The Kubota Statement: Reforestation, Railways, Rice Fields—and a Clash over “Compensation”
A detailed account of the “Kubota Statement” at the October 15, 1953 meeting, covering disputes over Japanese assets in Korea, claims, interpretations of annexation, the Cairo Declaration, and the legal framing of Korea’s independence, culminating in a breakdown of the talks.
June 8, 2016
The following continues from the previous chapter.
All emphasis in the text other than the heading is mine.
The Kubota Statement
At the meeting on October 15, 1953, the Korean side stated that Japanese assets in Korea had been confiscated by the United States, and that Korea, in principle, had the right to claim compensation for the massacre of patriots under Japan’s 36-year rule, the deprivation of the basic human rights of Koreans, the forced requisitioning of food, and the exploitation of labor.
In response, Kan’ichirō Kubota argued that Japan had carried out reforestation, laid railways, increased rice paddies, and provided many benefits to Koreans, and that if Japan had not advanced, Korea would likely have been occupied by Russia or China.
He also replied that he believed the U.S. confiscation of Japanese assets did not violate international law, and that even if it had, Japan had renounced its claims against the United States.
In response to Kubota’s remarks, the Korean side—believing that “colonial rule brought only harm to Korea”—criticized them as delusions, and the Japan–Korea talks were suspended.
According to Kubota’s explanation (House of Councillors, October 27, 1953) and the Korean record, the talks had the following content.
The Kubota Statement
Korean Position
Position of Counselor Kan’ichirō Kubota
The Claims Issue and the Handling of Japanese Property in Korea
Japan’s demands regarding claims cannot be accepted; Japan has no claims, and only Korea has claims against Japan.
Korea during the annexation period was a region in a state of slavery, and the Japanese property located there was confiscated because it was originally obtained illegally through coercive exploitation of power.
The new, higher ideal after World War II—liberating slave regions—is higher and stronger than respect for private property rights, and confiscation was carried out to realize that ideal.
Japan has not renounced its claims against Korea based on the principle of respect for private property.
Under an interpretation that Japanese private property in Korea was not confiscated, the measures of the U.S. military government conform to international law, but under an interpretation like Korea’s—namely that Japanese private property was confiscated—the United States would have committed a violation of international law, and Japan does not wish to adopt such an interpretation.
It is unjust that the Allied Powers confiscated Japanese property even in neutral countries.
The Politics of the Government-General of Korea
Japan’s demand for claims is highly political; if Japan makes such political demands, then Korea will demand compensation for the 36 years of annexation.
If Korea had demanded compensation for the 36 years of annexation, Japan would have cited the positive aspects of the Governor-General’s administration—such as barren mountains turning into green mountains, the laying of railways, the construction of ports, and the great increase in rice fields—and would have offset Korea’s demands.
The Cairo Declaration Issue
The Government-General’s rule oppressed and exploited Koreans through police politics and depleted natural resources; therefore, the Allied Powers explicitly stated in the Cairo Declaration that Korea was in a state of slavery.
The Cairo Declaration was written by the Allied Powers in the heightened excitement of wartime; at present, if the Allied Powers were to write it now, they would not have used such wording.
Independence of Korea
The Korean side asked whether it was a violation of international law that, in post–World War II arrangements, international law changed and the principle of independence and liberation of oppressed peoples emerged, and that Korea became independent without waiting for a peace treaty.
Korea’s independence is at the point when the San Francisco Treaty entered into force, and therefore independence prior to that, even if recognized by the Allied Powers, is an exceptional measure from Japan’s perspective (meeting on October 15).
Korea’s independence is not a question of violating international law, but rather a question of whether other countries recognize a newly independent state.
Japan acknowledges the fact that many countries, including the United Nations, recognized Korea before the peace treaty, and Japan does not regard that recognition as premature or as a violation of international law.
Japan approved the policy of Korean independence stated in the Cairo Declaration and signed the instrument of surrender, but afterward Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers and was not a fully sovereign state, and therefore could not voluntarily recognize Korea’s independence on its own initiative.
Japan recognized Korea’s independence at the time the peace treaty took effect, but because there was an interval between the Allied Powers’ recognition date and the treaty’s effective date, this was a remark that it was an exception under international law (explanation at the October 21 meeting, according to the Korean record).
Forced Repatriation of Japanese
The Korean side asked whether the forced repatriation of Japanese from Korea at the end of the war was a violation of international law.
Counselor Kubota replied that this was an issue of the occupying forces’ policy, and that he would not say whether it was or was not a violation of international law.
At the meeting on October 20, 1953, Representative Kim asked for confirmation that at the October 15 meeting the Japanese side had made the following statement: that Japan’s rule over Korea had been a forced occupation, that Japan had invaded with greed and violence and destroyed natural resources, and that Koreans had been placed in a state of slavery.
This manuscript continues.
