This essay examines how South Korea’s perception of China and its ambivalence toward the U.S.–ROK alliance are reshaping the premise of Japan–U.S.–ROK cooperation in East Asia.
It analyzes elite opinion, strategic hesitation toward confronting China, and the implications for Japan’s regional security framework.

2019-01-12
South Korea has been regarded as important to Japan on the premise of Japan–U.S.–ROK cooperation in East Asia.
The following continues from the previous chapter.
Do not want to anger China.
Four or five years ago, I received a paper from an acquaintance who had served as a diplomat stationed in South Korea, summarizing his thoughts on the country.
In it, he described a striking realization based on his experiences there.
“There is no consensus among South Korean elites that the U.S.–ROK alliance constitutes the foundation of foreign and security policy.”
“The sense of fear toward China among South Koreans, akin to resignation, differs from their feelings toward any other country.”
From Japan’s perspective, since both Japan and South Korea are allied with the United States, it seems natural that the three countries would cooperate in facing a rising China.
However, after extensive discussions with experts in South Korea, he reached this conclusion.
“Bringing South Korea onto Japan’s and the U.S.’s side in a strategy toward China would be, to put it mildly, ‘extremely difficult.’”
According to him, many South Koreans believe that strengthening the U.S.–ROK alliance in ways that might anger China would result in greater losses than gains.
South Korea’s importance to Japan has been premised on the framework of Japan–U.S.–ROK cooperation in East Asia.
Yet that very premise itself is beginning to erode.
To be continued.