Based on an article by Sankei Shimbun editorial writer Masafumi Miyamoto, this essay examines the acquisition of forests, farmland, tourist sites, and resort facilities in Hokkaido by Chinese capital.
Through cases such as Rusutsu Village, the Niseko area, and Toyonuka in Biratori Town, it warns that these purchases may not be mere investment, but part of a long-term Chinese Communist Party strategy to create settlement zones in Japan.

March 11, 2020
With one objective in mind, China has been targeting Okinawa for twenty-five years and Hokkaido for twenty years.
For the sake of immigration, it will continue to buy up more and more land in Hokkaido.
The following is from an outstanding article by Masafumi Miyamoto, editorial writer of the Sankei Shimbun, published in the monthly magazine Seiron released on March 1, under the title “The ‘Settlement Zone’ China Is Plotting in Hokkaido.”
It is also one reason why there are many cases of Wuhan pneumonia in Hokkaido.
In mid-January this year, when the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office was investigating a corruption case involving an integrated resort, or IR, project that included a casino, I received a call from a man I know who is well informed about China.
“In reality, more than two billion yen moved as operational funds. It must have been scattered around Nagatacho.”
And he continued as follows.
“Entry into IR is only a pretext. The true aim of Chinese capital is to secure a settlement zone inside Hokkaido. The Communist Party is behind it. Everything is going according to plan.”
He is one of the people who has cooperated with me through information and analysis ever since I began investigating the actual state of national land purchases by foreign capital, especially Chinese capital.
However, there is no evidence to support his testimony.
For a moment, I had doubts.
But then I thought, “It is possible.”
When I checked the “settlement zone” testimony with a real estate operator in Hokkaido, another source who has cooperated with my reporting, this answer came back.
“Chinese capital was trying to pour in about 170 billion yen to build hotels, condominiums, schools, hospitals, and a runway for private jets in Rusutsu Village, and to create a Chinese settlement. I have heard that the plan had existed for about three years under the instruction of the Communist Party. At first, there was no talk of a casino.”
The “settlement zone” testimony was not false.
No brakes on acquisitions.
There was a reason I felt that it was “possible.”
I began reporting on the acquisition of national land by foreign capital in 2008.
The trigger was that, in the previous year, 2007, land adjacent to the headquarters of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Tsushima Defense Unit, located on Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture, had been purchased by South Korean capital.
Since then, I have visited Tsushima more than ten times and have kept a close watch on the relationship between South Korean capital and Tsushima.
At the same time, I have visited border islands such as Okinawa, Sado in Niigata Prefecture, the Goto Islands in Nagasaki Prefecture, Rebun and Rishiri in Hokkaido, and Tanegashima in Kagoshima Prefecture, and reported on the state of real estate purchases by foreign capital.
In our country, real estate purchases by foreign capital are not regulated.
Moreover, the subsequent state of the areas purchased is not investigated in detail, and the actual state of the acquisitions themselves is not accurately grasped.
It is a problem in itself that farmland, forests, tourist sites, and other land are purchased by foreign capital.
But leaving such purchases unattended, with no follow-up on how the land is used afterward, is also not the conduct of a sovereign state.
From the standpoint of those making the purchases, there could be no more convenient shopping.
I have been observing Hokkaido from fixed points for four years.
Looking at the foreign capital that has purchased real estate in Hokkaido, Chinese capital, or capital behind which the shadow of China can be seen, stands out overwhelmingly.
For that reason, while paying attention to the movements of Chinese capital in Hokkaido, I have continued fixed-point observations of forests, golf courses, farmland, land for solar power plants, tourist sites, and other places already purchased.
Since 2012, Hokkaido has investigated and published the state of forest acquisitions by foreign capital and others every year.
Looking at the period from January to December 2018, forests purchased by foreign capital, meaning companies and individuals located overseas, totaled 21 cases and 108 hectares.
That is equivalent to about 30 Tokyo Domes.
Breaking it down, China, including Hong Kong and Macao, ranked first with 11 cases and about 91 hectares.
