September 8, 2016
This essay introduces a front-page column by Yoshiko Sakurai in the September 5 issue of the Sankei Shimbun, titled “Urgently Reform the Self-Defense Forces.”
Confronting China’s rapid military expansion and a fundamental shift in American strategy, the column argues that Japan is facing its greatest security crisis of the postwar era and must urgently reform the Self-Defense Forces.
It is the analysis of a true realist, one that all Japanese citizens—and, of course, the American people as well—should heed carefully.
The following is a column by Yoshiko Sakurai, published on the front page of the September 5 issue of the Sankei Shimbun under the title “Urgently Reform the Self-Defense Forces.”
It is a realist analysis that all Japanese citizens, and Americans as well, must heed.
After the war, Japan’s security was protected by the United States.
The Japanese people gradually came to regard this extraordinarily unusual security arrangement—one dependent upon another country—as something as natural as the air they breathed.
However, in response to China’s extraordinary military expansion, the United States has been fundamentally revising its defense strategy.
As a result, Japan is increasingly being required to assume responsibility for its own homeland defense in virtually every field other than nuclear deterrence.
This is a situation Japan has never faced before in the postwar era.
If Japan cannot respond to this profound change, it will not survive.
Yet our country has still not responded adequately.
Under these circumstances, how can Japan and the Japanese people possibly be fully protected?
One cannot help wondering whether those at the very center of government—especially those responsible for national defense—are spending sleepless nights confronting this reality.
Among those who have sounded the alarm over this unprecedented postwar crisis and the changing security environment is Kazuhito Mochida, a member of the policy proposal committee of the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies and a former Commanding General of the Ground Self-Defense Force’s Western Army.
Mochida warns that the United States has been forced to reconsider its forward posture in response to China’s A2/AD—anti-access/area-denial—capabilities, which are designed to prevent or obstruct the forward deployment and operation of U.S. forces.
Until now, Japanese defense planning had been based on the assumption that if China advanced toward the First Island Chain, U.S. aircraft carriers and other forces would rapidly move into the region, the U.S. military would take the initiative in confronting China, and American forces would possess the capability to strike targets on the Chinese mainland.
This way of thinking was associated with what was known as the U.S. AirSea Battle concept.
AirSea Battle was conceived as an approach for overcoming an adversary’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities through the integration of U.S. air, naval, and other military forces.
Within the analysis presented here, U.S. nuclear deterrence would remain effective, while conventional military forces would preserve the balance, deter escalation, and, if conflict occurred, seek to exhaust China’s ability to continue fighting over a prolonged period.
By contrast, China was understood to be preparing for what American military analysts described as a “short, sharp war”—a short-duration, high-intensity conflict in which non-nuclear military power would be concentrated to achieve a rapid and decisive victory in a limited theater.
Mochida’s warning was that, in a crisis involving signs of large-scale Chinese missile attacks, U.S. carriers and other naval and air assets could be compelled to operate farther east, beyond the most dangerous range of China’s A2/AD systems.
If that occurred, Japan could find itself confronting the immediate threat at the front line.
If that is the case, it is obvious that Japan’s entire defense posture must be fundamentally reconsidered.
The Self-Defense Forces suffer from serious shortages in both equipment and personnel.
Furthermore, the Constitution, the Self-Defense Forces Law, and Japan’s long-established policy of exclusively defense-oriented defense have imposed severe restrictions on the actions and capabilities available to the Self-Defense Forces.
The United States may envisage a conflict around the First Island Chain as one that could continue for an extended period.
But the countries and territories situated along that front line include Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
Leaving the other two aside for the moment, does Japan itself possess the strength and resilience necessary to endure a prolonged conflict?
According to a public opinion survey cited by the weekly magazine AERA, 30 percent of Japanese men and more than 50 percent of Japanese women said that they would not support even a war fought in self-defense.
Under such circumstances, can the Self-Defense Forces, operating under severe legal, political, material, and personnel constraints, fully defend the First Island Chain?
If they cannot, Japan could ultimately find itself overwhelmed by Chinese military power.
At a time when such a nightmare could become reality, it is the duty of the government to sound the alarm repeatedly and explain the seriousness of the crisis to the Japanese people.
As for what Japan might face if it were ever brought under Chinese military domination, the tragedies suffered elsewhere in Asia should not be forgotten.
The column points to historical examples involving Mongolia and Tibet as warnings of how one people brought under political and military control can be used against another.
If Japan were ever subdued, the danger would be that even the Self-Defense Forces could ultimately be compelled to serve the strategic purposes of the power that had defeated Japan.
Such an outcome would be a tragedy.
To be continued.