Taniguchi Tomohiko, former advisor to PM Abe, delivers a piercing analysis of the Japanese Left’s ideology and its hidden influence behind the LDP’s collapse in the 2025 election.
A must-read essay by Taniguchi exposes how the Left’s anti-national reflexes and pro-China sympathies have eroded Japan’s political foundations.
This article reveals why Japan’s LDP has crumbled—from Kishida’s missteps to the rise of left-leaning factions within.

Taniguchi’s Warning: The Japanese Left’s Disdain for Nation, Tradition, and Sovereignty

What Lies Beyond the Collapse of Japan’s “Big Tent Party” — LDP at the End of Its 70-Year Arc
By Tomohiko Taniguchi, Special Advisor at Fujitsu FSC, former Special Advisor to the Cabinet under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

The Liberal Democratic Party has long been a big tent—one that could accommodate almost anything under its canopy. Right or left, all were welcomed. But the tent was held up by a single conservative pillar, which, in recent years, was supported with both arms by the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

70 Years Since Its Founding: The Beginning of the End
At that time, the tent rose high and was clearly visible to the world. Then Abe was gone. Though guy-wires extended from the central pillar to the ground, Kishida Fumio, the previous prime minister, tore them all out. If he truly believed the structure would still stand, then his shortsightedness is beyond comprehension. In fact, we heard it collapse on July 20th with the results of the Upper House election—a loud tearing of canvas as the whole structure came down.
The party was founded exactly 70 years ago. At a time when academics and cultural figures fell helplessly to Soviet influence, the LDP alone stood firm on anti-communism. Despite criticism, it maintained the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance thanks to the fierce efforts of Nobusuke Kishi. If anyone scoffs at Japan’s democracy because the ruling party never changes, remind them: there was no viable alternative.
So long as one pledged to uphold private property rights and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the party accepted all else, becoming a true big tent. Buoyed by high economic growth, it rushed to expand welfare, reaching out to the left, absorbing and neutralizing political confrontation itself.
An era emerged when all parties called for more welfare and locked away disturbing wartime memories in a metaphorical box. Superficially or not, everyone was, in essence, an LDP member.
It was a time of naive belief that the communist dictatorship next door would never grow into a superpower nor disrupt world order with unprecedented military expansion.
Abe and his allies, who sought to open that sealed box and guide Japan toward self-respect and self-defense, were cast out just when their time had come. And so, it became the beginning of the end for the LDP.

After the Tent Collapsed
With the canopy gone, the left-right divide appears sharper than ever.
Unlike in the U.S., in Japan the scale or reach of government does not define ideological lines. In a country like Japan—where welfare spending rivals the U.S. military budget—calls for small government are untenable.
Thus, Japanese conservatism is best described as royalist and monarchist, or more broadly, traditionalist. The first two terms emphasize preserving the Imperial line.
The Imperial Family, through millennia of continuity, exists today as a rare thread of human history. A traditionalist sees value in what has long endured, recognizing the countless, nameless sacrifices behind it.
Japan is filled with shrines, temples, customs, and traditions preserved over centuries. The traditionalist recoils at the violence of sudden forces—rebranded as tourism—trampling these legacies.
The Sanseito party captured that sentiment through its slightly provocative phrase: “Japan First.”
Unlike before, the left no longer rejects capitalism or the U.S.-Japan alliance outright. But it still reacts with visceral disgust at the sight of the Hinomaru flag, and singing “Kimigayo” seems to shatter something inside them.

Who Will Show Us the Way Forward?
They regard their Japanese identity with detachment—never with pride.
Eventually, anything national becomes an object of hatred.
For the left, immigration is welcome, as it dilutes or distorts Japanese values.
Soon, they will likely advocate automatic citizenship for anyone born on Japanese soil.
One can also infer why the left is increasingly anti-Israel: a nation that arms itself to survive, surrounded by enemies, is nationalistic in the extreme—and thus repugnant to them.
Conversely, they remain mostly silent toward China’s aggressive militarization.
Confronting it seriously would require them to embrace national identity—something they abhor.
Elements we now call “left” have long existed within the LDP itself.
The recent election pushed many conservatives into the proportional vote and out of office, leaving power in the hands of the party’s internal left wing.
Now, as conservatives exit or are forced out, where will the LDP—that big-tent party without a canopy—go next?
The static state that once existed in Japanese politics is no more.
Everything is fluid.
Unless leaders arise, one by one, to declare clearly, “This is the way forward,” voter dissatisfaction will only grow.
And dissatisfaction, when left to fester, invites instability.

(Tomohiko Taniguchi)