That is equivalent to about 20 Tokyo Domes.
In addition, purchases by companies located in Japan in which foreign capital accounts for 50 percent or more of the capital, such as subsidiaries of foreign corporations, totaled 7 cases and 58 hectares.
That is equivalent to about 13 Tokyo Domes, and again China ranked first with 2 cases and 3.5 hectares.
That is equivalent to about one Tokyo Dome.
When forest purchases by foreign capital and others are combined with purchases by companies located in Japan but controlled by foreign capital, the total reaches 28 cases and 166 hectares.
That is equivalent to about 36 Tokyo Domes.
Capital from Canada, Thailand, Australia, and other countries can also be seen.
However, Chinese capital or China-related capital accounted for 13 cases and 94.64 hectares.
At the equivalent of 21 Tokyo Domes, it was the largest share and accounted for 57 percent of the total.
Singapore-related capital accounted for 2 cases and 49 hectares, equivalent to about 11 Tokyo Domes, but together with China it reaches 86 percent.
The stated purposes of purchase are mainly “construction of solar power plants” and “holding of assets.”
However, in the case of Chinese capital and China-related capital, four cases were “unknown” or “undecided.”
In our country, once a sales contract is concluded and ownership is transferred, how the land is used and how it is developed are entirely up to the owner.
Even though the land is inside Japan, no one can even object to what kind of development is carried out or how it is used.
The structure is such that foreign capital can freely purchase real estate regardless of purpose and can use it freely.
Purchases from overseas continued to increase, and from 2006 to 2018 they swelled to a cumulative 2,725 hectares in 38 municipalities.
That is equivalent to about 580 Tokyo Domes.
Eighty to ninety percent of it is Chinese capital.
However, this figure is limited to forests related to water sources.
Because it does not cover all real estate, including farmland and golf courses, the actual area purchased is unknown.
Looking at the acquisition method of Chinese capital, it spreads radially from the international resort area of Niseko and its surroundings.
Moreover, there are places where the scale of acquisition is large, in units of 100 hectares, and it feels as if purchases are being advanced with all of Hokkaido in view.
Putting together the accounts of people involved in real estate, some point out that the actual purchased area may be “one digit larger.”
A purchased town.
When one visits the same places repeatedly and continues fixed-point observation, one notices unnaturalness and change.
Amid the fierce real estate purchases by Chinese capital in Hokkaido, what I am watching closely is Toyonuka in Biratori Town, Saru District, where a village was almost entirely purchased by an agricultural production corporation said to have ties with China.
Biratori Town is also known for the legend of Yoshitsune, but the Toyonuka district is located at the western foot of Mount Poroshiri, at an elevation of about 250 meters.
At the time of purchase, the population was only 25, and it was a settlement far removed from human habitation.
In winter, the snow is deep, and it becomes an isolated island on land.
The Toyonuka district was purchased in 2011.
An agricultural production corporation, a subsidiary of Company A, which franchises business-use supermarkets nationwide, purchased 123.3754 hectares, or 56 percent, of the 219.4092 hectares of farmland.
From early March 2016, five years after the purchase, until the summer of 2019, I visited several times.
But weeds such as tall goldenrod were growing, and there was no sign of maintenance.
Uncultivated land, producing neither crops nor pasture grass, continued as far as the eye could see.
This was even though eight years had passed since the purchase.
Moreover, as I continued reporting, I noticed one pattern in the way the agricultural production corporation made its purchases.
One resident said the following.
“If you look at the way the farmland was purchased, for example, when there were three plots of farmland side by side, they bought the one in the middle, or they bought the two on the left and right. They did not buy all three, but bought them as scattered parcels. In the end, it is the same as buying all of them. It is a method that reminds one of go or Othello-like games. In the case of forests, if they buy the edges, then to enter the forest one must get permission from the production corporation that owns the field, so it is virtually the same as having bought the whole thing. They have not once come to buy more after the acquisition, because there is no need to buy more. No buyer will appear for the remaining half of farmland when the other half has been purchased. It is an efficient way of buying, and in effect it is the same as having purchased everything.”
