It examines how misleading information such as “Japan’s 47 tons of plutonium” and “nuclear proliferation risks” circulated in international discourse and Japanese media.
Despite being inaccurate, these narratives have been used as political and informational pressure to undermine Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle and distort the nation’s energy policy.

February 12, 2019.
It must be reread with the recognition that countries deploying intelligence organizations backed by vast funding continue active influence operations day and night within the United Nations, Europe, the United States, and Japan.
Even NHK commentator Mizuno Noriyuki criticized Japan by stating that “China and North Korea have specifically pointed to Japan as a country that could pursue nuclear development” (August 1 edition of “Jiron Kōron,” referenced in the chapter published on August 6, 2018).
Every Japanese citizen must recognize that China and the Korean Peninsula exist, so to speak, through propaganda, and that intelligence organizations funded with enormous resources are conducting active influence operations day and night in the United Nations, the West, and Japan.
The following continues from the previous chapter.
Japan’s nuclear policy is literally on the verge of collapsing from its very foundations.
Japan imports uranium for nuclear fuel from the United States and other countries and has processed spent uranium fuel from reactors to extract plutonium.
Reusing this plutonium in the prototype fast breeder reactor “Monju” in Fukui Prefecture or in ordinary light-water reactors through pluthermal use forms the nuclear fuel cycle, upon which Japan’s nuclear policy has been built.
However, Monju was decided to be decommissioned.
To maintain the nuclear fuel cycle, pluthermal use is now the only option.
Among the reactors that have been restarted, only four are capable of pluthermal operation.
One reactor consumes about 0.4 tons of plutonium annually.
If the reprocessing plant in Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture, expected to be completed in three years, begins operation, about eight tons of plutonium will be extracted annually from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.
Therefore discussions have emerged proposing not to reprocess spent fuel, or to limit reprocessing, in order to fulfill the Atomic Energy Commission’s “pledge” to reduce Japan’s plutonium holdings.
The policy of the Atomic Energy Commission can be interpreted as cutting off Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle and pushing the nuclear industry toward its end.
Does this not perfectly coincide with the intentions of Kan Naoto.
The public will be forced to bear enormous costs for renewable energy, nuclear policy will fail, and Japan will rely heavily on fossil fuels such as coal, ultimately becoming a country that emits massive amounts of CO₂.
Why is our nation being driven down such a foolish path.
During the automatic extension of the U.S.–Japan Nuclear Agreement, information circulated both in Japan and in the United States such as “Japan possesses 47 tons of plutonium,” “equivalent to about 6,000 nuclear bombs,” and “a risk of nuclear proliferation.”
However these claims are inaccurate.
The 47 tons of plutonium possessed by Japan is reactor-grade plutonium, which differs in composition from weapons-grade plutonium used in nuclear weapons and has significantly lower purity.
About 36 tons of Japan’s plutonium were reprocessed under contract in the United Kingdom and France and are stored in those countries.
Moreover inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency are permanently stationed at the Rokkasho reprocessing facility, and Japan is under strict international supervision.
It is scientifically and physically impossible for Japan to manufacture nuclear weapons.
There is therefore no problem with Japan possessing plutonium.
The only solution is the operation of the reprocessing plant and the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Nevertheless in the face of inaccurate information or information embedded with particular intentions, Japan as a whole became intimidated.
The media immediately reported “international concerns” when the U.S.–Japan nuclear agreement was automatically extended.
NHK commentator Mizuno Noriyuki even criticized Japan by saying that China and North Korea had singled out Japan as a potential nuclear developer.
The aim of such information is to force the abandonment of the reprocessing plant, collapse the nuclear fuel cycle, and eliminate Japan’s entire nuclear power sector.
The Abe administration, responsible for Japan’s energy policy, must recognize that anti-nuclear information is placing Japan’s future in jeopardy and must rebuild the nation’s energy policy.