August 19, 2026
Exclusive: Did China Conduct an Operation to Damage an Undersea Cable Near a Taiwanese Outlying Island? Two Vessels Involved Had Previously Participated in “Maritime Militia” Training
At the end of March, a Chinese work vessel damaged an undersea cable inside a bay on Dongyin Island in Taiwan’s Matsu Islands.
It has been learned that at least two of the four Chinese vessels involved had previously participated in maritime militia training.
It was also established that the four vessels had followed unusual routes.
This has raised the possibility that the incident was not an accident but a gray-zone operation intended to inflict damage on Taiwan through means falling short of an armed attack.
An Island Serving as a Military Base Against China
Dongyin Island, Taiwan’s northernmost territory, serves as a military base where Taiwan’s armed forces operate an early-warning radar system for monitoring China’s coastal region, as well as missile facilities.
According to Taiwanese authorities, late at night on March 30, the large Chinese work vessel Hai Hong Gong 66 was attempting to remove the Chinese fishing vessel Min Lian Yu 63896, from Fujian Province, which had run aground inside a bay on Dongyin Island, when it damaged the nearby Taiwan–Matsu No. 3 undersea cable.
Prosecutors detained and questioned the captain on suspicion of violating the Telecommunications Management Act through intentional conduct or negligence.
They subsequently determined that it would be difficult to establish criminal responsibility and decided not to indict him on July 11.
Chunghwa Telecom, which manages the undersea cable, objected to the decision and requested a review.
The Chinese fishing vessel’s representatives told Taiwanese authorities that Min Lian Yu 63896 had suffered a mechanical failure and begun taking on water off Dongyin Island.
They claimed that after its crew was rescued by another Chinese fishing vessel, the unmanned vessel drifted ashore on Dongyin Island.
Vessels Moved After Disabling Identification Signals
Meanwhile, based on data obtained from the American geospatial analysis company IngeniSpace and other information, Sankei Shimbun confirmed that both the stranded fishing vessel and the “rescue” vessel Min Lian Yu 68999 had previously participated in training conducted by China’s maritime militia.
The two vessels had also operated in waters surrounding a Chinese mobile drilling vessel, or rig, positioned near the Japan–China median line in the East China Sea.
The Chinese fishing vessels exhibited suspicious behavior before the grounding.
According to a route map prepared by IngeniSpace using Automatic Identification System data and other information, Min Lian Yu 63896 is believed to have transmitted a distress signal northeast of Dongyin Island at around 4:50 a.m. on March 20.
At around 6:00 a.m., it disabled its AIS at a point farther north and changed course from northward to southwestward.
Min Lian Yu 68999, which appeared to have been sailing south in response to the distress signal, also disabled its AIS and similarly changed course toward the southwest.
However, instead of immediately conducting a rescue operation, the two vessels made the suspicious movement of traveling approximately 50 kilometers toward Dongyin Island while keeping their AIS devices switched off.
At around 2:00 p.m., when they had approached to within approximately 300 meters of each other, both vessels reactivated their AIS.
At 3:00 p.m., another Chinese fishing vessel, Min Lian Yu 61986, which had sailed northward, appeared nearby.
At 3:30 p.m., the fishing vessel that later ran aground disabled its AIS again, while the other two vessels apparently left the area.
It is believed that the crew “rescue” claimed by the Chinese side had been completed by this point.
Min Lian Yu 63896 subsequently “drifted” in a straight line toward the undersea cable landing facility on Dongyin Island.
At around 2:30 a.m. the following day, it ran aground almost directly above the cable.
The possibility that someone remained aboard and operated the vessel cannot be ruled out.
Testing Taiwan’s Response Capabilities?
Hai Hong Gong 66 also followed an unnatural route.
After departing from waters off Fujian Province early on March 30, it made an unusually long detour, including twice entering waters where unauthorized Chinese vessels are restricted or prohibited from entering.
The sequence of movements by the Chinese vessels may have been intended to test Taiwan’s response and intelligence capabilities.
Meanwhile, there is no indication that Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, the equivalent of a coast guard service, or other Taiwanese authorities had understood the backgrounds of the Chinese vessels.
Jason Wang, chief operating officer of IngeniSpace, stated: “As Taiwan confronts irregular warfare conducted by China, its Coast Guard Administration is being required to assume a greater role in national security. Time, training, and continued support are necessary, but the time remaining is extremely limited.”
By Ryo Nishiyama, Makiko Takita, and Yoshiaki Nishimi in Taipei