This article warns that China could attempt to seize the Senkaku Islands at any moment. Drawing on insights from China expert Fukushima Kaori, it explains how public opinion constrains national defense policy in democracies and stresses the urgent need for Japan to maintain effective control and national consensus.

In democratic states, public opinion determines national defense policy. This essay argues that if Japanese public opinion drifts toward pseudo-pacifism, China may exploit the opening to create a fait accompli in the Senkaku Islands. Maintaining effective control before the 50-year mark is crucial, as international recognition of a “disputed area” would reset Japan’s legal position entirely.

2017-07-18
If Japan shows any weakness, China will come to seize the Senkaku Islands, and that could be tomorrow.
In a recent newspaper, an advertisement appeared for a new book published by Business Sha Co., Ltd.
“The Dangerous Game Between the U.S. and China Has Begun: The Equation for the Collapse of the Red Empire, China.”
The author is Fukushima Kaori, now one of Japan’s leading experts on China.
This book, too, is one that all Japanese citizens should immediately go to their nearest bookstore and buy.
People around the world should also read it, but for them, I will try to convey its contents as much as possible.
The following is from pages 200 to 202.
Omission of preceding text. Emphasis in the text is mine.
However, the problem is that in democratic countries, it is public opinion that determines the direction of national defense policy and strategy.
If public opinion flows toward pseudo-pacifist sentiments such as believing that China would never seize the Senkaku Islands, or that it would be acceptable to lose territory rather than go to war, policies related to national defense, legal frameworks, and accompanying budgets will be severely constrained.
The most difficult and urgently necessary task now is for the Japanese people to recognize the reality that if Japan shows weakness, China will come to seize the Senkaku Islands, and that it could be tomorrow.
Based on that recognition, what should be done?
First, Japan must defend its effective control.
Japan currently maintains effective control over the Senkaku Islands, but if that control is lost, not even the United States would reclaim them on Japan’s behalf.
The United States recognizes Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku Islands, but it does not explicitly recognize them as Japanese territory.
Under such circumstances, Japan has barely managed to maintain effective control over the Senkaku Islands.
In 2022, Japan will finally reach the 50th year of that effective control.
It would be difficult for the international community to claim that land effectively controlled for half a century is not part of a nation’s territory.
That year also happens to be the final year of Xi Jinping’s second term, assuming his administration successfully overcomes the 19th Party Congress.
If the Xi Jinping administration were to seek political or military tension to persuade domestic opposition in order to establish a long-term dictatorship, it would be entirely possible for it to attempt to create a fait accompli territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands before the 50-year mark of effective control.
If the international community were to recognize the area as disputed territory, the half-century history of effective control would be reset to zero.
Defending effective control over the Senkaku Islands is not an easy task; it requires corresponding resolve, and it will be necessary to form a shared national understanding and political consensus to that effect.
To be continued.