This article introduces a column by Makiko Takita in the digital edition of Sound Argument.
Drawing on a CSIS contribution by Michael Green and a speech by former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, it outlines a growing U.S. recognition that the deterioration in Japan–Korea relations stems largely from South Korea’s domestic politics and its approach toward Japan.
It argues that the rift benefits China and North Korea, strains alliances, and underscores the importance of Japan’s effective communication abroad.

2019-02-08
From Australia to Singapore, most countries in Asia view the deterioration in Japan–South Korea relations as being caused by South Korea.
The following is from the digital edition of Sound Argument that arrived a short while ago.
“A U.S. Expert Reprimands South Korea for Its Lack of Strategic Thinking.”
Deputy Director of the Sound Argument Research Desk, Makiko Takita.
It has not attracted much attention in Japan, but a contribution by Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), published on January 21 in the online edition of the South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo, is quite interesting.
Green, who served as Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council under the Bush administration, is known among those in the know as a Japan hand.
During the presidential campaign he criticized then-candidate Trump and even signed a pledge not to join the administration, and in recent years he has been pointed out as leaning toward South Korea.
Yet even Green argues that the responsibility for the deterioration in Japan–South Korea relations lies in South Korea’s domestic politics.
He develops a straightforward argument that South Korea’s intensifying anti-Japan stance and its worsening relationship with Japan only benefit China and North Korea.
If it means that even pro–South Korea circles in the United States have finally reached the level of recognizing how harsh South Korea’s approach toward Japan has become, that would be welcome, albeit belatedly.
Green’s contribution is structured by frequently quoting a speech delivered in South Korea last October by former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster.
McMaster reportedly devoted most of his speech to the challenges posed by China and North Korea.
According to Green, the key points of McMaster’s speech are as follows.
• For leading democratic nations to respond effectively to the challenges from China and North Korea, they must be strategic.
If they lack strategy, China will become more provocative and North Korea will never denuclearize.
• Even if not in exactly these words, the Moon Jae-in administration’s current approach toward Japan is strategically incompetent.
• South Korea needs strategic thinking in order to avoid falling into the geopolitical game plans of China and North Korea.
Green writes that the Trump administration, aware that South Korea was awaiting a Supreme Court ruling on the issue of Korean wartime labor, had hoped McMaster’s speech would draw attention in South Korea.
However the Supreme Court ruling ordered Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal to pay compensation, and Japan–South Korea relations deteriorated rapidly.
They worsened further due to the radar-lock incident involving a South Korean naval vessel and a Japanese Self-Defense Force aircraft.
Now South Korea’s business community is said to have begun avoiding regular meetings and dialogue with Japan out of fear of domestic political backlash.
South Korea’s foreign ministry has also told the U.S. State Department that it will not attend trilateral Japan–U.S.–South Korea public-private meetings.
Green points out that fear of engagement is emerging precisely at a time when like-minded diplomats and business leaders should be engaging more to overcome the worsened bilateral relationship.
Green says that there is broad consensus in the U.S. Congress and think tanks that the United States is in a strategic competition with China.
He argues that deteriorating Japan–South Korea relations only strengthen China’s arrogance by suggesting that democracies cannot jointly defend the norms and values indispensable to peace and stability in Asia.
He also notes the view that differences between Japan and South Korea amplify tensions in the U.S.–South Korea alliance, which is exactly what Beijing wants as it seeks greater hegemony in Asia.
In addition, he says there is concern in the United States that China may see South Korea, compared with Japan and Australia, as a more manageable target.
This is because China, watching South Korea’s relations with China over opposition to the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system as well as the worsening of South Korea’s relations with Japan, becomes more confident that snubbing South Korea would have no strategic impact.
Therefore the point that provocations will continue if like-minded partners cannot deter threats is correct.
Omitting the rest, Green emphasizes at the end as follows.
The harsh reality for the Moon Jae-in administration is that South Korea is not politically in a superior position in its confrontation with Japan.
From Australia to Singapore, most countries in Asia view the deterioration in Japan–South Korea relations as being caused by South Korea.
It should also be noted that former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera mentioned Green’s contribution at the House of Representatives Budget Committee on February 4.
As Onodera also pointed out, in order to win international public opinion, Japan should continue to communicate accurate information abroad effectively.