There Is No “Public Opinion” in China as Found in Democratic Nations: The CCP Policy Shift Behind Pro-Japanese Sentiment

Published on February 21, 2020.
This article cites an essay by Professor Tomohide Murai of Tokyo International University, published in Sankei Shimbun’s “Sound Argument” column, and examines why voices saying “Japan is a good country” have recently become more common in China.
It argues that China has no independent public opinion in the democratic sense, because mass media and the internet are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, and therefore a change in Chinese sentiment toward Japan means a change in the CCP’s policy toward Japan.

February 21, 2020
In present-day China, there is no “public opinion” of the kind that exists in democratic nations… therefore, the fact that Chinese public opinion has become favorable toward Japan means that the Chinese Communist Party’s policy toward Japan has changed.
The following is from an essay by Tomohide Murai, professor at Tokyo International University, published in today’s Sankei Shimbun “Sound Argument” column under the title “Is Japan China’s Friend or Its Scapegoat?”
Recently, voices saying “Japan is a good country” have been heard frequently from China.
In a public opinion survey five years ago by Genron NPO, 80 percent of Chinese respondents answered that they disliked Japan.
What has changed?
In present-day China, there is no “public opinion” of the kind that exists in democratic nations.
China’s mass media are under the control of the Communist Party, and the internet is also controlled.
Therefore, the fact that Chinese public opinion has become favorable toward Japan means that the Chinese Communist Party’s policy toward Japan has changed.
Mao Zedong’s Enemy Was the Kuomintang More Than Japan
The Chinese Communist Party’s policy toward Japan has changed depending on the period.
During the Mao Zedong era, from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the Communists overthrew the Kuomintang and took power, the Communist Party’s foremost enemy was the Kuomintang.
The Communist Party was presented as the representative of workers and peasants, and class struggle against corrupt landlords and capitalists was emphasized.
Also, for the Chinese Communist Party at that time, which felt strong pressure from the United States, Japan was a less serious enemy than America.
In national education as well, the civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang was the main focus, while the war of resistance against Japan was secondary.
The “Monument to Commemorate the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan,” built to commemorate victory over Japan, was rewritten as the “People’s Liberation Monument,” celebrating the victory of the revolution.
Toward the end of the Mao Zedong era, the Communist Party’s policy toward Japan changed.
The most important policy during this period was the unification of Taiwan, but the Communist Party shifted the emphasis of its Taiwan policy from unification by force to peaceful unification, and began to seek a third united front with the Kuomintang.
In order to promote cooperation with the Kuomintang, the Communist Party tried to create a common enemy.
The Communist Party came to emphasize research on the war of resistance against Japan by making Japan the common enemy, and the “Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” was built in Beijing and Nanjing.
In addition, textbook descriptions concerning the Sino-Japanese War, which had emphasized the “great defeat of the Kuomintang,” were revised to emphasize the “atrocities of the Japanese invading army.”
However, during this period, conflict with the Soviet Union over the legitimacy of communism intensified, and “Soviet hegemonism” became a major threat to China.
Therefore, China attempted to draw Japan into the anti-Soviet camp, and came to restrain its criticism of Japan.
Also, as the capitalist transformation of the economy advanced in the 1980s, expectations for Japanese economic assistance grew, and as a result, criticism of Japan was restrained, and commemorative events on September 18, the Manchurian Incident, and July 7, the Sino-Japanese War, ceased to be held.
This essay continues.

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