China’s “textbook issue” was not primarily about criticizing Japan itself, but a diplomatic card exploited within the power struggle between Deng Xiaoping and the People’s Liberation Army.
Through a dialogue involving Miyawaki Junko and Miyazaki Masahiro, this essay sharply illuminates the essence of Chinese politics, the folly of Japan’s excessive accommodation toward China, and the deeper reality of China that outlets such as The Asahi Shimbun and NHK failed to grasp.

2019-07-01
It is a pitiful story that foolish Japanese, ignorant of the power struggles within the Communist Party, showed consideration toward China through textbook censorship and the so-called neighboring countries clause, with the result that China profited even in its relations with Japan, killing two or even three birds with one stone.

This is a chapter I published on 2018-12-11 under the title, This Chapter Brilliantly Proves That Miyawaki Junko Is One of the World’s Leading Oriental Historians and a Person Who Thoroughly Understands the Essence of China.
The following is a chapter from pp. 139–140 of the book introduced in the previous chapter.
It is a chapter that brilliantly proves that Miyawaki Junko is one of the world’s leading Oriental historians and a person who thoroughly understands the essence of China.
At the same time, it instantly exposes the crudeness and low intelligence of those who call themselves journalists and speak in places such as The Asahi Shimbun and NHK.
In NHK’s case, the miserable reality is that mere highly paid employees put on the face of journalists and serve as anchors of news programs.
There are very few essays that have so brilliantly made clear how, in the postwar era, they have continued to damage Japan’s national interests to an unbelievable degree…and have continued to side with China and the Korean Peninsula.
The Hidden Struggle Between Deng Xiaoping and the Military Behind the “Textbook Issue”
Miyawaki
By the way, what about control of the military.
Isn’t that a path where “easier said than done” applies.
Even Deng Xiaoping did not manage it so successfully.
Within China, the military is, after all, the greatest real power, isn’t it.
Miyazaki
In Deng Xiaoping’s case, he mobilized the military by waging the Sino-Vietnamese War.
Even the method of sending the units of his political enemies to the very front lines of the battlefield and getting rid of them was learned from Mao Zedong’s know-how in sending the units of his political enemies to the front lines during the Korean War.
Or rather, this is the same in all times and places, for even in the Boshin War, the domains that defected to the imperial side were placed at the very front.
Another point was the actual ability to move the military.
Miyawaki
But in order to restrain the military’s political influence, Deng Xiaoping failed in his attempt to separate the Central Military Commission from the Party and turn it into the state’s Central Military Commission.
It was just when the textbook issue arose and the Japan-bashing began, but in fact such Chinese domestic political problems lay behind the Sino-Japanese textbook issue.
In other words, because Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping’s successor, had no military career, it did not seem possible that after Deng Xiaoping’s death he could control the head of the Party’s Military Commission and take command of the People’s Liberation Army.
So Deng Xiaoping tried to transfer the Central Military Commission to the state and reorganize it into the State Central Military Commission.
If that had happened, the military would have had to obey the orders of the Premier of the State Council.
But of course the military resisted fiercely, and in order to drive the Deng Xiaoping–Hu Yaobang–Zhao Ziyang regime, which had tried to undermine the power of senior military men, into a corner, the elders of the People’s Liberation Army manipulated from behind such organs as the People’s Daily, stirring things up so that it would become a diplomatic issue that Japanese textbooks had changed the term “invasion” to “advance” (Collected Works of Okada Hidehiro 5: How to View Contemporary China, 2014, Fujiwara Shoten).
Deng Xiaoping, who until then had maintained good relations with Japan, was steadily driven into a corner, and in the end had no choice but to abandon reform of the military, agreeing instead to preserve the Central Military Commission as the supreme organ of the Party.
The moment that happened, the textbook issue disappeared from the Chinese media and abruptly came to an end.
And yet, because foolish Japanese who knew nothing of the Communist Party’s power struggles showed consideration toward China through textbook censorship and the neighboring countries clause, China profited even in its relations with Japan, making it a pitiful story of killing two or even three birds with one stone.
This was what is called “zhisang makuai,” a typical case of attacking somewhere other than the true target, and the textbook issue was used for that purpose.
Omitted below.