A Sankei Shimbun column by Tatsuya Kato reveals the realities of foreign intelligence operations targeting Japan.
The reported approach toward former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama highlights profound weaknesses in Japan’s political and security awareness.

2016-07-06
This article, too, proved the correctness of my own commentary.
The following is from page 9 of yesterday’s Sankei Shimbun, from the column “Toraana ni irazunba” by Tatsuya Kato.
This article, too, proved the correctness of my own commentary.
All emphasis in the text except the headline is mine.
A Spy Who Approached Former Prime Minister Hatoyama
In the past, I had opportunities to interview individuals described as “operatives” or “intelligence agents” from Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea.
Except for North Korea, with which Japan has no diplomatic relations, they were affiliated with embassies or other diplomatic institutions, and public security officials refer to such personnel as “official cover.”
Naturally, they never reveal their true identities.
Japanese security agencies accumulate and analyze information to “identify” which individual from which country is an intelligence operative.
The military attaché’s office of the Russian embassy is said to be a nest of official-cover operatives.
There was an attaché there who enjoyed the deep trust of President Vladimir Putin.
His true affiliation was the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), a military intelligence agency.
Although his Japanese was not fluent, he became head of the attaché’s office over his seniors and built personal networks with former Japanese bureaucrats and corporate executives.
Meanwhile, an officer of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) embedded in the embassy’s political section frequently attended small security-related study groups, but shortly after I became acquainted with him, he developed stomach problems and returned to Russia about ten years ago.
The attaché was sociable, even cracking jokes using his own name during self-introductions.
The political officer spoke fluent Japanese, had abundant topics of conversation, and was full of personal charm.
When speaking with them, both showed keen interest in personal information about specific individuals, but did not appear particularly desperate to collect classified information.
When asked, the attaché said, “Surveillance is strict. We are not doing anything dangerous. What matters is building personal connections,” but he never explained how those connections would be used.
In 2010, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered a Russian spy group centered on a then 28-year-old woman named Anna Chapman.
Many readers may remember her as the “too-beautiful spy.”
She was an “illegal spy” posing as a law-abiding citizen and, with assistance from Russian embassy personnel in the United States, received false identities and several million dollars in funding from SVR headquarters, operating for more than ten years.
The FBI fully deciphered the encrypted top-secret directives of the SVR.
A senior official of Japan’s National Police Agency who learned of the investigation results at the time felt a heightened sense of crisis upon realizing that Russia’s objective in the United States was not so much the collection of classified information as the penetration of influential circles involved in shaping public opinion and policy decisions, thereby creating a political and diplomatic environment favorable to Russia.
“Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his eldest son are being targeted by individuals believed to be agents of Russian organizations.”
A senior public security official revealed this to me at the time.
Kang Song-hui, a member of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), was the ringleader of a North Korean spy case uncovered by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department’s Public Security Bureau in 2000.
When I interviewed Kang in 2015, the last three digits of his mobile phone number were “216,” which he boasted were chosen to show loyalty by matching the birthday of Kim Jong-il (February 16).
At the time of his arrest, large volumes of materials were seized, and what caught the attention of public security investigators was the content of the training Kang had received in North Korea in late July 1974.
It detailed Japan as “enemy territory,” outlining operational targets and precautions to avoid surveillance by public security authorities.
Under orders from North Korea, Kang used a Christian church in Shinjuku, Tokyo, as cover to conduct operations aimed at fostering pro–North Korea sentiment in South Korea, while also advancing infiltration efforts into Japan’s political and economic circles.
During the interview, I asked, “What kind of people were targeted for operations?”
Among those Kang named was former Prime Minister Hatoyama.
What became of the operations targeting Hatoyama thereafter is now impossible to confirm, as Kang passed away in April 2004.
Some titles omitted.