This article analyzes Masayoshi Matsumoto’s pro-China stance and its implications for Japan’s economy and national interests. Originally published on November 19, 2025, and revisited after his remarks on January 5, 2026, it examines whether profits earned by Japanese corporations in China were ever repatriated to Japan, or merely reinvested domestically in China, contributing to China’s GDP growth while Japan’s GDP and wages stagnated for over thirty years. Using Sumitomo Electric Industries as a case study, the article explores China dependency, strategic risks in EV and optical communications markets, and questions the responsibility of Japan’s business elite toward the nation and its leadership.

This article examines Masayoshi Matsumoto’s remarks on January 5, 2026, in the context of over three decades of Japan’s economic stagnation driven by corporate dependence on China. It argues that such policies enriched the Chinese Communist Party while harming Japan’s economy and wages, and clarifies what a true leader of the Kansai business community should say in defense of Japan’s national interests.

The following is a chapter published on November 19, 2025.

To begin with, have the profits earned in China actually been brought back smoothly to Japan?
Or have they merely increased as figures on balance sheets?
Because those profits cannot be repatriated, are they instead being reinvested within China, thereby increasing China’s GDP?
Have the actions you have taken over more than thirty years amounted to nothing more than enriching China while impoverishing Japan?
As evidence of this, Japan’s GDP has scarcely increased from 550 trillion yen over these past thirty-plus years.
The only time GDP rose to around 600 trillion yen was during the brief period when Abe worked hard—this is an undeniable fact.
In other words, your China-related business activities merely enriched China (the CCP) and increased the arrogance of China (the CCP).
That is precisely why Japanese workers’ wages did not rise by even one yen over these thirty-plus years.
Even now, do you still fail to realize that those thirty-plus years were nothing more than a period in which you were completely outplayed by China?
And yet, how can you possibly claim to be an elite of the Japanese nation?
Far from being an elite, is it not accurate to say that you are merely a test-taking honor student—second-rate or third-rate—who ultimately does nothing but harm the nation?

January 5, 2026—once again, it was Masayoshi Matsumoto.
I considered why this man—without question, nothing more than a test-taking honor student and merely a private-sector corporate executive—could speak with such rudeness toward Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who in reality is supported by more than 90 percent of the Japanese people, excluding only those of his own generation whose minds were formed by reading and carefully studying the Asahi Shimbun.

The first thought that came to mind was whether, like the late Hiroshi Shimozuma, former chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation sixteen years ago—the very figure whose presence led me to appear regularly in this column—Matsumoto might possess the same kind of background: graduating from one of the top preparatory schools in Hokkaido, then the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law.
Might it be one of the characteristic traits of University of Tokyo graduates, an unfounded tendency to speak down to Prime Minister Takaichi, who studied at Kobe University?

When I searched just now, however, I discovered that this man is not even a University of Tokyo graduate, but a graduate of Hitotsubashi University.
Put bluntly, for a Hitotsubashi graduate to speak down to a Kobe University graduate—especially Prime Minister Takaichi—is nothing short of “showing excessive arrogance; know your place.”

At that point, the thought that had immediately come to mind when I first heard this man’s remarks at the end of the year resurfaced as an undeniable truth: he has fallen into a honey trap.
Those who fall into China’s traps invariably repeat bizarre and abnormal statements, and they also display bizarre and abnormal facial expressions.
Why is that?
Because for individuals in key positions, or scholars and commentators who make their living through television appearances, once they have fallen even once into China’s honey traps or money traps, China’s traps exert destructive power comparable to an atomic bomb.
The moment China’s trap is made public, their social lives and family lives collapse completely.

If, on the other hand, he has not fallen into such traps set by China, then could it be because the extent to which his former company, Sumitomo Electric Industries, has advanced into China—likely under his leadership as the responsible executive—has reached such a foolish state that China now accounts for a large share of the company’s sales?

With that in mind, I searched using AI for information on the relationship between Sumitomo Electric and China.
The results are as follows.

I will explain the history of Sumitomo Electric Industries’ expansion into China and its current share of sales there.

To state the conclusion first, the company began expanding into China in the late 1970s and accelerated that expansion in the 2000s.
At present, sales in China account for approximately 13 to 14 percent.

1. History of Expansion into China: When It Accelerated

Sumitomo Electric’s development in China can be broadly divided into three phases.

Initial Entry (Late 1970s)
In 1977, the company began expanding into China.
At that time, the focus was primarily on providing Japanese infrastructure technology to China.

Full-Scale Operations (1990s)
In the 1990s, seeking low-cost production bases, the company established a series of local subsidiaries aimed at manufacturing products such as wire harnesses for automobiles.
In 1994, it began contract cable processing in Shenzhen, further strengthening the overseas shift of its production system.

Acceleration of Investment (2000s–2010s)
In the 2000s, as China transformed from the “world’s factory” into the “world’s market,” the company intensified its expansion.
In 2001, it established a wire manufacturing and sales company in Suzhou.
In 2005, it set up a base for its fine polymer business.

In the 2010s, in response to the shift toward electric vehicles (EVs) and infrastructure demand such as optical fiber, the company strengthened not only production functions but also sales and development functions, positioning China as more than just a manufacturing base.

2. Share of Sales in China

Based on the latest financial data (results for the fiscal year ending March 2025), the regional breakdown of sales is as follows.

Japan: 1,775.2 billion yen (37.9%)
Americas: 1,015.4 billion yen (21.7%)
China: 617.9 billion yen (13.2%)
Asia excluding China: 666.7 billion yen (14.3%)
Europe and others: 604.6 billion yen (12.9%)
Total: 4,679.8 billion yen (100.0%)

(Source: Calculated from Sumitomo Electric Industries’ FY2025 financial results and supplementary materials)

Recent trends show that China’s share of sales has remained stable at approximately 13 to 16 percent in recent years.
According to the FY2024 financial report, sales of wire harnesses declined in China due to reduced production by Japanese automakers, while demand for high value-added products such as EV components and optical communication devices for generative AI remains important.

Sumitomo Electric currently positions China as both an “important production base” and a “strategic market” characterized by intense technological competition.

Regarding trends in EV-related components and optical communications in China under the latest business environment (2024–2025), these two fields are currently marked by contrasting conditions: “domestic economic slowdown and intensified competition” on the one hand, and “new tailwinds driven by generative AI” on the other.

[Detailed discussion of EV components, optical communications, Chinese automakers, and Sumitomo Electric’s technological strengths continues, exactly as in the original.]

Today’s front page of the Nikkei, widely known for its pro-China stance, carried a headline suggesting that China may impose export restrictions on dual-use goods to Japan, possibly including rare earths.
Without even realizing that this actually exposes the intellectual incompetence of Xi Jinping himself, it appeared to echo China’s bullying of Japan, with its true intent seemingly being criticism of Prime Minister Takaichi.

Any Japanese who loves Japan and possesses a sound mind must have thought the same thing.
What fools Xi Jinping and his followers are.

What Masayoshi Matsumoto should say, as chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation, is this:
If you continue such nonsense and harass Japan, we will no longer tolerate it.
From now on, we will supply not a single advanced component in any field to China.
That is what he should say.

If he is a genuine Japanese who truly loves Japan.
And especially if he has not fallen into any honey traps or money traps.
He should be able to say it immediately.

That is the statement he should make as chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation.
It is not, by any stretch, an arrogant, condescending remark that exposes him as an agent of China directed at Prime Minister Takaichi, who is supported by more than 90 percent of the Japanese people precisely because she is implementing completely correct policies.