This section also examines the so-called “Tanaka Memorial,” which Franklin D. Roosevelt reportedly believed, and its influence on U.S.–Japan negotiations.

2017-06-13
The following is a continuation of the previous section.
The February 26 Incident gave birth to Tōjō.
The February 26 Incident was an event far greater than anything before it.
Major cabinet ministers were lined up and assassinated, and the military leadership could do nothing but panic, unable to bring the situation under control.
However, because Emperor Shōwa declared, “They are rebel forces,” the military leadership was finally able to act, and leaflets announcing the Emperor’s words were distributed, which caused the young officers and soldiers to stand down.
Yet this incident triggered a situation in which whatever the military said would now prevail.
If someone said, “If you do such a thing, another February 26 Incident will occur,” anyone would naturally be frightened.
And there was no way to stop it.
A rebellion could break out from anywhere, and while soldiers obey their superiors, those superiors were young officers.
Meanwhile, the China Incident showed no sign of ending.
Therefore, Japan absolutely had to reach an understanding with the United States and Britain.
At that time, concessions were unavoidable.
However, making diplomatic concessions carried a strong risk of triggering another incident like February 26.
So who could negotiate with the United States without provoking a February 26-style uprising?
Everyone concluded that it had to be that man—Hideki Tōjō.
Tōjō was in Manchuria at the time of the February 26 Incident, but he handled the arrest of those involved with remarkable efficiency.
Although Tōjō had graduated at the top of his class from the Army War College, he had previously been sidelined.
He was not someone who had smoothly followed a conventional promotion path.
After being assigned to minor posts and sent to Manchuria, his abilities were finally recognized there, allowing him to return as Vice Minister of the Army.
Thus, at the beginning of the China Incident, Tōjō had no direct involvement.
In negotiations between Japan and the United States, the Americans made no concessions at all.
This was because Roosevelt had read something called the “Tanaka Memorial” before he became president.
The “Tanaka Memorial” was purported to be a national policy plan submitted to the Emperor in 1928 by Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, who was also president of the Seiyūkai party and an Army general.
It claimed that Japan planned to seize Manchuria, then North China, and ultimately conquer the entire world.
That document circulated throughout the world.
However, no one in Japan had ever seen such a document.