This article examines why Japan failed to internationalize the yen, contrasting Britain’s financial strategy with Japan’s media-driven structural weakness.

2016-05-06

The following is an essay by Takatoshi Kato, Chairman of the Japan Center for International Finance and former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, published online by the monthly magazine Wedge on November 28, 2015.

The world has been surprised by Britain’s conspicuous courtship of China, but when one looks back at history, it becomes clear that Britain has repeatedly acted in similar ways.
In the past, it entertained oil-producing countries to attract petrodollars; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it sought to draw in capital from former Soviet bloc nations; and during Japan’s bubble era, Japan too received lavish treatment.
In that sense, it can be said that Britain’s attention is now simply directed toward China.

Such activities underpin the City of London’s current position, and Singapore, which has grown into one of the world’s leading financial centers, has pursued a similar strategy.
Becoming a “financial nation” is synonymous with aligning oneself with countries possessing strong financial power.

At one time, Japan also aimed to internationalize the yen, but it lacked this perspective and these activities.

Recently, I pointed out the reason for this for the first time in the world.
Until August of the year before last, Japan was a country dominated by Asahi Shimbun.
That Asahi had been manipulated by the governments of China and South Korea, or by the CIA, and further by people in Japan who were virtually spies acting on their behalf.
Therefore, it had absolutely no intention of making Japan bigger or stronger.
It lacked the philosophy that any corporate manager naturally possesses.
On the contrary, various facts clearly demonstrate that Asahi Shimbun has served South Korea and China.
Asahi did not desire the internationalization of the yen and, together with the United States, crushed it.
In the United States, not only influential newspapers such as the New York Times but also individuals such as Alexis Dudden and Carol Gluck—who could be said without exaggeration to be spies for China and South Korea—existed as powerful collaborators of Asahi Shimbun.

When one observes Britain’s stance of prioritizing economic interests over diplomacy and security and refraining from addressing China’s human rights issues, one can understand the view that Britain is “no longer a great power.”

(Edited by the Wedge editorial staff)