“It is a place where neither trailers nor large vehicles can enter. If it were me, I would not pay a large sum of money to buy it.”
It is a remote mountain area where the road conditions cannot be called good, as both local elders and residents say in unison.
Why did the agricultural production corporation purchase almost the entire settlement?
And why according to a certain pattern?
Furthermore, why does it leave the purchased farmland as wasteland or uncultivated land?
The questions never cease.
A local resident explained my doubts as follows.
“If farmland is left as wasteland for years, trees naturally begin to grow. Then an application can be made to the agricultural committee to change the land category to ‘miscellaneous land.’ If it is farmland, there are restrictions and it cannot be freely bought and sold, but if the land category is changed to ‘miscellaneous land,’ it can be freely bought and sold, and houses or factories can be built.”
Furthermore, the resident hypothesizes that the aim is to change the land category, saying that “a person connected to the parent company of the agricultural production corporation sits on the agricultural committee that decides land category changes.”
When I explained the current situation to the agricultural committee, it acknowledged that the land was in an uncultivated state, saying, “From what we can see, no work is being done.”
On top of that, it said, “We have notified the agricultural production corporation to manage the land, but the local residents are aging and cannot do the work. As the agricultural committee, we cannot touch it, so we have no choice but to leave it to the production corporation.”
Regarding an application to change the land category, it was evasive, saying, “It has not yet been submitted.”
If I am overthinking this, nothing would be better.
But as I continued reporting, I became skeptical that there might be some special purpose behind this acquisition.
One resident of Biratori Town says the following.
“In Toyonuka, aging and depopulation are advancing, and there are only about 12 households and 23 people. If the residents disappear, considering how completely the land has been secured, it would not be surprising if it became the domain of Chinese capital.”
When I asked a China commentator with whom I have long had exchanges about the Toyonuka case, he said the following.
“It is better to think that behind Chinese companies operating overseas stands the Chinese Communist Party. The same can be said of Japanese companies connected to China.”
On top of that, he said the following.
“With one objective in mind, China has been targeting Okinawa for twenty-five years and Hokkaido for twenty years. For the sake of immigration, it will continue to buy up more and more land in Hokkaido. At water sources and on farmland, crops can be grown, so it is possible to create independent settlements or autonomous districts, and to install hospitals and offices for military use. Toyonuka is a rural area and also a water source, so if people wanted to live self-sufficiently, they could do so as much as they wished. Moreover, because it is a remote mountainous area with little exchange with other regions, what is going on inside cannot be known. If they wanted to create a closed society, like an autonomous district, into which no one could freely enter, they could do so easily. It can be considered a test case.”
The case of Toyonuka is only one example.
When one travels around Hokkaido, one encounters scenes that make one wonder why such vast places have been bought up.
A real estate operator in Hokkaido, noting that Chinese capital has been buying tourist sites and lodging facilities one after another, said the following, prefacing it as “speculation.”
“Tourist sites that are not prospering, aging buildings, condominiums, and the like are being purchased. If such real estate is secured, the moment the Chinese government declares an emergency, all of the purchased places could become barracks for the Chinese Communist Party army or destinations for relocation. If they are made available for China to use in an emergency, then there is meaning in purchasing them. This can already be called a takeover.”
In 1993, Chinese Premier Li Peng is said to have told Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, “The country called Japan may no longer exist in forty years.”
This “Li Peng statement” was also reported in the Japanese Diet, and if it were to come true as stated, Japan would disappear in 2033.
Another China watcher also warned, “In some media, it is said that Hokkaido will become China’s 32nd province in ten years.”
I heard this testimony two years ago, so ten years later would mean 2027.
I think you can now understand why I nodded at the testimony introduced at the beginning, that “preparations for a settlement zone” lie behind the IR corruption case.
Even looking only at objective facts, one can imagine that preparations are steadily advancing toward the construction of a settlement zone.
This essay continues.