Japan’s television broadcasters pay extraordinarily low public spectrum fees compared with international standards.
This essay reexamines the institutional and historical foundations of that structure, including the political–media dependency formed through broadcasting license administration during the Kakuei Tanaka era.
It analyzes how Japan’s spectrum pricing system diverged from Western models and why reform remains difficult, revealing a core structural issue behind the Japanese “old media” system.

Memorandum IV.
On public spectrum fees and the structure of Japan’s broadcasting administration.
I have long been convinced that the public spectrum fees paid by Japanese television broadcasters are extraordinarily low compared with those of other countries.
I also intuitively suspected that this structure might have been formed in order to bring the mass media onto the side of political power during the era of Kakuei Tanaka.
I therefore conducted a reexamination of the matter.
What follows is a structured summary.

To state the conclusion first.
It is a fact that the spectrum usage fees paid by Japanese television broadcasters are extremely low by international standards.
However, there is no public documentary evidence proving that Kakuei Tanaka himself directly established the current fee structure.
This is the objective situation that can presently be confirmed.

First, what Japanese broadcasters pay is known as the “spectrum usage fee.”
It falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
It is collected under the pretext of compensation for frequency allocation and for the costs of monitoring and managing radio waves.
In essence, however, it is a fee for the use of spectrum, which is a public asset.

Yet the Japanese system is not based on the market value of spectrum.
It is set merely as a shared cost to cover administrative expenses such as monitoring and regulation.
In other words, it is not a market-based price but a system that collects only actual management costs.

As a result, even major nationwide key stations pay only tens of millions to a few hundred million yen per year.
Compared with the enormous advertising revenues and influence of the broadcasting industry, this burden is extremely small.

When viewed internationally, the unusual nature of this structure becomes even clearer.
In the United States, frequencies are allocated through auctions conducted by the FCC.
Bids worth tens or hundreds of billions of yen are not uncommon.
In the United Kingdom and across Europe, spectrum usage fees, license fees, and public service obligations are combined, and substantial payments are required.

Thus in the United States and Europe, spectrum is treated as a national asset and a scarce resource carrying high monetary value.
In contrast, Japan has maintained a structure in which only administrative management costs are charged.

The origin of this system lies in the Radio Act of 1950.
It was enacted under the occupation authorities.
At that time, usage fees were virtually zero.

The current spectrum usage fee system was introduced in 1993.
It was created during the Hosokawa administration by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
Even then, however, the fees were set at extremely low levels.

Therefore, the claim that Kakuei Tanaka personally created the spectrum fee system and set it low cannot be established as a direct causal relationship.
The system itself was introduced in 1993, and the timeline does not match.

However, the matter does not end there.
The more essential issue lies at the entrance to the system.

From the 1950s through the 1960s, Kakuei Tanaka was a central figure in the postal and telecommunications political faction and served as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications.
That ministry controlled broadcasting licenses and frequency allocation.
At the time, television station licenses and the establishment of local stations were political matters, and broadcasting was an industry dependent on government authority.

Many studies point out that Tanaka, through broadcasting license administration, helped shape the framework of commercial broadcasting and strengthened the structure of mutual dependence between politics and broadcasting.
Licenses functioned as bargaining tools between political power and the media, often handled through informal political practices.
The scarcity of documentary evidence reflects the fact that such politics operated through verbal arrangements and customary practices.

Thus the situation can be summarized as follows.
There is no conclusive proof that Tanaka directly set spectrum fees at low levels.
However, it is highly certain that he consolidated the structural framework of the broadcasting industry and its political dependence through licensing administration.
As a result, the protection of existing broadcasters became fixed over the long term, and it became difficult to shift toward a system that would charge fees corresponding to the market value of spectrum.

This structure continues in Japan to the present day.

Furthermore, broadcasting in Japan has been treated as a quasi-public institution and has functioned within the press club system and as a governmental information conduit.
For this reason, spectrum has remained fixed at privileged and inexpensive levels.

Even internal research groups within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications acknowledge that Japan’s spectrum fees are extremely low by international comparison.
Yet fundamental reform remains extremely difficult due to the strength of entrenched interests.

The essence of the matter is simple.
Only Japan allows the exclusive use of public spectrum—a national asset—at costs close to zero.
In the United States and Europe, spectrum is treated as a national asset requiring substantial payment.

Without understanding this structure, it is impossible to discuss the core of Japan’s old-media problem.
This essay will continue.