This essay, based on the testimony of former Saga University president Haruo Uehara, who gave advice and proposals to the Prime Minister’s Office immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, exposes Naoto Kan’s lack of decisiveness and how his abnormal conduct threw crisis management into confusion.
It reveals how a prime minister, who should not have been making technical judgments himself, became obsessed with details and delayed crucial decisions, thereby highlighting the grave absence of leadership in Japan.

2019-03-26
“Well now, the Japanese people really did end up with an absurd prime minister. As far as I know, is he not the worst prime minister in history.”
Then, it is said, Mr. Kan suddenly flew into a rage, shouting, “Whaaat!” and then kept ranting on and on in words that could scarcely even be recognized as Japanese.
The chapter I released on 2019-03-10 under that title has now entered the top ten in search rankings.
What follows is a continuation of the previous chapter.
A leader unable to make decisions.
“Well now, the Japanese people really did end up with an absurd prime minister. As far as I know, is he not the worst prime minister in history.”
This was the impression of Haruo Uehara, former president of Saga University, who as a specialist in reactor condensers had been giving advice and proposals to the Prime Minister’s Office from immediately after the nuclear accident occurred.
Mr. Uehara had been asked for opinions on energy policy in general by many prime ministers, from Takeo Fukuda in earlier times to, more recently, Shinzo Abe, but he is said to have been utterly appalled by Mr. Kan.
The course of events was as follows.
In response to the accident, Mr. Uehara immediately urged the Prime Minister’s Office to restore the cooling system, and he also sent drawings for the installation of an external cooling device.
On March 16, he was summoned to Tokyo by Goshi Hosono, then Special Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Integrated Headquarters for Accident Response.
He also met Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda, both in office at the time, then returned temporarily to Saga City, where his office was located, and proceeded to arrange the machinery necessary for the work.
“However, no matter how much I talked with senior officials at the Prime Minister’s Office, all they would say was, ‘The prime minister just will not make a judgment and will not decide. Since the prime minister is the final decision-maker, there is nothing we can do’,” Uehara said.
At that time, one government official lamented, “The prime minister has absolutely no grasp of the big picture. On the contrary, he obsesses over trivial details that he happens to know something about, and he is always two days late in making a decision,” and precisely that structure was unfolding.
On March 20, former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Kazuhiro Haraguchi and former Parliamentary Secretary of the Cabinet Office Hiroshi Ogushi of the Democratic Party gathered at Mr. Uehara’s office to discuss the response to the nuclear accident.
There, Mr. Haraguchi contacted Mr. Kan by mobile phone and passed the call to Mr. Uehara, and the following exchange took place.
Mr. Kan said, “I have looked through your report, but I cannot understand it technically. Where is this external cooling device to be attached. I cannot make a decision without knowing where I myself should attach it.”
Mr. Uehara replied, “That is not something the prime minister ought to be thinking about. Even if you do not understand the technical details, surely you can decide whether to do it or not.”
Then, it is said, Mr. Kan suddenly flew into a rage, shouting, “Whaaat!” and then kept ranting on and on in words that could scarcely even be recognized as Japanese.
Mr. Uehara later reflected to the writer in these words.
“I was shocked and truly frightened. I felt that if the prime minister of a country is in such a state, then the country is in danger.”
This article continues.